Conceptual Marketing Corporation - EUROPEPETROFILM.COMNEWS CULTURE TECHNOLOGY NATO DEFENSE Oslo, May 2022 EMPATHY RESPECT DIGNITYANALYSIS, INFORMATIONS FROM A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE طلاعات تجزیه و تحلیل از یک چشم انداز اروپاییعزت احترام به همدلی یکپارچه سازیتجزیه و تحلیل ، اطلاعات از یک چشم انداز اروپاییEMPATHIE RESPECTEER WAARDIGHEIDANALYSE, INFORMATIE VANUIT EEN EUROPEES PERSPECTIEFEMPATHIE RESPECT DIGNITÉANALYSE, INFORMATIONS D'UNE PERSPECTIVE EUROPÉENNE EMPATÍA RESPETO DIGNIDADANÁLISIS, INFORMACIONES CON PERSPECTIVA DE EUROPAСОБСТВЕННОСТЬ УВАЖЕНИЕ ДОСТОИНСТВА АНАЛИЗ ИНФОРМАЦИИ С ПЕРСПЕКТИВЫ ИЗ ЕВРОПЫ 誠信尊重尊嚴分析，來自歐洲的信息 Welcome!Herzlich willkommen! Bienvenido! добро пожаловать! ようこそ! Bienvenue! 歡迎 أهلا بك The Grand European Plain It stretches from the Pyrenees Mountains and the French coast of the Bay of Biscay in the West to the Russian Ural Mountains in the East.EUROPE ЕВРОПА603.8 Million people - 603,8 миллиона человек - 6.038億人歐洲 اروپا CLICK MAP PLAY EUROPEAN ANTHEMCLICK FLAG PLAY EUROPEAN UNIONThe European Union: 445 MillionCLICK EFTA LOGO FOR VIDEOThe European Free Trade Association EFTA: 13.6 MillionCLICK FLAG FOR RUSSIA BELARUSThe Russian Federation West of Ural: 101.6 Million CLICK FLAG FOR BREXIT VIDEOThe United Kingdom: 66.6 Million CLICK HERE ORE RESOURCE CENTER BELOWTHE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY EUROPEPETROFILM.COMEMPATHY RESPECT DIGNITYEUROPE ЕВРОПАHelmut KohlCHANCELLOR OF GERMANY'S UNITY AND THE EURO Click picture Play videoHelmut Kohl was the Chancellor who voted for the Euro, created dialogue and common ground with Russa and united Germany together with Mikhail Gorbachev. Kohl was a German statesman who served as Chancellor of Germany from 1982 to 1998 and as the chairman of the Christian Democratic Union from 1973 to 1998. From 1969 to 1976, Kohl was minister president of the state Rhineland-Palatinate. Kohl chaired the Group of Seven in 1985 and again in 1992. ANALYSIS INTERPRETATION FROM A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVEPETROFILM.COMInstitute for Empathic Dialogue Creation and Conflict ResolutionHarald Dahle-SladekFounder and Editor-in-chiefОснователь и главный редакторبنیانگذار و مدیرمسئول創始人兼主編 Want a larger picture? Press Ctrl + scroll wheel.Хотите большую картинку? Нажмите Ctrl + колесо прокрутки.想要更大的圖片？按 Ctrl + 滾輪中文版太空中的中國我們衷心祝賀中國在航天航空領域取得的巨大成就。中華古文明驕傲人的全部潛力，如今已為世人所欽佩。我們預測中華人民共和國將首次登陸火星。 Petrofilm.com 的主編 Harald Dahle-Sladek 在美國太空飛行器 Gemini 10 內拍攝電視紀錄片《Space 1989 歐洲的未來》。我們必須與中華人民共和國建立對話和共同點。中國絕不能孤立。那會導致戰爭他們在國家內部建立了一個國家。他們自己宣稱自己凌駕於法律之上，同時繼續騷擾和破壞許多人的生命。在他們遵守法律的門面的背後，他們將自己的人民賣給了外國勢力。這些人喜歡被抬頭仰望，帶著令人難以置信的虛榮心雜亂無章地走來走去。這些人通過邀請外國軍隊和熱核武器將許多人的生命置於極大的危險之中，這些人被帶到了挪威的土地上。歷史將評判這些叛徒。中國的法律權利法治是中國的基石。祖國擁有在其自己的領土後院香港實施法律和秩序的合法權利。無需徵得任何其他國家的許可。在西方，這既不是很好理解也不是很受歡迎。西方在民主和“權利”方面天真爛漫的言論常常被表現為政治壓迫，並被用作宣傳。香港是祖國；只有一個。 CHINA’S LEGAL RIGHTLaw and order are the corner stone of China. The Motherland has legal right to impose law and order in it’s own territorial backyard, Hong Kong. Without having to ask any other country of permission. In the West, this is neither not very well understood nor liked. Western naivete spun in terms of democracy and “rights” are often presented as political oppression and used as propaganda. Hong Kong is the Motherland; and there is only one. 親愛的讀者們。總編輯的真誠意見是，最好是在同情，尊重和尊嚴的基礎上與俄羅斯和中國建立對話與共同點，而不是加劇緊張局勢並冒著核對峙的危險。由於這個簡單的原因，除了英語以外，petrofilm.com還被部分翻譯成俄文和中文。在這種情況下，俄羅斯意味著俄羅斯人居住在歐洲大平原上烏拉爾山脈以西的歐洲一側。謝謝您的理解，祝您有美好的一天。騷擾和破壞許多人的生活挪威的秘密警察在本州內作為一個州運作戰爭還沒有結束。 1945年結束的戰爭一直持續到今天。挪威秘密警察的目標對像是秘密警察，奧斯陸司法部和其他部門的作家，記者和反對違法行為並無視人權的人。挪威警察和卑鄙的人在為美國大使館的SIMAS計劃監視自己的居民時違反了第90條的規定。完全無視人權違反了§90，間諜段落，挪威法律，《歐盟基本權利憲章》和《聯合國人權》這位無法無天的秘密警察滲透了天主教堂，使教會對自己教會的成員發動攻擊。秘密警察在商店，工作場所的人中散佈虛假謠言，以無視和排斥國家敵人。竊聽手機並使用獲得的信息進一步使生活變得更具破壞性。從航空公司獲取飛行數據以進行跟踪和進一步騷擾。關注國外人士。在西班牙和其他國家開展活動，以鎮壓反對派。在奧斯陸的街道上激怒人們，向他們走去，在商店的門口封鎖入口，到達人們的工作場所以招惹麻煩，從而將人們開除。他們使用廉價策略，散佈同性戀和其他偏見的謠言，以進一步抹黑人們。他們拜訪目標的鄰居，並告訴他們這個人是壞人。他們盡一切可能破壞任何有反對自己意見的人的生活。特別是那些將與俄羅斯對話而不是戰爭的人。您將目光投向當今挪威的東方，您的生活就好壞了。秘密警察可以與無數與他們合作的人接觸。他們通過人民工作，因此其行為的印記不明顯。真理，人權和正義的叛徒。挪威的秘密警察：“事實就是我們所說的” 戰爭結束後的挪威納粹警察已經消失，但邪惡的實質核心卻沒有消失。這就是今天的挪威，與沃爾特·烏爾布里希特（Walter Ulbricht）領導下的東德民主共和國復員，斯大林（Satlin）統治下的生活以及克羅地亞（Ante Pavelic）統治下的克羅地亞處於同一水平。挪威有一個光輝的民主國家-獨裁政權的獨裁統治，侵蝕著人民的真正繁榮和真正人權，並在一個國家內部作為一個國家運作。 Petrofilm.com擁有大量有關“秘密國家”運作的證據。這不是玩笑或幻想，它是真實的。今天的挪威魁斯林（Quslings）賣光了挪威的人口，摧毀了反對派。當我們與人類有關時，會特別想到三個詞：同理心，尊重和尊嚴。您將在此處閱讀和觀看的是這三個詞的反義詞，並結合了一個常見的口號“法西斯主義”。法西斯主義的種子存在於我們內部，在一般公眾中，它在一個有魅力的法西斯領袖領導下，在適當的時候出現在這裡。在我自己與人打交道和進行一般對話的工作中，我發現我們中的許多人無法以溫暖，同情和人性的眼光看待另一個人。我認為這種缺陷是造成不和諧，衝突和戰爭的幾個主要原因之一。我稱這種現象為人與人之間的冷漠。另請參閱中文文件夾中的中文文本主編相信與中國建立良好的雙邊關係和持久和平符合人類的利益。各國和人民必須放眼長遠，共同努力。 Translation: The Editor-in-chief believes that establishing good bilateral relations and lasting peace with China is in the interests of Mankind. Countries and people must take a long-term view and work together. 與中華人民共和國建立對話與共同點親愛的讀者們。總編輯的真誠意見是，最好是在同情，尊重和尊嚴的基礎上與俄羅斯和中國建立對話與共同點，而不是加劇緊張局勢並冒著核對峙的危險。由於這個簡單的原因，除了英語以外，petrofilm.com還被部分翻譯成俄文和中文。在這種情況下，俄羅斯意味著俄羅斯人居住在歐洲大平原上烏拉爾山脈以西的歐洲一側。謝謝您的理解，祝您有美好的一天。潛艇與英國的 F-35核威懾力量先鋒級是為皇家海軍服務的英國核動力彈道潛艇。每艘潛艇最多配備16枚UGM-133 Trident II導彈。該類是1994年引入的三叉戟核計劃的一部分。該班級包括四艘潛艇：先鋒，維克托里烏斯，警惕和復仇。它們是由Vickers Shipbuilding and Engineering在1986年至1999年在Barrow-Furness建造的，現在由BAE Systems擁有。這些潛艇位於蘇格蘭格拉斯哥以西的HM海軍基地克萊德。英國的核威懾態勢英國逐漸鞏固了其核力量，因此僅保留了海上戰略威懾成分。英國的獨立核威懾力量通常被稱為“三叉戟”，它由三個主要要素組成：“先鋒”級潛艇是運載“三叉戟”彈道導彈的平台。四艘“先鋒”級潛艇（SSBN）保持連續的海上威懾（CASD），這意味著一艘船始終配備三叉戟導彈進行巡邏。該級從1992年開始服役，並將繼續服役至2030年代。如果英國要維持CASD，一旦潛艇達到使用壽命，則需要使用新型的SSBN來取代Vanguard。這種導彈的射程超過4000海裡，是英國核彈頭的運載工具。根據1998年戰略防禦評論（SDR）和2010年戰略防禦與安全評論（SDSR）的限制，現在每艘Vanguard潛艇只能部署8枚作戰導彈和不超過40枚核彈頭。英國的核彈頭庫存。建立和維護英國核儲存的基礎設施位於伯克郡的兩個原子武器設施（AWE）站點2引言有報導稱，影子國防部長埃米莉·桑伯里（Emily Thornberry）審查了勞方國防計劃，考慮以機載系統取代英國目前的潛艇核威懾方案。1該計劃將看到取消先鋒繼任者潛艇計劃，從而終止英國的潛艇計劃。當前的持續海上威懾（CASD）姿態。作為替代方案，將開發一種基於自由落體核彈的能力，這是英國在1950年代和1960年代最後一次使用的一種威懾手段，這項政策建議最初是在2015年大選之前為智庫CentreForum起草的。分析師兼前皇家空軍情報部門儲備人員托比·芬威克（Toby Fenwick）。23芬威克先生是自由民主黨的成員，是該黨的“三叉戟政策工作組”成員。4根據該計劃，英國的洛克希德·馬丁公司F-35輕型II多用途戰鬥機的未來機隊正在採購國防部將進行“雙重使用”，以交付B61-12制導核炸彈。有人提出這架飛機不能提供全天候的能力，但是一旦發生危機，它可能會迅速動員。有關英國的CASDposture可以被機載核力量取代的建議對裁軍，能力，歐洲有嚴重影響。威懾力和成本增加，需要仔細檢查3對基於F-35的核威懾提案裁軍的批評摘要批評者認為，利用“雙重用途”飛機進行任何形式的核共享都違反了《核不擴散條約》（NPT）的第一條。根據托比·芬威克（Toby Fenwick）的提議，意大利是《不擴散核武器條約》規定的無核國家，仍將是北約核共享安排的一部分。可以看到，B61-12型熱核精密自由落體重力炸彈安裝在F-15E攻擊鷹的塔架建議將B61-12炸彈的準確性，低產量和對地面穿透能力相結合，使其成為北約核武庫中最有用的核彈。如果英國要開發托比·芬威克（Toby Fenwick）設想的新功能，那將意味著開始一項測試計劃。這不僅會很昂貴，而且很可能違反《核禁試條約》。有人爭辯說，只有將北約飛機交付的戰術核武器完全從歐洲撤走，並僅憑歐洲對戰略核力量的威懾力量，才能為華盛頓和莫斯科創造必要的政治環境，以減少俄羅斯自己的戰術核武器。能力基於F-35的核力量將無法達到對敵對國家造成不可接受的損害所必需的全部目標，因此不會取得可信的威懾力。空軍基地和航空母艦容易受到核打擊和常規的先發製人打擊以及恐怖主義。與當前的“三叉戟” II彈道導彈相比，飛機在空中時更容易受到地空導彈的攻擊。在危機期間，基於飛機的系統將需要進行可見部署，這在任何外交危機中都有可能破壞穩定和升級的影響，因為其他國家將能夠在英國動員其核力量時發現。根據俄羅斯的核武庫現代化計劃，僅基於B61-12自由落體炸彈的英國獨立核威懾力量對有效防禦威懾未來威脅的能力將極為有限。將飛機交付的戰術核武器整合到英國和意大利這兩個國家，將進一步使北約的核威懾態勢合法化，這種態勢不適合冷戰後21世紀的安全環境。以英國為基礎的美國和英國的戰略彈道導彈系統是第二個決策中心，有助於確保東歐盟國保有北約的防禦能力。降低北約核威懾的信譽可能會受到東歐反對派的反對，並可能給歐洲安全環境帶來更大的不確定性。托比·芬威克（Toby Fenwick）的論文低估了在英國維持本土造船能力的價值。芬威克對於基於F-35的核力量的能力的錯誤估計直接導致他大大低估了有效的基於F-35的核威懾力量的成本。對於英國是否能夠操作維持可信的核威懾所需的所需飛機數量，存在著嚴重的疑問，如果確實這種類型的平台完全適合這種角色的話。由美國領導的F-35計劃充滿了技術和財務問題，涉及許多其他夥伴國家。依靠這個平台提供英國的核威懾力量將是巨大的風險，特別是與英國主權潛艇產業的穩定相比。基於三叉戟的系統的退役可能會花費數十億美元文本也用單獨的文件夾翻譯成中文恥辱！像美國這樣技術最先進的國家怎麼可能是數字最差，死亡最多的國家呢？之所以發生這種情況，是因為該國的領導層已經腐爛到核心，更多地關注貪婪而不是生命。下圖來自紐約我們不需要的是電視屏幕上的另一張面孔，bla或其他解釋。站在美國文化中謀殺其公民。將貪婪擺在生前。不安？是的，你應該是！假使人類誤入歧途的假領導者，只不過表現出正派，欺詐和犯罪的光彩。是的，人不單靠麵包生活。但是，如果我們的領導人不以理智和道德的態度對自己的內心和思想都有所了解，那麼我們的救贖將從何而來呢？你們中有人聽說過建立對話和共同立場嗎？我們必須與中國建立和平與穩定，而不是仇恨和建立隔離牆。中國是人類重要和尊重的一部分，如果人類要生存，就必須包括中國。對於你們所有人-包括WION-TV-您是否想與中國開戰？顯然，因為您可惡的言論一次又一次證明了您積極進取，而您的主要興趣是批評。“向量”威脅俄羅斯火箭專家在分析美國彈道導彈能力和具有遠距離彈道能力的防空導彈時發現，問題在於美國火箭無法攔截中層中的任何彈道導彈，即高度在35000m至80000m之間。因此，俄羅斯一直致力於開發高超音速巡航飛行手段，這些距離正是在這些不同的高度。美國彈道導彈防禦系統使用的原理是將火箭送入太空，並在撞擊點附近計算彈道導彈的彈道。美國的攔截彈正在以固體燃料作為亞軌道火箭運行。一旦啟動，便無法停止並且無法調節牽引力。更重要的是，攔截彈將不符合彈道導彈的目標彈道計算，迴避機動以及有關導彈攔截彈的計算。北約的國防存在巨大漏洞！如今，北約正處於關鍵的切入點，如果該聯盟不成為沒有爪子的紙老虎，那麼所有國家都必須應對媒介威脅！伙計們，要保持專注和警覺！消除恐怖主義的一切禍害，對所有人來說都是美好的一天。捍衛我們的自由總統拜登（Joe Biden）必須立即重啟與俄羅斯的核對話，以確保歐洲的持續和平，就像裡根（Regan）總統和戈貝切夫（Gorbechev）秘書長在他之前所做的那樣。今天，包括這位作家在內的許多人都認為，美國應該而不是一直批評某些國家並以長期制裁對其進行懲罰，而是應該首先考慮自己的國內問題！ 1961年，德國猶太人社會心理學家埃里希·弗洛姆（Erich Fromm）在墨西哥和美國居住並當過心理學家，哲學家和作家，後來在瑞士洛迦諾生活和工作，發表了他的論文“人類可以預防嗎？他在對外交政策的事實和虛構進行的分析中對冷戰進行了分析。弗洛姆指出，“美國，美國和蘇聯都使用相同的預測，將對方視為敵人，並主張結束這種危險的對抗。左圖顯示的是1971年，埃里希·弗羅姆（Erich Fromm）在他位於瑞士洛迦諾的公寓里手稿。波紋管圖片顯示了1961年11月4日至9日在東德西柏林的弗里德里希大街的美國和俄羅斯坦克對桶的情況。潛在的極端危險情況。這在許多方面都類似於今天的海灣地區局勢，以及北約與俄羅斯在烏克蘭之間不斷升級的對抗。挪威的逻辑障碍美国对北越政权的近乎狂热的批评夺去了282,000名美国人的生命，合计1,353,000。从您自己之外的其他角度对待其他国家可能会带来可怕的后果。 2000年，挪威怀着雄心壮志进入伊朗，三年后被驱逐出境。 2010年，挪威向刘晓波颁发了诺贝尔和平奖，此后不久，他就被赶出了中国。在这两种情况下，挪威都使用支票簿外交手段向后爬行。白俄罗斯目前有一位统治者，他知道他想要什么。挪威总理索尔伯格访问了立陶宛维尔纽斯，并会见了反对卢卡申科总统的领导人斯韦特兰娜·蒂哈诺夫斯卡娅。挪威也不喜欢普京总统。地球上陆地面积最大的国家的领导人。但这似乎并不重要。挪威支持香港所谓的民主反对派团体，这些团体将这座城市变成了战区，为自己的“权利”而战。压制香港是祖国的事实。觸摸圖片播放視頻Macron一需要一支歐盟聯合軍事力量來使歐洲擺脫美國的威脅，尤其是在特朗普宣布退出冷戰時代的核條約之後。 “我們必須保護自己，不論是中國，俄羅斯甚至是美國，”他告訴歐洲一家廣播公司，他首次暗示歐洲可能需要從美國進行自衛。法國總統已經制定了主要的國防開支，以使法國與北約的支出目標保持一致，正在帶頭建立一支獨立於北約的九國歐洲快速反應部隊。挪威諾貝爾委員會濫用職權，並在政治背景下使用該獎項來推動挪威議會Stortinget的議程。他們於2003年與伊朗和七年後與中華人民共和國合作。這兩個例子都證明挪威議會，挪威諾貝爾委員會和奧斯陸外交部在建立可持續對話和國際關係共識方面的能力嚴重缺乏經驗。在這種情況下，挪威為聯合國的共同利益為聯合國安理會作出貢獻的事情對我們來說仍然是一個謎。中國的法律權利親愛的朋友和讀者們。治安是中國的基石。祖國擁有在其自己的領土後院香港實施法律和秩序的合法權利。無需徵得任何其他國家的許可。在西方，這既不是很好理解也不是很受歡迎。西方天真的從“民主”和“權利”的角度講是政治上的壓迫，是宣傳。香港是祖國；只有一個。美國在製裁世界“每個其他”國家之前，應照顧好自己的人權和黑人公民問題。祝你有美好的一天，乾杯PC2000地震調查當被判有罪的欺詐者Norex Group的Kjell G Finstad乘坐BGP的Xu Wenrong登上豪華護衛艦Grace並逃走了數百萬。閱讀文章。尊敬的讀者和朋友們！我們已經意識到當今支持美國政治的暴力文化，儘管通常不承認或報導這類事件，但經常壓制和否認這種事件。 1861年至1865年美國第一次內戰的結果決定了誰應該加入獲勝者俱樂部，並引領這個新國家邁向未來。第二次美國內戰是在我們自己的時代通過隱身進行的，它決定誰不應該包括在獲勝者俱樂部中。正是在這兩種矛盾的情況下，美國發生的許多暴力政治死亡事件使我們更加清楚地表達了自己的看法，以我們以前從未意識到的方式脫穎而出，並向我們發出了警告。保持警惕。幫助打擊國內外恐怖主義。向當局報告可疑事件。祝你有美好的一天，加油！北約核核空軍基地，歐洲，美國核倉庫，美國海軍早期預警，即時響應相控陣雷達歐洲和美國以及北約之間的深刻分裂不能成為歐洲土地上戰術核武器的守護者。必須由歐洲控制，而不是由美國控制。Macron一需要一支歐盟聯合軍事力量來使歐洲擺脫美國的威脅，尤其是在特朗普宣布退出冷戰時代的核條約之後。 “我們必須保護自己，不論是中國，俄羅斯甚至是美國，”他告訴歐洲一家廣播公司，他首次暗示歐洲可能需要從美國進行自衛。法國總統已經制定了主要的國防開支，以使法國與北約的支出目標保持一致，正在帶頭建立一支獨立於北約的九國歐洲快速反應部隊。中國的法律權利親愛的朋友和讀者們。治安是中國的基石。祖國擁有在其自己的領土後院香港實施法律和秩序的合法權利。無需徵得任何其他國家的許可。在西方，這既不是很好理解也不是很受歡迎。西方天真的從“民主”和“權利”的角度講是政治上的壓迫，是宣傳。香港是祖國；只有一個。美國在製裁世界“每個其他”國家之前，應照顧好自己的人權和黑人公民問題。祝你有美好的一天，乾杯總統唐納爾·J·特朗普造成了非常危險的內部和跨大西洋崩潰！迪士尼樂園是這個國家最高的智力貢獻。這方面只有批評。跨大西洋的關係是極限！特朗普皇帝與歐洲政治領導人和北約夥伴進行對話-長官貴賓犬除了詹斯·斯托爾滕貝格，聽話的北約秘書長唐納德·J·特朗普。老實說，我們不感激！我們也不重視美國拒絕《 INF條約》並使歐洲脆弱的事實。皇帝的最後誓言是一時興起裁減美軍在德國！一遍又一遍地證明唐納德·J·特朗普總統是我們不信任的人。但是，他應該向真正的總統約翰·肯尼迪（John F. Kennedy）學習，他給了歐洲人，尤其是德國人民在困難時期的希望和方向。但是他沒有！挪威諾貝爾委員會濫用職權，並在政治背景下使用該獎項來推動挪威議會Stortinget的議程。他們於2003年與伊朗和七年後與中華人民共和國合作。這兩個例子都證明挪威議會，挪威諾貝爾委員會和奧斯陸外交部在建立可持續對話和國際關係共識方面的能力嚴重缺乏經驗。在這種情況下，挪威為聯合國的共同利益為聯合國安理會作出貢獻的事情對我們來說仍然是一個謎。。在世界外交舞台上取得的驚人成就。伊朗與挪威之間的局勢是一場災難，隨著挪威國家石油公司（Statoil）受賄案的迅速展開，僅用了十二個月，挪威就被徹底踢出了伊朗。 2010年之後不久，挪威又引爆了另一枚外交炸彈，這次是與中國一起爆炸的，這是天真地向中國反對派人物溫家寶頒發了諾貝爾和平獎。挪威花了十年的時間在中華人民共和國建立了新的外交據點。波斯和中國是人類最古老的兩種文化，在不到十年的時間裡都拒絕了挪威的使用。在世界外交舞台上取得的驚人成就。你們中有人聽說過建立對話和共同立場嗎？我們必須與中國建立和平與穩定，而不是仇恨和建立隔離牆。中國是人類重要和尊重的一部分，如果人類要生存，就必須包括中國。對於你們所有人-包括WION-TV-您是否想與中國開戰？顯然，因為您可惡的言論一次又一次證明了您積極進取，而您的主要興趣是批評。 Translation: Have any one of you heard of creating dialogue and common ground? We must create peace and stability with China, not hate and build walls. China is an important and respectful part of Humanity, and if Humanity want to survive, China must be included. To all of you - including WION-TV - do you want war with China? Clearly, because your hateful rhetoric proves again and again that you are aggressive and that your main interest is to criticize. 點擊圖片播放視頻CLICK PICTURE PLAY VIDEO習近平，我們的中國夢還重申 TikTok還重申，它從未與中國當局共享數據，也從未按照當局的命令審查內容。該公司進一步表示，將近整整一年它一直試圖與美國進行真誠的談判。Bytedance寫道：“相反，我們遇到的是一個沒有考慮事實的政府，沒有通過標準的法律程序就規定了協議的條款，而是試圖干預私人公司之間的談判，” Bytedance寫道。 COVID-19並非中國病毒，必須停止陰謀論與中國建立對話與共同點。我們不建議進行熱核戰爭。與中國和平相處中華人民共和國對美國和歐盟的持續騷擾作出了反應。世界人民應該放眼長遠，與中國建立對話和共同立場，而不是短視，以便人民解決共同問題，鼓勵良好合作。 COVID-19是共同的全球挑戰，需要最佳的合作。中國的污名化和政治化是幼稚的，不是很聰明，並且有潛在的危險。我們只有一個星球，讓我們共同努力。中國是和平與穩定的重要貢獻者。隱秘的平民戰爭美國。在唐納德·J·特朗普總統的領導下，美國社會的兩極分化變得更加明顯。我們已經意識到當今支持美國政治的暴力文化，儘管通常不承認或報導這類事件，但經常壓制和否認這種事件。 1861年至1865年美國第一次內戰的結果決定了誰應該加入獲勝者俱樂部，並將這個新國家引領到未來。第二次美國內戰是在我們自己的時代通過隱身進行的，它正在決定誰不應該包括在獲勝者俱樂部中。正是在這兩個矛盾的情況下，美國發生的許多暴力政治死亡事件使我們更加清楚地表達了自己的看法，以我們從未意識到的方式脫穎而出，並向我們發出了警告。保持警惕。幫助打擊國內外恐怖主義。向當局報告可疑事件。祝我們必須與中華人民共和國建立對話和共同點。中國絕不能孤立。那會導致戰爭香港中國的法律權利親愛的朋友和讀者們。治安是中國的基石。祖國擁有在其自己的領土後院香港實施法律和秩序的合法權利。無需徵得任何其他國家的許可。在西方，這既不是很好理解也不是很受歡迎。西方天真的從“民主”和“權利”的角度講是政治上的壓迫，是宣傳。香港是祖國；只有一個。美國在製裁世界“每個其他”國家之前，應照顧好自己的人權和黑人公民問題。祝你有美好的一天，乾杯歐美關係中國不能克制，過去三十年來美國一直在睡覺。歐美之間的關係發生了衝突，夥伴關係也因此破裂。 Covid-19暴露出西方領導人的災難性缺乏和準備。華盛頓可以在20年前與德黑蘭握手，但要讓這個“千載難逢的機會”從窗口中消失。閱讀我的深入文章。總統唐納爾·J·特朗普造成了非常危險的內部和跨大西洋崩潰！迪士尼樂園是這個國家最高的智力貢獻。這方面只有批評。跨大西洋的關係是極限！特朗普皇帝與歐洲政治領導人和北約夥伴進行對話-長官貴賓犬除了詹斯·斯托爾滕貝格，聽話的北約秘書長唐納德·J·特朗普。老實說，我們不感激！我們也不重視美國拒絕《 INF條約》並使歐洲脆弱的事實。皇帝的最後誓言是一時興起裁減美軍在德國！一遍又一遍地證明唐納德·J·特朗普總統是我們不信任的人。但是，他應該向真正的總統約翰·肯尼迪（John F. Kennedy）學習，他給了歐洲人，尤其是德國人民在困難時期的希望和方向。但是他沒有！我們愛這個國家當她起來時遙遠的挪威像金子一樣閃閃發光她今年43歲，是奧斯陸一家計算機商店的商店經理。一天，四個男人和一個女人進入商店。他們在她為客戶服務的辦公桌前排隊。五人小組中的一位女士走近她，說：“我的硬盤驅動器有問題，”她拿著一個小的便攜式驅動器，“您能幫我修理一下嗎？”她問櫃檯後面的女人。她回答說：“我們在這裡不做這種操作，”但是我當然可以嘗試為您私下修復它，如果您可以接受的話，明天您可以在這裡收集它。”中年婦女同意為這項服務支付40美元。” 第二天，女人回到商店。商店經理說：“在這裡，我為您固定了驅動器。”女人回答：“我不要！”商店經理說：“但是，為什麼……我們達成協議！”女人就說：“我不要，因為你是私下做的！” 兩天后，告訴女店長與計算機商店的老闆，律師和她的朋友會面。她來了。她的朋友律師介紹了一個不知名的人。他說：“他是在這里工作的人。我有關於您的投訴。”律師指著他面前桌子上的四封信。這些信是從奧斯陸警察學院（Politiskolen）寄來的。困惑的商店經理回答：“能給我看看嗎？”她伸胳膊收到一封信。律師回答：“對不起，不，您不能看看。” 商店經理被踢出了商店經理職位。沒有工作，沒有錢，沒有食物。在隨後的三十年中，同一名婦女在街上遭到騷擾，從字面上走下來，竊聽電話，工作被拒絕，工作被破壞，汽車經銷商作為項目的一部分給她的汽車突然從她身邊奪走。在有人打電話給經銷商並給她口臭之後她曾經去過的天主教堂裡的神父和修女被介紹了關於她的虛假故事。一位神父在教堂內襲擊了她。她每週在商店，咖啡館，餐館，公共圖書館和公共場所受到騷擾。為什麼今天在挪威會發生這種情況？因為這位誠實的女人曾是挪威最大的報紙《 Aftenposten》和右翼報紙《 Morgenbladet》的記者，並且多年來一直是一名自由職業者，並寫了關於俄羅斯可能滲透到歐洲和平運動中以抗議釋放的報導美國製造的中子炸彈銷往歐洲。她還寫過關於俄羅斯在挪威的行動的文章，並通過她的工作與在奧斯陸的俄羅斯人擦臂。挪威當局和秘密警察不關心違反《聯合國第23條》，工作權和大規模侵犯基本人權的情況。這名婦女現在得知另一個國家，另一個挪威“正在崛起”。壓抑和邊緣生活之一。她還活著，但是有多長時間，還不確定。一支警察部隊在凌晨4點將挪威猶太人從床上拖下，擠進他們等待的出租車，然後將其運送到波蘭的納粹滅絕營，這絕對不會讓一個人喪生！他們完全沒有問題，可以讓一個人安德·貝林·布雷維克（Ander Behring Breivik）徹底站起來，無論他在奧斯陸還是在外島（烏托亞）都沒有開槍射擊來阻止他，工黨兒童和青少年度假營。當天有數千名上班的警察中，沒有人有權干預。 “是的，我們熱愛這個崛起的國家……” 挪威人是一個好人。善良的人。一個可以信任的人。這就是為什麼來挪威的人們喜歡在這裡的原因。但是，在集體心理中的某個地方，我不確定這是什麼時候發生的，挪威人必須做出生存選擇。扮演溫柔的失敗者的角色，他們需要更強大的狗的安心支持，或者堅持真正的愛國主義，這種愛國主義足以站得住自己的兩隻腳。足夠可靠，可以被他人信任，足夠強大，不能利用美利堅合眾國的慷慨。我們都想賣東西。天氣是54架F-35戰鬥機，服務，石油和天然氣，有時甚至是我們。一些人已經表明，挪威已經有充分的理由成為美國的第51個州。當挪威人唱歌時說：“是的，我們愛這個國家，因為它崛起。”這是有必要問的，他當時指的是哪個國家？這個國家是自由世界的燈塔，美國還是歐洲最外圍的一塊狹長的土地，它正努力成為對自己和人民誠實的不誠實的人？漲潮時，我們有六個小時的時間來拍攝地震線。這是4471號線。在這裡，我們位於Hendijan的泥灘上，兩邊都是皮帶驅動的車輛，這些車輛分別來自中國石油天然氣集團公司（CNPC）和地球物理勘探局（BGP）。在右側的後面，將兩公斤炸藥向下推至十米，然後引爆。然後，地震檢波器開始接收地震信號。挪威的寂寞之魂她說，她是六十年代的虛弱女性，在挪威生活了四十年。她來自英國，與挪威人結婚。他去世後，她繼續住在奧斯陸時尚區之一比格多（Bygdøy）的房子裡。 “我在這裡住了四十多年。我從來沒有受到鄰居的邀請，甚至沒有喝咖啡或談話。我丈夫去世後，我感到非常孤獨。”紮根於英國文化的人們容易相處並互相邀請喝茶，這對她而言尤其困難。可悲的是，在挪威，尤其是在奧斯陸，很少有人或從未有人邀請過鄰居。確認。 “他們只是孤立自己，因為沒有人在乎，然後他們獨自一人死亡。這是挪威財富，金錢，自然和大肆宣傳的幸福魅力幕牆的背面。奧斯陸主要藥店之一的負責人證實：“自殺率很高，合法化的人越來越多，而且整個社會都在邊緣化。”幾千年來，挪威人互相邀請來喝杯咖啡，而我本人也被邀請來了，但那是遙遠的北方，但現在已經不復存在了。挪威人變得懶惰，自食其力，並且在許多方面對待生活和同胞的方式變得人性化。挪威作為社會幸福展示的神話是一個故事。挪威的逻辑障碍总编辑美国对北越政权的近乎狂热的批评夺去了282,000名美国人的生命，合计1,353,000。从您自己之外的其他角度对待其他国家可能会带来可怕的后果。 2000年，挪威怀着雄心壮志进入伊朗，三年后被驱逐出境。 2010年，挪威向刘晓波颁发了诺贝尔和平奖，此后不久，他就被赶出了中国。在这两种情况下，挪威都使用支票簿外交手段向后爬行。白俄罗斯目前有一位统治者，他知道他想要什么。挪威总理索尔伯格访问了立陶宛维尔纽斯，并会见了反对卢卡申科总统的领导人斯韦特兰娜·蒂哈诺夫斯卡娅。挪威也不喜欢普京总统。地球上陆地面积最大的国家的领导人。但这似乎并不重要。挪威支持香港所谓的民主反对派团体，这些团体将这座城市变成了战区，为自己的“权利”而战。压制香港是祖国的事实。觸摸圖片播放視頻 Macron一需要一支歐盟聯合軍事力量來使歐洲擺脫美國的威脅，尤其是在特朗普宣布退出冷戰時代的核條約之後。 “我們必須保護自己，不論是中國，俄羅斯甚至是美國，”他告訴歐洲一家廣播公司，他首次暗示歐洲可能需要從美國進行自衛。法國總統已經制定了主要的國防開支，以使法國與北約的支出目標保持一致，正在帶頭建立一支獨立於北約的九國歐洲快速反應部隊。危險的行為地方法院法令親愛的讀者和朋友們！唐納德·J·特朗普總統已將國民警衛隊和其他可疑人物進入美國城市和州，以維護秩序與和平。該法案不會阻止陸軍國民警衛隊或國家授權的國民警衛隊在其本州或相鄰州內以執法身份行事-關鍵是要受到該州州長的邀請！通過拒絕尊重擔任州長的人民的意願，總統有意繞開了《波斯國民憲法》的真正含義。要合理。對平民人口使用戰爭型武力是否合理且相稱？不它不是。正如我們所看到的那樣，這將導致無政府狀態，甚至導致更加危險和日益加劇的兩極分化，由此產生的結果是不確定的。我的總統應該在批評美國人之前首先考慮自己的性格。環顧Barents歐洲北極地區總編輯該地區被稱為Barents歐洲北極地區。這個最北端的區域通過挪威，瑞典，芬蘭和俄羅斯與北部邊界向巴倫支海方向延伸。該地區是歐洲大陸的最北端，突然掉入大海，消失了。歐洲大陸突然冰冷的巴倫支海盡頭，這清楚地證實了曾經在這裡發生的地質過程。挪威最終進入了歐洲巴倫支海巴倫支歐洲北極地區包括挪威，瑞典，芬蘭和俄羅斯。眾所周知，歐洲突然之間毫無預警地完成了！親身體驗這個第一手資料會對旅行者產生重大的心理影響，他們敢於走近這個“幽靈般”的區域。特別是在11月，12月和1月之間的冬季。為什麼冬季旅行？我從12月23日至1月6日乘坐Richard S渡輪來回旅行。因此，我申明我有一個“實用的”冬季經歷。北極圈位於南部的兩個奈斯恩站和奧恩山脈之間。再往北。雄偉的沿海輪渡“理查德·威斯（MS Richard With）”全速駛過大海！10月19日，俄羅斯北部一個多雨的城市會見了來自Barents World及其他地區的旅行者。歷史悠久的城市阿爾漢格爾斯克再次向世界展示了一些東西-兩國人民的關係及其合作，這對於生活在北方的人們而言是值得注意的。隨著俄羅斯將巴倫支/歐洲北極理事會（BEAC）的主席移交給瑞典，發生了一個重要事件。等等。從北一站到下一站。下雪了，船慢慢駛過有時是淺海峽。這些沿海渡輪上的船長本身就是也操縱這些船的船長的兒子。船體下方的大沙洲移動，狹窄的通道機動，保持高度警惕。有光。但這是另一種光。經過北角，歐洲邊緣和北極之間沒有任何東西。風在吹，光線必須遵循自然循環。突然，一個小小的人被與自己比自己大得多的東西的巨大接觸“俘獲”。可以觀看，而不是爭論。沿著挪威海岸的冬季旅行有助於提高心理意識和深度，這是在灰色和弱色光中體驗生活的獨特機會。和冷！ -12至-27之間，風不開。帶一件很厚的冬衣！沿海地區的人們紛紛前來-邀請您喝咖啡。他們對我做了！（這僅在冬季，輪渡半滿或半滿，具體取決於您的需求。）食物非常美味，當您越過北極圈時，您將在寬敞的飯廳裡的食客面前在冰水中洗禮。數。真冷！旅程結束後，您和我一樣會感到“重生”-並且您將永遠不會忘記剛剛經歷過的爬行動物的大腦。因為此旅程不是大腦認知部分的體驗，也不是迪斯尼樂園的錯覺核威懾威懾的定義各不相同，但已故著名學者肯尼思·沃爾茲（Kenneth Waltz）提出了一個普遍的定義，即核武器比常規武器更能可靠地阻止國家參戰。可信度和能力對威懾至關重要，因為它們會影響嚴厲程度和懲戒程度。特定威懾態勢的可信度是基於對潛在攻擊者的威懾力和威脅的可實現性進行評估的主觀判斷。 MoD用以下術語定義威懾：令人信服的潛在侵略者認為，脅迫或武裝衝突的後果將超過潛在的收益。這就要求維持具有明確的政治意願採取行動的可信的軍事能力和戰略。政府2013年的《三叉戟替代方案評論》將英國的核力量描述為：“作為政治手段而不是戰爭手段，這是不得已而為之的手段，它是在危機期間能夠在短時間內向適當規模和非常高的一系列目標發出核打擊的最低核威懾能力。置信度。” 信譽標準可信和有效的核威懾以五個標準為基礎：可讀性，可及性，解決能力，生存能力/無敵性和破壞力。擴大威懾力一個國家的核武庫首先保護那個國家免受外部侵略。因此，核武器與國家主權概念緊密相關。但是，人們普遍同意，核威懾也可以擴大到無核盟國。原則上，所需要的只是核武器國家的一項聲明，即它將對以核手段對其盟友的襲擊進行報復。然而，這種承諾是否會被認為是可信的則完全是另一回事。沒關係美國傳播什麼，只有來自這一方面的批評，而跨大西洋的關係正處於斷裂點。唐納德·J·特朗普皇帝正在與歐洲政治領導人和北約夥伴進行對話，除了詹森·斯托爾滕貝格，唐納德·J·特朗普的服從的北約秘書長貴賓犬。坦率地說，我們對此不感激。 記者卡爾·伯恩斯坦（Carl Bernstein）週一在美國有線電視新聞網（CNN）的一項調查中稱，唐納德·特朗普總統與德國總理安格拉·默克爾的電話交談“如此不尋常”，以至於德國官員被要求保密。 消息人士告訴CNN，特朗普以“非常激進”的方式鄙視默克爾，稱她為“愚蠢”，並指責她“在俄羅斯人的口袋裡”。一位消息人士告訴美國有線電視新聞網：“他在電話中最堅強，在他看來是弱者，而在最弱者中他是最弱者。” 消息人士告訴CNN，儘管為回應特朗普與默克爾的對話採取了特別措施，但德國總理還是採納了美國總統的言論“就像鴨背上的水一樣”。我們也不讚賞美國退出《 INF協議》並使歐洲脆弱。皇帝的最新口號是一時興起削減美軍在德國！一次又一次地證明唐納德·J·特朗普總統是我們不能信任的人。但是，他本應該從真正的總統約翰·肯尼迪那裡學到的，他給歐洲人，特別是德國人民帶來了困難時期的希望和方向。但是他沒有。歐洲人將自己決定，歐洲決不能成為美國的附庸國！最終，歐洲的戰術核武器必須由新的歐洲陸軍控制。保持警惕。睜大你的眼睛和耳朵。與國內外恐怖主義作鬥爭祝你有美好的一天。乾杯! 挪威人口得不到任何保護，什麼都沒有！挪威的新Quislings是個人，對國際刑事法院戰爭罪行法庭負有刑事責任，並應受懲罰在新戰爭爆發前的幾年中，挪威向左，右和中央派發了和平獎，同時又將本國人口騙向了威脅生命的核角，從那裡沒有生存的希望。挪威的超級官僚使人民準備死，沒有生存的希望。巴拉克·奧巴馬（Barack Obama）總統應獲得什麼獎項，而不是由挪威國會選拔的華盛頓諾貝爾委員會（Norwegian Nobel Committee）以外的諾貝爾和平委員會。這與阿爾弗雷德·諾貝爾（Alfred Nobel）的獎項構想相去甚遠。圖片：奧巴馬在奧斯陸舉行的諾貝爾頒獎典禮上從諾貝爾委員會主席蓋爾·倫斯塔達上課。核共享是北約核威懾政策中的一個概念，其中涉及沒有自己的核武器的成員國，例如挪威，計劃由北約使用核武器，特別是為這些國家的武裝部隊提供了條件在使用這些武器時參與交付這些武器。在1960年代後期，成立了北約核計劃小組，以解決歐洲希望對美國的核計劃施加影響的願望。這些核共享安排將緩解歐洲人，尤其是德國人對簽署《不擴散條約》的擔憂。挪威的新奎斯林在ICC戰爭犯罪法庭中是個人，刑事責任人並應受懲罰第7條將危害人類罪定義為“在了解攻擊的情況下，作為針對任何平民的廣泛或系統攻擊的一部分而犯下的行為”。第8條根據武裝衝突是國際衝突（通常意味著在國家之間進行戰鬥）還是非國際衝突（通常意味著在非國家行為者（例如反叛團體）之間或在國家與國家之間進行戰鬥）來定義戰爭罪行。此類非國家行為者）。第8條列出了總共74項戰爭罪。 CLICK PICTURE FOR THE ICC WEB PAGES在新戰爭之前的幾年中，挪威向左，右和中央派發了和平獎，同時又將本國人口騙入了威脅生命的核角，沒有生存的希望。奧斯陸的大佬官僚讓它的人口準備死了！Vidkun Quisling在他的時代也這樣做，他在戰後被處決。德國哲學家卡爾·賈斯珀斯（Karl Jaspers）：“如果曾經發生過一次，那就有可能再次發生！” 主編：“如果挪威不是非常非常謹慎，它可能會再次發生。” Vidkun Quisling：“我真的相信我所做的是正確的事情！”挪威人口得不到任何保護，什麼都沒有！挪威的新Quislings是個人，對國際刑事法院戰爭罪行法庭負有刑事責任，並應受懲罰在新戰爭爆發前的幾年中，挪威向左，右和中央派發了和平獎，同時又將本國人口騙向了威脅生命的核角，從那裡沒有生存的希望。挪威的超級官僚使人民準備死，沒有生存的希望。挪威人口將無法吸收大規模的俄羅斯反擊下圖：在Zapad-2017演習中，Iskander M導彈在哈薩克斯坦命中目標。容量增加的導彈飛行了480公里，成功擊中了哈薩克斯坦馬卡特射擊場的目標。下圖：伊斯坎德爾M平台上的兩枚導彈。迅速，精確和無情的報復。我將一如既往地彬彬有禮，首先將這句話告訴對方。希望您能從歷史和地理角度上進行反思，如果您已經忘記了，請允許我仔細地提醒您，直到烏拉爾（Ural）屬於北歐平原的俄羅斯大陸。 70％的俄羅斯人口居住在烏拉爾以西。因此，俄羅斯“本身”是歐洲生活中一個完整，和平與積極的組成部分。舉起兩個典型的天然氣管道Nord Stream 1和Nord Stream 2就足夠了。德國公司和俄羅斯之間的合作以及俄羅斯公司在德國的合作對兩國和歐洲都至關重要。沒關係美國怎麼說。歐洲人必須自己決定，歐洲決不能成為美國的附庸國。歐洲的戰術核武器必須由新的歐洲陸軍控制。保持警惕。睜大你的眼睛和耳朵。與國內外恐怖主義作鬥爭祝你有美好的一天。乾杯! 永遠的朋友？一個人不能通過將狗屎扔在另一側並表現出好像一個人擁有該地方的方式來營造良好的氛圍一個人不能通過將狗屎扔在另一側並表現出好像一個人擁有該地方的方式來營造良好的氛圍。圖片來自2003年5月在國家石油公司NIOC總部舉行的挪威與伊朗伊斯蘭共和國上次部長級會議。左側是伊朗，石油部長是左手Namdahr Zangeneh編號樹閣下。挪威的右邊是能源和石油部長，埃納·斯坦森斯閣下閣下從右數第六。照片（C）2003 Harald Dahle-Sladek Y-12橡樹嶺國家安全中心Y-12國家安全中心是美國能源部國家核安全管理局的設施，位於田納西州橡樹嶺，靠近橡樹嶺國家實驗室。Y-12國家安全中心由Babcock＆Wilcox Y-12運營（B＆W Y-12），並由WSI-Oak Ridge保護你好朋友！ Pantex工廠位於得克薩斯州阿馬里洛（Amarillo）東北，是美國進行核武器最終組裝，拆卸和維護的主要設施。 Pantex是國家核安全局（National Nuclear Security Administration）核安全企業（Nuclear Security Enterprise）的六個生產設施之一。我們感謝美國為維護歐洲的安全與和平提供的慷慨支持。保持警惕！我們必須團結一致，以一切邪惡手段打擊恐怖主義，並向當局報告可疑活動。祝你有美好的一天！核共享是北約核威懾政策中的一個概念，其中涉及沒有自己的核武器的成員國，例如挪威，計劃由北約使用核武器，特別是為這些國家的武裝部隊提供了條件在使用這些武器時參與交付這些武器。在1960年代後期，成立了北約核計劃小組，以解決歐洲希望對美國的核計劃施加影響的願望。這些核共享安排將緩解歐洲人，尤其是德國人對簽署《不擴散條約》的擔憂。航空之星飛機廠俄羅斯烏里揚諾夫斯克航空工業園區主編從迪米特羅夫格勒到伏爾加河附近的薩馬拉，並住在列寧的出生地烏里揚諾夫斯克。 “我們參觀了在冷戰期間生產戰略轟炸機的AVIASTAR飛機工廠，” Harald Dale-Sladek說。 1970年代初期從頭開始設計生產下一代戰略轟炸機，但不清楚哪一個，Ulyanovsk航空生產中心，在1991年11月成為由自己的員工控制的股份制企業後，更名為Aviastar，據說是最大的世界上的航空業生產以及俄羅斯的最新生產。俄羅斯艦隊將在未來7年內更新70％弗拉基米爾·普京（Vladimir Putin）參加了在克里米亞船塢鋪設的兩艘新登陸艦的活動。幾年前，在克里米亞加入俄羅斯之前，這些造船廠正在衰落。但是現在俄羅斯艦隊的更新正在緊鑼密鼓地進行中。普京從克里米亞接觸了聖彼得堡和塞弗德文斯克的造船廠，那裡也正在建造新船。北約和烏克蘭在黑海開始聯合實踐的明確信號是：最好將它們帶離克里米亞海岸和俄羅斯水域。俄羅斯的新艦已經擁有新的高超音速武器美國是否解除了製裁在2016年和2018年之間真的發生了嗎？'尊敬的讀者和朋友們。雖然，有人可以辯稱，所謂的美國製裁在2016年至2018年間確實發生了。但是，有理由相信，當外國資產控制辦公室OFAC對同一時期與伊朗和伊朗資產有業務往來的外國個人進行尖銳而令人不快的調查時，會得出這樣的結論：制裁併不意味著任何事情。”如果您的意圖是在知情的情況下規避美國與伊朗的政治，我們認為這是一個非常糟糕的主意，並且將產生後果。北流2允許在丹麥使用錨定舖管機由俄羅斯天然氣工業股份公司（Gazprom）領導的在俄羅斯波羅的海建造Nord Stream 2天然氣管道的公司Nord Stream 2 AG已獲得丹麥當局的許可，可使用帶錨的管道鋪設船代替動態定位船。Nord Stream 2項目由兩條平行的管道組成，總長度為1230公里，用於將俄羅斯的天然氣通過波羅的海運輸到德國。 B61-12如果他們將到達俄羅斯領土，那就是懷疑北約核核空軍基地，歐洲，美國核倉庫，美國海軍早期預警，即時響應相控陣雷達核空軍基地-歐洲-美國核武器庫，美國海軍-預警預警，即時響應，相控陣雷達歐洲和美國以及北約之間的深刻分裂不能成為歐洲土地上戰術核武器的守護者。必須由歐洲控制，而不是由美國控制。Macron一需要一支歐盟聯合軍事力量來使歐洲擺脫美國的威脅，尤其是在特朗普宣布退出冷戰時代的核條約之後。 “我們必須保護自己，不論是中國，俄羅斯甚至是美國，”他告訴歐洲一家廣播公司，他首次暗示歐洲可能需要從美國進行自衛。法國總統已經制定了主要的國防開支，以使法國與北約的支出目標保持一致，正在帶頭建立一支獨立於北約的九國歐洲快速反應部隊。歐洲美國今天我們比冷戰時期更接近核戰爭！特朗普國內和跨大西洋瘋狂的崩潰！我將一如既往地彬彬有禮，首先將這句話告訴對方。對於更歷史性和地理性的思考，謝謝。如果您已經忘記了，請讓我小心地提醒您，直到烏拉爾（Ural）屬於北歐平原的一部分之前，俄羅斯都是一片大陸。 70％的俄羅斯人口居住在烏拉爾以西。因此，俄羅斯“本身”是歐洲生活中一個完整，和平與積極的組成部分。美國以其單方面政策，消極和仇恨的言論，正在推動德國，波蘭和挪威與俄羅斯聯邦發生衝突。另一方面，我們的目標是創造對話和共同基礎，並緩解緊張局勢。足以支撐兩條天然氣管道Nord Stream 1和Nord Stream 2，這是當今德國公司與俄羅斯以及俄羅斯和德國的俄羅斯公司之間合作的主要例證。這對兩國和歐洲都至關重要。別管美國說什麼，因為只有來自這一方面的批評，而跨大西洋的關係正處於斷裂點。唐納德·J·特朗普總統正在與歐洲政治領導人和北約夥伴對話，坦率地說，我們對此不感激。他應該向約翰·肯尼迪總統學習，他給了歐洲人特別是德國人民以希望和方向。在華盛頓的軍事計劃者眼中，歐洲不過是單方面和以自我為中心的唐納德·J·特朗普政府的危險性，單方面製裁政治的緩衝區。畢竟，美國從未在自己的領土上經歷過重大國際衝突，現在押注自己的未來，即下一場戰爭將繼續進行，並將再次失敗於歐洲的生存灰燼！歐洲人必須自己決定，歐洲不能成為美國的附庸國。最終，歐洲的戰術核武器必須由新的歐洲陸軍控制。保持警惕。睜大你的眼睛和耳朵。打擊恐怖主義，無論在國內還是國外，都具有邪惡的力量。祝你有美好的一天。乾杯! 挪威對中國龍的荒謬虛偽和俄羅斯熊。主編點擊圖片觀看中國異議人士劉曉波入獄獲諾貝爾和平獎1977年11月，我被挪威最大的報紙《 Aftenposten》送往意大利羅馬，報導政治，電影和電視。當意大利廣播電台（RAI）從黑白轉為彩色電視的那個月，當電視主持人Rosanna Vaudetti將我介紹給馬奇尼廣場（Piazza Mazzini）的電視新聞室時，她顯得更加迷人和風度翩翩，米蘭的現場故事與AMPEX融為一體羅馬的錄音故事。那時我在Qurinal宮（意大利共和國總統的官邸）進行了會談，當時他是現任總統Giovanni Leone的兒子Jancarlo Leone。點擊圖片觀看蘇聯外交大臣安德烈·格羅米科與意大利總統喬凡尼·利昂意大利共和國總統喬瓦尼·利昂先生閣下，左三，妻子和三個兒子。揚卡洛·萊昂（Jancarlo Leone）從右數排名第二。President of the Italian Republic His Excellency Giovanni Leone, number three from left, with wife and three sons. Jancarlo Leone is number two from right. 六個月後，遭到十槍擊中，意大利第38任總理Aldo Moro遇難。被激進的極左組織紅旅正式殺害。北約與中央情報局和美國合作的比利時格拉迪奧後備部隊是真正的肇事者。 1940年4月9日，德國軍隊佔領了奧斯陸。German troops take Oslo 1940卡爾·賈斯珀斯（Karl Jaspers）：“如果它曾經發生過一次，那麼它可能會再次發生！”1978年，在冷戰中期，我對歐洲的基督教佩斯運動進行了深入研究，主要是在丹麥，荷蘭和德國。這些熱情的信徒團體抗議美國的“中子炸彈”（Neutron Bomb），該炸彈可殺死人類和動物，但其基礎設施完好無損。但是歐洲的年輕一代則相反。在阿姆斯特丹，柏林和哥本哈根之間爆發了大規模的示威遊行，這清楚表明，這種炸彈在歐洲領土上不受歡迎。但是，最大的問題是，這些反中子彈和平團體是否得到了莫斯科的財政支持。 Click picture to watch: London, protests for Peace against War點擊圖片觀看：倫敦，抗議和平戰爭歐洲針對美國中子彈的示威Demonstrations in Europe against the American Neutron Bomb 我會見了人們，打了些電話，做筆記。其中一個電話是俄羅斯奧斯陸大使館。我們仍然在1978年，我為右翼報紙“ Morgenbladet”撰稿。我應邀在奧斯陸的挪威秘密警察臨時秘書處辦公室聊天。在那兒，我遇到了一個向俄羅斯大使館打來的特別電話，以及我所說的話。這些句子是脫離上下文的，並作為串謀的證據發給我。當然，這顯然是胡說八道。這是一項巨大的調查，為了獲得結果，我不得不努力。此外，我的印像是PTS希望以孤立的陳述和曲解的故事為基礎。二十九年後的2007年，來自PST的人們進入我在奧斯陸的工作地點，要求我把我趕出去。這違反了《人權》第23條，該條規定人人有權工作。但是警察因不尊重挪威簽署的國際條約而聞名。自2007年冬季以來，我一直被拒絕在挪威從事所有工作，在包括教堂在內的公共場所遭受了數千次騷擾。我們寫信並希望對正確的問題有答案，我們使用的是人類的權利以及聯合國人權和《歐洲聯盟憲章》的權利。但是挪威卻不這樣認為。 2010年，挪威諾貝爾委員會授予劉曉波中國人“諾貝爾和平獎”，以表彰其“為在中國實現基本人權的長期而非暴力的鬥爭”。挪威戲劇作家易卜生（Henrik Ibsen）：-挪威應該首先考慮自己，而不是批評其他國家。Henrik Ibsen: Norge burde se mer på seg selv først, istedet for å kritisere andre land. 正如挪威劇作家賴恩·易卜生（Henrik Ibsen）曾經說過的那樣：“挪威應該而不是批評其他任何人，而要首先研究自己！”挪威政府的荒唐偽善，拒絕我的工作並將挪威猶太人送往波蘭的毒氣室的挪威國家警察，以及挪威諾貝爾委員會的愚蠢，使挪威成為了本世紀偽善的“世紀最佳國家”。挪威於2000年加入伊朗伊斯蘭共和國，成為該國經歷過的最嚴重的外交和工業災難的序幕。 2010年，在挪威議會任命的挪威諾貝爾委員會向被囚禁的中國人權活動家劉曉波頒獎之後，與中國的噩夢般的關係才使它黯然失色。從1998年1月到2003年5月，我在伊朗伊斯蘭共和國工作。前兩年，我用六艘地震船記錄了世界上最大的2D地震項目，將伊朗的沿海地區從北部的Hendijan映射到阿曼海。接下來的幾年，我在德黑蘭進行了高層對話。 2002年4月，我在德黑蘭外交部與阿里·阿哈尼（Ali Ahani）大使和侯賽因·阿德利（Hussein Adeli）博士副對外經濟事務部長，中央銀行行長，駐渥太華大使館和東京進行了會談。德黑蘭外交部大使阿里·阿哈尼·哈拉爾德·達勒·斯萊德克Ambassador Ali Ahani Harald Dahle-Sladek in the Foreign Ministry Tehran 挪威終於在2000年進入伊朗伊斯蘭共和國。然後，德黑蘭的外交部等待了二十年或更長時間，想知道為什麼挪威沒有採用其專門的深水技術來幫助伊朗建設南帕爾斯項目以及其他近海和陸上項目。至少可以說，當我於2002年4月到達德黑蘭外交部時，心情很陰沉。阿里·阿哈尼（Ali Ahani）大使很生氣。挪威外交部多年來一直在街頭兩旁發揮作用，以培養與伊朗反對派團體的接觸，例如聖戰者默克（Mejahidin Kalk MEK）。挪威人的態度是親切的，但態度僵硬，沒有反映出伊朗文化及其人民的偉大。德黑蘭非常受傷。伊朗反對派組織Mujahedin KalkMujahedin Kalk: Iranian oposition Organization達勒·斯拉德克（Dahle-Sladek）：-關於挪威和伊朗關係的阿哈尼（Ahani）大使，我注意到您有些惱怒，為什麼？阿里·阿哈尼（Ali-Ahani）：-實際上，伊朗伊斯蘭共和國和挪威有很多機會。除了經濟和工業合作，我們還有石油和天然氣。我想強調我們完成在波斯灣南部和里海的油氣項目的重要性。挪威和伊朗是兩個重要的產油國，可以在世界石油市場上進行合作與協調並穩定油價，這既符合石油生產國的利益，也符合石油消費者的利益。挪威外交大臣揚·佩特森先生Foreign Minister Mr. Jan Pettersen 達勒·斯拉德克（Dahle-Sladek）：-您提到挪威外交大臣揚·佩特森（Jan Pettersen）訪問德黑蘭是一個分水嶺。你能解釋一下嗎？阿里·阿哈尼（Ali-Ahani）：事實上，在過去幾年中，我們的關係缺乏足夠的勢頭來進一步擴大我們的關係。實際上，與歐洲其他國家相比，我們與挪威的關係處於落後狀態。外交部長對德黑蘭的訪問顯示了貴國對擴大與伊朗關係的堅定決心。當然，伊朗伊斯蘭共和國政府具有這種政治意願和熱情！Dahle-Sladek：-謝謝Ahani博士。這次秘密的挪威警察PST在哪裡？儘管我單槍匹馬地穿透了美國所謂的世界第一恐怖主義國家，但我什麼也沒聽到。從2000年至2004年，我與伊朗駐奧斯陸大使一直保持著親密和友好的關係，而Noghrehkar Shirazi閣下閣下，並於2007年在奧斯陸軍事協會會見了伊朗外交部長Manouchehr Mottaki。伊朗外交部長Manouchehr Mottaki和主編Harald Dahle在2007年挪威奧斯陸軍事學會上今天，挪威公民的警察監視已經超過了DDR中對STASI的監視。與狂熱並存的是同一名警察對挪威猶太人的培育。挪威納粹高級警官在警察中任職很久，直到1960年代。引用德國哲學家卡爾·賈斯珀斯的話說：“如果發生過一次，就可以再次發生！你好朋友！在戰後實施當前的“陷進”戰略時，對挪威的領導層來說，與我們我們非常尊重的美國朋友一起玩似乎更為重要，而不是想出一個更聰明，更充分的準備在當今精確的導彈技術仍是科學幻想的時代建造的，比當今的大型洞穴更靈活，更便宜，更不易受傷害的替代品。挪威軍隊再也不能讓其軍事人員在演習中使用實彈，因為挪威棘手的國防預算實在是微不足道！這向東方俄羅斯發出了多麼美妙的信號。挪威有一種防禦，但主要是在紙面上以及在高權力走廊的政要之間的非約束性對話中。在發生嚴重國際危機的情況下，裝有遠程巡航導彈9M728的Iskander-K導彈，射程未知，但估計範圍為2000公里，將從伊拉克邊境轉移至Alakurtti軍事基地48公里。由於距離足夠近，足以威脅美國海軍陸戰隊在挪威特隆德拉格縣的八個預置洞穴。伊斯坎德爾有幾種不同的常規彈頭，包括集束彈藥彈頭，燃料-空氣炸藥增強爆炸彈頭，高爆炸性碎片彈頭，用於掩體掩體的對地穿甲彈和用於反雷達任務的電磁脈衝裝置。該導彈還可以攜帶核彈頭。 2017年9月，KB Mashinostroyeniya（KBM）總設計師Valery M.Kashin說，伊斯坎德爾至少有七種導彈，其中包括一枚巡航導彈。下圖：炸彈中熱核鏈反應的發展。 A WARNING SIGN FOR OUR TIMEMonuments Carved in Granite on Barren FieldsBy Harald Dahle-SladekWhen one talks about Life, it is pertinent to ask, what life does one mean? The entire life, or just selected parts of it? The parts that we like and prefer and leave the rest not to be mentioned? The person who says she “loves me”, but ignore everything that I have achieved after I came out of the hospital? The people who will walk a mile with me, but say “no thank you” to carry my burden and walk another mile? The ones who never invited me for a cup of tea, but proclaim seriously that I am a “friend”? The ones who admire their own achievements highly, but never had time to visit me once? What life are they adhering to? The one in parts, or the one in totality?A warning sign for our time.I want to be seen in totality; I do not want that my life be selectively butchered and twisted into something it is not. My articles are monuments in stone in a barren landscape devoid of humanism. They are there to warn and to encourage, but not to be neglected. In today’s vain world, where it has become so increasingly popular to talk IN a mobile phone, instead of empathizing WITH and showing human DIGNITY; where one is accustomed to appreciating media hype, political lies, lack of responsibilities leading to mass starvations and mass death. In such a world and coldness between people, the abnormal has become the trend, and sadly this is what we adhere to. In such an inter-human setting, the message is clear: why bother to respect the other person right in front of ourselves. It is so much easier to babble because the spoken word carries no longer any commitment. It is free and it does not cost anything to say this or the other. Life is easy when one is free not to engage in another person’s life-and-death experiences, when it is so much more convenient to look at a movie. People who ignore monuments carved out in granite on barren fields are confirming themselves to the believes of death and destruction. We who write and warn have the humanistic right to say this. It is our task in life. Not to be kind to death and destruction, but to admire and encourage Life. We expect the same from others as we expect from ourselves. And if “the other” fail, we must go forward alone, and warn. That is our destiny. TEHRAN Seyed Mohammad Hossein Adeli PhDDeputy Foreign Minister for Economic AffairsGovernor of the Central Bank - Ambassador to Tokyo and OttawaSecretary General of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum Dr. Adeli explains Iran's view regarding Afghanistand and the U.S. The success of the United States in Afghanistan also comes as the active support from Iran. A golden opportunity for Washington to better its relations with Tehran went out of the window. CLICK PICTURE PLAY VIDEODr. Adeli: "Great disappointment!"This interview was conducted in Dr. Hussein Adeli's office in the Foreign Ministry in Tehran. It was the first of two meetings that Harald Dahle had with Dr. Adeli. The first was in April 2002, and the second meeting was held in May 2003. During the interview made in April of 2002 it became quite clear to the Editor-in-Chief, that the rejection of the United Sates to appreciate what Iran had done for the country in Afghanistan, neither did not sit well with the upper echelon of the Islamic Republic of Iran, nor was it well received by the Deputy Foreign Minister for Economic Affairs. This would have been a Golden Opportunity for the United States to better the relations with Iran, but in wain. Washington was not ready to hand Tehran a firm handshake. Dahle: -Tehran has sent an invitation to Washington for a meeting and better the relations between the two sides. I understand that the United States has rejected this initiative. How do you view the current relations with the U.S. after this disappointment? Adeli: -Well, actually our relations with the West in general has improved a lot during the last, may be four, five years. Dahle: -Yes. Adeli: -Specially with the policies that have been followed by President Khatami, Dialogue among Civilization, the Rule of Law, the Principles of Civil Society, the elimination of tensions between Iran or other countries, the elimination of misunderstanding. All of these policies have been seriously followed by Iran in its Foreign Policy and has contributed to the relations with all countries except the United States. And with the West in general we have been able to exchange delegations on the level of Foreign Minister and head of Governments. Dahle: -Aren't the operations of the United States in Afghanistan very much based on the early assistance from Iran? Adeli: -But with the United States, it is unfortunately to see, that even developments in Afghanistan, which owes a lot to understanding and effective assistance from Iran, has not, I believe, been able to penetrate into the hearts or the minds of decision makers in the United States. Dahle: -Without the help from Iran in Afghanistan, you say that the United States would not have been where they are now? Adeli: -I think that there is no doubt, even in the American eyes, that what we now see in the situation in Afghanistan owes a lot to Iranian assistance, Iranian understanding. The military success of the United States owes a lot to understanding and appreciation from Iran, and also the political process in Afghanistan owes the same thing. Adeli: -And may be that was a very unique opportunity for the United Sates to reciprocate these kinds of understanding, and to seize and stop those kinds of policies that are pursued by them, in the past couple of decades. But apparently there is still not a very strong sign from that side. Dahle: -Iran has friendly relations with many countries in the world, so why not also with the United States? Adeli: -Off course, the general policy of Iran is to have friendly relations with every country in the world, including the United States, provided that this kind of relationship would be based on an equal footing, on a mutual beneficial sort of relationship. So, this is why I think that, as the policies of the United States, which are normally a unilateral policy, we hope that one time they would join the other countries of the West and developing countries, and would join that kind of understanding of Iran. That the developments in the region would open their eyes, and that they would adopt a new policy towards our country! Dahle: -Thank you Dr. Adeli. GASPROMEUROPE'S DEPENDENCE ON RUSSIAN GAS FINLANDFINLAND AND SWEDEN TO JOIN NATO. RUSSIA COUNTRES WITH PUTTING NUCLEAR MISSILES IN KALININGRAD. IS NATO REALY DEFENDING OUR FREEDOM OR JUST THINKING THAT IT IS?Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor is a fifth-generation, single-seat, twin-engine, all-weather stealth tactical fighter aircraft developed for the United States Air Force.REINFORCING DETERRENCE ON NATO'S EASTERN FLANK Hello friends! The US think-tank RAND with close ties to the military, just completed a very important study with regards to NATO allies defence of the Baltic states Estonia and Latvia. And the result is pretty darn gloomy reading. For my own part I will also ad Norway. NATO today is not able to defend it's most vulnerable states! Please read the report yourself and make up your own opinion. We must fight ISIS and terrorism in all it's uglyness. Keep your eyes and ears wide open and repport anything suspicious. Cheers! A RAND CORPORATION STUDYRussias's Planned Expansion Dwarfs NATO'sNATO CANNOT SUCCESSFULLY DEFEND THE TERRITORY OF ITS MOST EXPOSED MEMBERSIn a series of wargames conducted between summer 2014 and spring 2015, the RAND Corporation examined the shape and probable outcome of a near term Russian invasion of the Baltic states. The games’ findings are unambiguous. As currently postured, NATO cannot successfully defend the territory of its most exposed members. Across multiple games using a wide range of expert participants in and out of uniform playing both sides, the longest it has taken Russian forces to reach the outskirts of the Estonian and/or Latvian capitals of Tallinn and Riga, respectively, is 60 hours. THE SUWALKI GAP NATO'S NIGHTMARE DEFENDING THE BALTIC REPUBLICS A STRATEGIC CHALLENGE FOR NATOThe outcome was, bluntly, a disaster for NATO. Across multiple plays of the game, Russian forces eliminated or bypassed all resistance and were at the gates of or actually entering Riga, Tallinn, or both, between 36 and 60 hours. NATO'S WAR GAMES ANACONDA 2016: PROTECTION OF THE BALTIC STATESVladimir Putin has now attacked neighboring countries three times, with his second invasion of Ukraine still unfolding. His pursuit of greater Russian influence along Moscow’s periphery has ended what was nearly a generation of post–Cold War peace and stability in Europe and revived legitimate fears of Moscow’s intentions among its neighbors. After eastern Ukraine, the next most likely targets for an attempted Russian coercion are the Baltic Republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Like Ukraine, all three spent many years as component republics of the Soviet Union, gaining independence only on its dissolution. The three are also contiguous to Russian territory. Also like Ukraine, Estonia and Latvia are home to sizable ethnic Russian populations that have been at best unevenly integrated into the two countries’ postindependence political and social mainstreams and that give Russia a self-justification for meddling in Estonian and Latvian affairs. This storyline is disturbingly familiar. Unlike Ukraine, the Baltic states are members of NATO, which means that Russian aggression against them would trigger Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty —the collective defense provision according to which an at- tack against any signatory is considered to be an attack against all. This creates an obligation on the part of the United States and its alliance partners to be prepared to come to the assistance of the Baltic states, should Russia seek to actively and violently destabilize or out-and-out attack them.In a September 2014 speech in the Estonian capital of Tallinn, President Barack Obama articulated and strongly affirmed that commitment: [W]e will defend our NATO Allies, and that means every Ally. . . . And we will defend the territorial integrity of every single Ally. . . . Because the defense of Tallinn and Riga and Vilnius is just as important as the defense of Berlin and Paris and London. . Article 5 is crystal clear: An attack on one is an attack on all. . . . We’ll be here for Estonia. We will be here for Latvia. We will be here for Lithuania. You lost your inde- pendence once before. With NATO, you will never lose it again.2 Unfortunately, nei- ther the United States nor its NATO allies are currently prepared to back up the Presi- dent’s forceful words. MILITARY GEOGRAPHY FAVORS RUSSIA During the Cold War, NATO positioned eight Allied corps along the border between West Germany and its Warsaw Pact neighbors to the east. More than 20 allied divisions were stationed to defend that frontier, with many more plan- ned to flow in as reinforcements before and during any conflict (see Figure 1). The borders that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania share with Russia and Belarus are roughly the same length as the one that separated West Germany from the Warsaw Pact. They are, however, defended only by the indigenous forces of the three Baltic states, which muster the rough equivalent of a light infantry brigade each. Since Russia’s invasion of Crimea, other NATO countries, including the United States, have rotated forces through the Baltics, but these have typically been in battalion strength or smaller—hardly enough to defend the republics against a plausible Russian attack. The distances in the theater also favor Russia. From the border to Tallinn along the main highways is about 200 km; depend- ing on the route, the highway (versus crow-flight) distance to Riga is between about 210 and 275 km. From the Polish border to Riga, on the other hand, is about 325 km as the crow flies; to Tallinn, almost 600 km. And to get anywhere from Poland, NATO forces would have to transit the “Kaliningrad corridor,” a 110- to 150-km-wide stretch of territory between the Russian enclave and Belarus that could be subject to long-range artillery and flank attacks from both sides and would require a commitment of (scarce) NATO forces to secure. The terrain in the theater is a mix, with large open areas interspersed with forested regions; lakes; and, in some places, sizeable wetlands. Off-road mobility in parts of all three Baltic countries could be difficult, especially for wheeled vehicles. There is, however, a fairly rob- ust network of roads and highways throughout, and there are few large rivers to serve as natural defensive lines and barriers to move- ment. Our analysis sought to account for the effects on movement and combat of this variability in terrain. To be sure, Russia’s army is much smaller than its Soviet predecessor. Today, it can muster for operations in its Western Military District (MD)—the region adjacent to the Baltic states—about 22 battalions, roughly the same number of divi- sions forward deployed in the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries in 1990. These forces appear more than ade- quate, however, to overwhelm whatever defense the Baltic armies might be able to present. German Army CURRENT NATO POSTURE CANNOT SUPPORT ALLIANCE COMMITMENTS Despite President Obama’s bold words in Tallinn, a series of RAND wargames clearly indicates that NATO’s current posture is inadequate to defend the Baltic states from a plausible Russian conven- tional attack. The games employed Russian forces from the Western MD and the Kaliningrad oblast—a chunk of sovereign Russian territory that sits on the northeastern border of Pol- and, along the Baltic Sea coast—totaling approx- imately 27 maneuver battalions in a short-warning attack to occupy either Estonia and Latvia or both and present NATO with a rapid fait accompli. The strategic goal of the invasion was to demonstrate NATO’s inability to protect its most vulnerable members and divide the alliance, reducing the threat it presents from Moscow’s point of view. The scenario assumed about a week of warning, which en- abled NATO to flow some reinforcements into the Baltics— mainly light infantry units that could be speed- ily air transported, along with airpower. Tables 1–4 list the forces with which both sides were credited at D-Day—when the hostilities began. The two sides adopted strategies that were generally similar across the games played. The Red players typically made a main effort toward the Latvian capital of Riga, with a secondary attack that quickly secured the predominantly ethnic Russian areas of northeast Estonia, and then proceeded toward Tallinn. The NATO players, recognizing that they had woefully inadequate forces to mount anything resembling a forward defense, sought instead to use indigenous forces to delay Red’s advance along major axes while positioning the bulk of their forces in and around Tallinn and Riga in an attempt to sustain a minimal lodgment in and around the two capitals. The outcome was, bluntly, a disaster for NATO. Across multiple plays of the game, Russian forces eliminated or bypassed all resistance and were at the gates of or actually entering Riga, Tallinn, or both, between 36 and 60 hours. Four factors appeared to contribute most substantially to this result. First and obviously, the overall correlation of forces was dramatically in Russia’s favor. Although the two sides’ raw numbers of maneuver battalions—22 for Russia and 12 for NATO —are not badly disprop- ortionate, seven of NATO’s are those of Estonia and Latvia, which are extremely light, lack tactical mobility, and are poorly equipped for fighting against an armored opponent. Indeed, the only armor in the NATO force is the light armor in a single Stryker battalion, which is credited with having deployed from Germany during the crisis buildup prior to the conflict. NATO has no main battle tanks in the field. Meanwhile, all Russia’s forces are motorized, mechanized, or tank units. Even their eight airborne battalions are equipped with light armored vehicles, unlike their U.S. counterparts. Second, Russia also enjoys an overwhelming advantage in tactical and operational fires. The Russian order of battle includes ten artillery battalions. Type Location Qty Maneuver battalions Tank Mechanized infantry Motorized infantry Airborne Naval infantry Total Western MD Western MD Western MD Western MD Kalin- ingrad oblast 4 5 5 8 3 25 Artillery battalions Tube artillery Heavy rocket launcher Medium rocket launcher Total Western MD Western MD Western MD 3 2 5 10 Surface-to-surface missile battalions Iskander short-range ballistic missile Tochka very short-range ballistic missile Tochka very short-range ballistic missile Total Western MD Western MD Kaliningrad oblast 2 2 1 5 Mi-24 Hind attack helicopter battalion 6. Each Russian brigade or regiment in the Western MD or Kaliningrad was assumed to be able to produce one deployable battalion tactical group for the attack. This is consistent with the pattern observed in Russian Army operations in Ukraine. The majority of Russian ground forces in Kaliningrad were assumed to be held in reserve for defense of the enclave, and were not available for offensive operations; they are not listed in this table.France, Poland, Rafale B/C 1, Norway, Stockholm F-16C 1 Canada, Poland CF-18C/D 0.5 Denmark Poland F-16C 1 Total 18.5 a Deployed from Spangdahlem, Germany. Deployed from Aviano Air Base, Italy. We allowed some NATO combat aircraft to be based in Sweden, based on discussions with RAND colleagues who have had informal discussions with Swedish defense officials about scenarios similar to this one. Analytically, this allowed us to explore the possible value of such arrangements. The relative abundance of bases available in Central and Western Europe, especially relative to the size of the deployed force, makes our results relatively insensitive to this assumption, although Swedish basing proved valuable insofar as it allowed NATO combat aircraft access to the battlespace that largely avoided the concentration of modern air defenses located in Kaliningrad. Deployed from Lakenheath Air Base, United Kingdom. One deployed from Lakenheath Air Base, United Kingdom. RUSSIAN FAIT ACCOMPLI CONFRONTS NATO WITH UNPALATABLE CHOICES Russian forces knocking on the gates of Riga and Tallinn in two or three days would present NATO leaders with a set of highly unattractive options. The leaders and people of the Baltic states, who would need to decide whether to defend their capitals, would confront the first quandary. Quality light forces, like the U.S. airborne infantry that the NATO players typically deployed into Riga and Tallinn, can put up stout resistance when dug into urban terrain. But the cost of mounting such a defense to the city and its residents is typically very high, as the residents of Grozny learned at the hands of the Russian Army in 1999–2000. Furthermore, these forces likely could not be resupplied or relieved before being over- whelmed. Whether Estonia’s or Latvia’s leaders would choose to turn their biggest cities into battlefields—indeed, whether they should—is, of course, uncertain. The second and larger conundrum would be one for the U.S. President and the leaders of the other 27 NATO countries. Under the best of circumstances, this would require a fairly prolonged buildup that could stress the cohesion of the alliance and allow Russia opportunities to seek a political reso- lution that left it in possession of its conquests. Even a successful counteroffensive would almost certainly be bloody and costly and would have political consequences that are unforeseeable in advance but could prove dramatic. Any counteroffensive would also be fraught with severe escalatory risks. If the Crimea experience can be taken as a precedent, Moscow could move rapidly to formally annex the occupied territories to Russia. NATO clearly would not recognize the legitimacy of such a gambit, but from Russia’s per- spective it would at least nominally bring them under Moscow’s nuclear umbrella. By turning a NATO counterattack aimed at liberating the Baltic republics into an “invasion” of “Russia,” Moscow could generate unpredictable but clearly dangerous escalatory dynamics. On a tactical level, a counteroffensive campaign into the Baltics would likely entail the desire, and perhaps even the necessity, of striking targets, such as long-range surface-to-air defenses and surface-to-surface fires systems, in territory that even NATO would agree constitutes “Russia.” Under Russian doctrine, it is unclear what kinds or magnitudes of conventional attacks into Russian territory might trigger a response in kind (or worse), but there would certainly be concern in Washington and other NATO capitals about possible escalatory implications. Finally, it is also unclear how Russia would react to a successful NATO counteroffensive that threatened to decimate the bulk of its armed forces along its western frontier; at what point would tactical defeat in the theater begin to appear like a strategic threat to Russia herself? The second option would be for NATO to turn the escalatory tables, taking a page from its Cold War doctrine of “massive retaliation,” and threaten Moscow with a nuclear response if it did not withdraw from the territory it had occupied. This option was a core element of the Alliance’s strategy against the Warsaw Pact for the duration of the latter’s existence and could certainly be called on once again in these circumstances. The deterrent impact of such a threat draws power from the implicit risk of igniting an escalatory spiral that swiftly reaches the level of nuclear exchanges between the Russian and U.S. homelands. Unfortunately, once deterrence has failed—which would clearly be the case once Russia had crossed the Rubicon of attacking NATO member states—that same risk would tend to greatly undermine its credibility, since it may seem highly unlikely to Moscow that the United States would be willing to exchange New York for Riga. Coupled with the general direction of U.S. defense policy, which has been to de-emphasize the value of nuclear weapons, and the likely unwillingness of NATO’s European members, especially the Baltic states themselves, to see their continent or countries turned into a nuclear battlefield, this lack of believability makes this alternative both unlikely and unpal- atable. The third possibility would be to concede, at least for the near to medium term, Russian control of the territory they had occupied. Under this scenario, the best outcome would likely be a new cold war, with the 21st century’s version of the old “inner German border” drawn somewhere across Lithuania or Latvia. The worst be would be the collapse of NATO itself and the crumbling of the cornerstone of Western security for almost 70 years.Cruice missiles attached to a B52 pylon NATO NEEDS HEAVY FORCES TO DENY RUSSIA A QUICK VICTORY In addition to assessing the viability of NATO’s current posture, our games explored enhancement options for creating a force that could deny Russia a swift victory in the first three days. Quality light forces, like the U.S. airborne infantry that the NATO players typically deployed into Riga and Tallinn, can put up stout resistance when dug into urban terrain. But the cost of mounting such a defense to the city and its residents is typically very high. Avoiding the fait accompli is valuable because it begins to present Russia with the risk of a conventional defeat and thereby is at least the beginning of a more credible deterrent. On the one hand, Russia today looks to its northwest and sees little between its forces and the Baltic Sea but highway and the prospect of forcing NATO into the three-sided corner described above. Our goal was to devise a posture that would present an alternative landscape: one of a serious war with NATO, with all the dangers and uncertainties such an undertaking would entail, including the likelihood of ultimate defeat at the hands of an alliance that is mater- ially far wealthier and more powerful than Russia. Nations can be tempted or can talk themselves into wars that they believe will be quick, cheap, victories that are “over by Christmas” but, historically, are far less likely to choose to embark on conflicts that they expect to be protracted, costly, and of uncertain outcome. We set out to identify at least one plausible NATO posture that would change Moscow’s calculus in this scenario from the former to the latter. Our results strongly suggest that a posture that could credibly deny the fait accompli can be achieved without fielding anything like the eight corps that defended NATO’s Cold War border with the Warsaw Pact. A total force of six or seven brigades, including at least three heavy brigades, backed by NATO’s superior air and naval power and supported by adequate artillery, air defenses, and logistics capabilities, on the ground and ready to fight at the onset of hostilities appears able to avoid losing the war within the first few days. Not all these forces would need to be forward stationed. Given even a week of warning, NATO should be able to deploy several brigades of light infantry to the Baltics. Soldiers from the U.S. 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team in Italy and the 82nd Airborne Division in North Carolina could be airlifted in within a few days, as could similar units from other NATO countries, including the United Kingdom and France. U.S. Army combat aviation assets rotationally based in Germany could self-deploy to provide some mobile antiarmor firepower, but by and large, these fast-arriving forces would be best suited to digging in to defend urban areas. In our games, the NATO players almost universally chose to employ them in that way in and immediately around Tallinn and Riga. What cannot get there in time are the kinds of armored forces required to engage their Russian counterparts on equal terms, delay their advance, expose them to more frequent and more-effective attacks from air and land-based fires, and subject them to spoiling counterattacks. Coming from the United States, such units would take, at best, several weeks to arrive, and the U.S. Army currently has no heavy armor stationed in Europe. America’s European allies have minimal combat-ready heavy forces. At the height of the Cold War, West Germany fielded three active corps of armored and mechanized units; today, its fleet of main battle tanks has shrunk from more than 2,200 to around 250. The United Kingdom is planning on removing all its permanently stationed forces from Germany by 2019; currently, only one British brigade headquarters, that of the 20th Armoured Infantry, remains in continental Europe, and the British government is committed to its withdrawal as a cost-saving measure. The quickest-responding NATO heavy armor force would likely be a U.S. combined arms battalion, the personnel for which would fly in and mate up with the prepositioned equipment of the European Activity Set stored in Grafenwoehr, Germany. Getting this unit into the fight is a complicated process that will not be instantaneous. Breaking out the equipment—24 M-1 main battle tanks, 30 M-2 infantry fighting vehicles, assorted support vehicles—preparing it for movement, transporting it by rail across Poland, offloading it, and roadmarching it forward into the battle area are unlikely to take less than a week to 10 days. Providing adequate heavy armor early enough to make a difference is the biggest challenge to NATO’s ability to prevent a rapid Russian overrun of Estonia and Latvia. It is critical to emphasize that this relatively modest force is not sufficient to mount a forward defense of the Baltic states or to sustain a defense indefinitely. It is intended to keep NATO from losing the war early, enabling but not itself achieving the Alliance’s ultimate objectives of restoring the territorial integrity and political independence of its members. But it should eliminate the possibility of a quick Russian coup de main against the Baltic states, enhancing deter- rence of overt, opportunistic aggression. There are several options for posturing the necessary heavy forces, each carrying different combinations of economic costs and political and military risks. For example, NATO could permanently station fully manned and equipped brigades forward in the Baltic states; could preposition the equipment in the Baltics, Poland, or Germany and plan to fly in the soldiers in the early stages of a crisis; could rely on rotational presence; or could employ some combination of these approaches. The next phase of our analysis will explore a range of these options to begin assessing their relative strengths and weaknesses.It is unclear whether denial of the prospect for a rapid victory would suffice to deter Russia from gambling on an attack on the “Baltic three,” were it inclined to contemplate one. What seems certain is that NATO’s current posture, which appears to offer Moscow the opportunity for a quick and relatively cheap win, does not. It is also important to point out that, critical though they are, maneuver brigades are insufficient in and of themselves. Armor and infantry battalions must be adequately supported with artillery, air defense, logistics, and engineering. Over the past 15 years, the Army has reduced the amount of artillery organic to its divisions and has essentially stripped out all air defense artillery from its maneuver forces. Further, there are presently no fires brigades in Europe able to augment the modest number of guns at the brigade and battalion level. This is in marked contrast to Russian tables of organization and equipment, which continue to feature substantial organic fires and air defense artillery, as well as numerous independent tube and rocket artillery and surface-to-air missile units. This disparity has had substantial impacts in our wargames. In one instance, in which NATO was playing with an enhanced force posture, the Blue team sought to use a U.S. armor brigade combat team (ABCT) to fight what was in essence a covering force action to delay the advance of a major Russian thrust through Latvia. A critical element of such a tactic is the use of fires to cover the maneuver elements as they seek to disengage and move back to their next defensive position. In this case, however, the ABCT was so thoroughly outgunned by the attacking Red force, which was supported by multiple battalions of tube and rocket artillery in addition to that of the battalion tactical groups themselves, that the battalion on one flank of the brigade was overwhelmed and destroyed as it sought to break contact, and the rest were forced to re- treat to avoid the same fate. The lack of air defenses in U.S. maneuver forces showed up in another game, in which two arriving NATO heavy brigades were organized into a counter- attack aimed at the flank of a Russian thrust toward Riga. Because the Russian Air Force is sufficiently powerful to resist NATO’s quest for air superi- ority for multiple days, the Red team was able to create “bubbles” in space and time to launch massed waves of air attacks against this NATO force. The absence of short-range air defenses in the U.S. units, and the minimal defenses in the other NATO units, meant that many of these attacks encountered resistance only from NATO combat air patrols, which were overwhelmed by sheer numbers. The result was heavy losses to several Blue battalions and the disruption of the counter- attack. This highlights a critical finding from our analysis: A successful defense of the Baltics will call for a degree of air-ground synergy whose intimacy and sophistication recalls the U.S. Army–U.S. Air Force “AirLand Battle” doctrine of the 1980s. The games have repeatedly identified the necessity for allied ground forces to maneuver within the envelope of friendly air cover and air support and for ground fires to play an integral role in the suppression campaign against Russia’s advanced surface-to-air defenses. Against an adversary, such as Russia, that poses multidimensional threats, airpower must be employed from the outset of hostilities to enable land operations, and land power must be leveraged to enable airpower. Preventing a quick Russian victory in the Baltics would also require a NATO command structure able to plan and execute a complex, fast-moving, highly fluid air-land campaign. This is not something that can safely be left to a pickup team to “do on the day”; it requires careful preparation. What cannot get there in time are the kinds of armored forces required to engage their Russian counterparts on equal terms, delay their advance, expose them to morefrequent and more-effective attacks from air- and land-based fires, and subject them to spoiling counterattacks.NATO corps that defended the inner German border during the Cold War each possessedadmittedly to different degrees in some cases, the ability to plan for and fight the forces they would command in wartime. Tactical and operational schemes of maneuver were developed and rehearsed; logistics support was planned; the reception, staging, and onward integration of reinforcing forces were laid out and, if never practiced in full, tested to an extent that lent confidence that procedures would work reasonably well when called upon. Traditionally, the level of planning called for in the initial phase of the defense has been the province of a U.S. corps. At the height of the Cold War, two Army corps under the operational command of 7th Army had planning responsibilities for Europe; today, none do. The Army should consider standing up a corps headquarters in Europe to take responsibility for the operational and support planning needed to prepare for and execute this complex combined arms campaign, as well as a division headquarters to orchestrate the initial tac- tical fight, to be joined by others as forces flow into Europe. Follow-on operations to rel- ieve and reinforce the initial defense and restore the prewar borders could well require at least one additional corps headquarters, which could be provided by a NATO partner or drawn from one of the Alliance’s nine preexisting corps. THE PRICE OF DETERRING DISASTER For more than 40 years, NATO’s member states made enormous investments to deter a potential Soviet attack on Western Europe. Today, the West confronts a Russia that has violently disrupted the post–Cold War European security order. Led by a man who has characterized the fall of the Soviet Union as the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century, Russia has at the very least put on hold the vision of a “Europe whole and free.” To the extent that Moscow believes that NATO poses a threat to its ability to exercise necessary influence along its periphery, the presence of the Baltic NATO members along its borders may well seem unacceptable..Since the early 1990s, the United States and its NATO partners have shaped their forces based on the belief that Europe had become an exporter of security, and for more than two decades that assumption held true. Unfortunately, the usually unspoken accompanying assumption—that the West would see any disruption to that status quo coming far enough in advance to reposture itself to meet any challenge that might emerge—appears to have missed the mark. Instead, Russia’s aggressiveness and hostility have caught NATO still resetting itself in a direction that is making it less prepared to deal with Moscow’s behavior. The first step to restoring a more-robust deterrent is probably to stop chipping away at the one that exists. If NATO wishes to position itself to honor its collective security commitment to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, its members should first hit the pause button on further steps that reduce its ability to do so. While some ongoing actions may be too far advanced to stop, the United Kingdom and the United States should evaluate whether additional withdrawals of forces from Germany are wise, given the changed circumstances. All members should reassess their force structures and postures with an eye toward deter- mining whether there are affordable near-term actions that can be taken that could in- crease the Alliance’s capability to respond to a threat to the Baltics and thereby strengthen deterrence of such a threat. These measures need not be limited to strictly military ones. For example, one challenge NATO would face in the event of a Baltic crisis would be moving heavy equipment and supplies from storehouses and ports in Western Europe east to Pol- and and beyond. A successful defense of the Baltics will call for a degree of air-ground synergy whose intimacy and sophistication recalls the U.S. Army–U.S. Air Force “AirLand Battle” doctrine of the 1980s. Substantial investments may be necessary to facilitate these flows, investments that becau- se they also benefit the civilian economy— may prove more politically palatable than direct expenditures on troops and weapons. But troops and weapons are also needed, and it verg- es on disingenuous for a group of nations as wealthy as NATO to plead poverty as an excuse for not making the marginal investments necessary to field a force adequate at the very least to prevent the disaster of a Russian coup de main. Buying three brand-new ABCTs and adding them to the U.S. Army would not be inexpen- sive—the up-front costs for all the equipment for the brigades and associated artillery, air defense, and other enabling units runs on the order of $13 billion. However, much of that gear—especially the expensive Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles—already exists. Some is available due to recent cuts in Army force structure; there is also equipment in long-term storage, and some could be transferred from Reserve Component units, if needed. So, although there may be some costs to procure, upgrade, or make serviceable existing equipment—as well as to transition units from one type to another—it is likely much less than $13 billion. The annual operating and support costs for three ABCTs plus enabling units—the price tag to own and operate the units—are roughly $2.7 billion.23 That is not a small number, but seen in the context of an Alliance with an aggregate gross domestic product of more than $35 trillion and combined yearly defense spending of more than $1 trillion, it is hard to say that it is a fortiori unaffordable,24 especially in comparison to the potential costs of failing to defend NATO’s most exposed and vulnerable allies—of potentially inviting a devastating war, rather than deterring it. It can be hoped that Russia’s double aggression against Ukraine is the result of a unique confluence of circumstances and that it does not portend a more generally threatening approach to the West. However, President Putin clearly appears to distrust NATO and harbor resentments toward it. His rhetoric suggests that he sees the Alliance’s presence on Russia’s borders as something approaching a clear and present danger to his nation’s security. Aggressive acts, angry—even paranoid— rhetoric, and a moderate but real military buildup combine to signal a situation where it may be less than prudent to allow hope to substitute for strategy. Taking measured steps to bolster NATO’s defensive posture in the Baltic states is not committing the United States and Europe to a new Cold War and does not signal irreversible hostility toward Russia. It is instead due diligence that sends a message to Moscow of serious commitment and one of reassurance to all NATO members and to all U.S. allies and partners worldwide. The first step to restoring a more-robust deterrent is probably to stop chipping away at the one that exists. If NATO wishes to position itself to honor its collective security commitment to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, its members should first hit the pause button on further steps that reduce its ability to do so. Methodology and Data: The research documented in this report was conducted in a series of wargames conducted between the summer of 2014 and early spring 2015. Players included RAND analysts and both uniformed and civilian members of various Department of Defense organizations, including the U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, Joint Staff, U.S. Army in Europe, and U.S. Air Forces, Europe, as well as NATO Naval Command, Europe. RAND developed this map-based tabletop exercise because existing models were ill-suited to represent the many unknowns and uncertainties surrounding a conventional military campaign in the Baltics, where low force-to-space ratios and relatively open terrain meant that maneuver between dispersed forces—rather than pushing and shoving between opposing units arrayed along a linear front—would likely be the dominant mode of combat.THE UNITED STATESDangeroU.S. Polarization!"We believe that the United States might not be able to control it's internal emotions as a Nation (6.1.21) and therefore risk taking the wrong decitions in foreign politics. This dangerous polarization can have a catastrophic concequence for the people of the world. It happened in Vietnam and with Afghanistan and it can happen again with the Peoples republic of China!"In the name of Human Dignity.The Russian withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 was an orderly and dignified affair. In sharp contrast to the withdrawal of the United States and NATO forces withdrawal of the same country 31.8.2021 which is a shameful and degrading experience which left thousands of people stranded waiting for their certain execution by the Taliban. Afghanistan became the mountain on which Western logic was pulverized. Warning lamps Flashing!And now. Warnings lamps are flashing, as nuclear powered nations seek to preserve an imagined threshold over an even more imaginary enemy. The people who brought us complete shame in Afghanistan are the very same people who now have control over the keys to the depots in Europe that store B61-12 thermo nuclear bombs. The collapse of Western logic in Afghanistan is the fuse which can bury Human Dignity.Dear friends and readers,The U.S. Federal Government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic exposes incompetence and decay. The conse-quences will play out over years to come. The COVID-19 crisis augurs three water-sheds: the end of Europe’s inte-gration project, the end of a united, functional America, and the end of the implicit social compact between the Chinese state and its citizens. As a result, all three powers will em-erge from the pandemic internally weakened, undermining their ability to provide global leadership. CLICK ON FLAG PLAY ANTHEM The Corona Virus is Accelerating America’s Decline! We have been living for some time in a G-minus-2 world of poor leadership by the U.S. and China.EuropeStart with Europe. As with the 2010-12 eurozone crisis, the bloc’s fault line today runs through Italy. Drained over decades of dynamism and fiscally fragile, it is too big for Europe to save and too big to let fail. During the pandemic, Italians have felt abandoned by their European partners at a moment of existential crisis, creating fertile ground for populist politicians to exploit. The images of Bergamo’s COVID-19 victims being carried in body bags by military convoy to their anonymous, unaccompanied burials, will long remain etched in the Italian collective psyche. Meanwhile, when addressing how to help pandemic-stricken member states, the European Union’s technocratic, ostrich-like elites lapse into the institutional alphabet soup — ECB, ESM, OMT, MFF and PEPP — that has become their default language. The continent’s leaders have faltered and dithered, from European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde’s apparent gaffe in March — when she said that the ECB was “not here to close spreads” between member states’ borrowing costs — to the bickering over debt mutualization and COVID-19 rescue funds and the reluctant, grudging incrementalism of the latest agreement. Suppose, as seems likely, that the successful economies of the EU core recover from the crisis while those on the bloc’s periphery falter. No political integration project can survive a narrative featuring a permanent underclass of countries that do not share their neighbors’ prosperity in good times and are left to their own devices when calamity strikes.The U.S.The United States’ decline, meanwhile, is over-predicted and under-believed. Even before the COVID-19 crisis, key U.S. institutions signaled decay: the incontinent presidency of Donald Trump, a gerrymandered Congress, a politicized Supreme Court, fractured federalism and captured regulatory institutions (with the U.S. Federal Reserve being an outstanding exception). Deep down, however, many of those Americans who see the decay reject the thesis of decline. They remain convinced that the country’s thick web of non-state institutions and underlying strengths including its universities, media, entrepreneurial spirit, and technological prowess, as well as the global supremacy of the dollar — provide the resilience America needs to maintain its pre-eminence. But so far, the world’s richest country has been by far the worst at coping with the pandemic. Although the US has less than 5% of the world’s population, it currently accounts for about 24% of total confirmed COVID-19 deaths and 32% of all cases. In rapid succession, therefore, America’s credibility and global leadership have been buffeted by imperial overreach (the Iraq war), a rigged economic system (the global financial crisis), political dysfunction (the Trump presidency), and now staggering incompetence in tackling COVID-19. The cumulative blow is devastating, even if it is not yet fatal. Many of these pathologies in turn stem from the deep and poisonous polarization in US society. Indeed, Trump is now goading his supporters into insurrection. Come November, even the basic democratic criterion of holding free and fair elections could end up being flouted. Of course, it would be alarmist and premature to see America’s far-reaching failures in the face of the COVID-19 crisis as threatening U.S. democracy or nationhood. But clinging adamantly to American exceptionalism at such a time seems like dangerous denialism.P.R.ChinaFinally, there is China. Since the time of Deng Xiaoping, the country has thrived on a simple, implicit agreement: citizens remain politically quiescent, accepting curbs on freedom and liberties, and the state — firmly under the control of the Communist Party of China — guarantees order and rising prosperity. But the COVID-19 crisis threatens that grand bargain in two ways. First, the Chinese authorities’ terrible initial handling of the pandemic, and in particular their catastrophic suppression of the truth about the COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan, has called the regime’s legitimacy and competence into question. After all, the social contract looks less attractive if the state cannot guarantee citizens’ basic well-being, including life itself. China’s true COVID-19 death toll, which is almost certainly higher than the authorities are admitting, will eventually come to light. So, too, will the stark contrast with the exemplary response to the pandemic by the freer societies of Taiwan and Hong Kong. Second, the pandemic could lead to an external squeeze on trade, investment, and finance. If the world deglobalizes as a result of COVID-19, other countries will almost certainly look to reduce their reliance on China, thus shrinking the country’s trading opportunities. Similarly, more Chinese companies will be blocked from investing abroad, and not just on security grounds — as India has recently signaled, for example. And China’s Belt and Road Initiative — its laudable effort to boost its soft power by building trade and communications infrastructure from Asia to Europe — is at risk of unraveling as its pandemic-ravaged poorer participants start defaulting on onerous loans. The COVID-19 crisis will therefore probably hurt China’s long-term economic prospects. Widespread internal rumblings have begun, even if they are less evident externally. Domestic disorder is unlikely, because President Xi Jinping could ratchet up repression even more ruthlessly and effectively than he already has. But the current social contract will seem increasingly Faustian to the average Chinese citizen. Command of resources is a prerequisite for power. But, as international-relations theory reminds us, projecting power beyond one’s borders requires a modicum of cohesion and solidarity within them. Weak, fractured societies, no matter how rich, cannot wield strategic influence or provide international leadership — nor can societies that cease to remain models worthy of emulation. We have been living for some time in a G-minus-2 world of poor leadership by the U.S. and China. Both have been providing global public “bads” such as trade wars and erosion of international institutions, instead of public goods such as stability, open markets, and finance. By further weakening the internal cohesion of the world’s leading powers, the COVID-19 crisis threatens to leave the world even more rudderless, unstable, and conflict-prone. The sense of three endings in Europe, America, and China is pregnant with such grim geopolitical possibilities.中國的法律權利親愛的朋友和讀者們。治安是中國的基石。祖國擁有在其自己的領土後院香港實施法律和秩序的合法權利。無需徵得任何其他國家的許可。在西方，這既不是很好理解也不是很受歡迎。西方天真的從“民主”和“權利”的角度講是政治上的壓迫，是宣傳。香港是祖國；只有一個。美國在製裁世界“每個其他”國家之前，應照顧好自己的人權和黑人公民問題。祝你有美好的一天，乾杯 China's Legal RightsDear friends and readers. Public security is the cornerstone of China. The Motherland has the legal right to enforce law and order in the backyard of Hong Kong in its own territory. No permission from any other country is required. In the West, this is neither well understood nor popular. The naivety of the West is political oppression and propaganda from the perspective of "democracy" and "rights." Hong Kong is the motherland, and there is only one! The United States should take care of its own human rights and black citizen issues before sanctioning "every other" country in the world. Have a nice day, cheers! FASCISM IN AMERICA"That which has happened is a warning!"Karl Jaspers"To forget it is guilt. It must be continually remembered. It was possible for this to happen. And it remains possible for it to happen again at any minute. Only in knowledge can it be prevented." Karl Theodor Jaspers German, Born 23 February 1883, passed away on 26 February 1969, was a German-Swiss psychiatrist and philo-sopher who had a strong influence on modern theology psychiatry, and philosophy. After being trained in and practicing psychiatry, Jaspers turned to philosophical inquiry and attempted to discover an innovative philosophical system. He was often viewed as a major exponent of existentialism in Germany, though he did not accept the label.The Stealthy Civil War OF the United States Polarization of the American society has become more evident under president Donald J Trump.Dear friends and readers!We have become aware of the violent culture underpinning American politics of today, even though such incidents are usually not acknowledged or reported, but often repressed and denied. The outcome of the first American civil war fought from 1861 to 1865 decided who should be included in the winner’s club and steer the new nation into the future. HISTORY REPEATS ITSELF The second American civil war, which is fought in our own time by stealth, is deciding who shall not be included in the winner’s club. It is against these two contradictory scenarios that many of the violent political deaths that has occurred in the United States speak more clearly to us, stand out in a way we have not realized before and warn us. Stay vigilant folks. Help fight terrorism, domestic and foreign. Report suspicious incidents to the authorities. Have a blessed day, cheers!NEVILLE AT CAPITOL HILLTHE DESTRUCTIVE FORCE OF THE AMERICAN PARTITOCRACYHe came, went, and lost. Gravely misunderstanding his oppo-nent’s narrative, naively showing off a piece of paper which had the support of the parties and his Government. People rejoiced little Adolf's signature. Surrounded by the masses, Prime Minister Chamberlain appeared confident indeed!A deal was reached on 29 September, and at about 1:30 a.m. on 30 September 1938, Adolf Hitler, Neville Chamberlain, Benito Mussolini and Édouard Daladier signed the Munich Agreement. On 30 September, upon his return to Britain, Chamberlain delivered his controversial "peace for our time" speech to crowds in London.With a typical laid-back self-reassuring British flair, the parties had for years argued back and forth weather little Adolf on the other side of the secure Channel was worth taking seriously. And in the meantime, little Adolf released a few tricks himself, he had hidden upon his sleeves; a provocative gesture here, a threat there. Never mind that, the parties said, we have enough Port to ride off that. The dictatorship of the self-reassuring, democratic partitocracy was in swing! The very safety valve which Democracy was dependent on, failed to open. And as a result, thousand of Londoners perished in flames, and all hell brought lose. Neville’s ghost! He came, stayed, and lost. Gravely misunderstanding his oppo-nents narrative, naively showing off his ball-cap with the inflammatory message, “Make America Great Again”. The masses rejoiced! On the Capitol Hill, Tom and Nancy, Chuck, and Mitch meant it well; with paper in hand each side proclaimed a moment of victory, futile as it was. Nine days after the Capitol was nearly burned down to the ground, these same representatives of the United States self-proclaimed, dysfunctional Democracy are still debating what to do with little Adolf, who just might have another trick hidden upon his sleeves. We have no guarantee that he has not. Capitol Hill, the very safety valve which the Democracy of the United States is dependent on has not opened. It imploded. Neville’s shadow again! The German-Swiss psychiatrist and philosopher Karl Jaspers once uttered, “If it has happened once, it can happen again. To forget it guilt.”In these desperate days, when we failed Democracy, we know for certain that it did happen again! You can’t blame little Adolf. It was the system that failed, Tom and Nancy, Chuck, and Mitch. Every one of them held up a piece of signed paper in their hands. And with it, brought Capitol down. Little Adolf will disappear, and Capitol must be rebuilt from the inside out. Ore, we might all go down in flames! 01/07/2021 12:00 AM ESTStatement of Acting Attorney GeneralJeffrey A. Rosen“Yesterday, our Nation watched in disbelief as a mob breached the Capitol Building and required federal and local law enforcement to help restore order. The Department of Justice is committed to ensuring that those responsible for this attack on our Government and the rule of law face the full consequences of their actions under the law. Our criminal prosecutors have been working throughout the night with special agents and investigators from the U.S. Capitol Police, FBI, ATF, Metropolitan Police Department, and the public to gather the evidence, identify perpetrators, and charge federal crimes where warranted. Some participants in yesterday’s violence will be charged today, and we will continue to methodically assess evidence, charge crimes and make arrests in the coming days and weeks to ensure that those responsible are held accountable under the law.” Our leaders are not qualified to bring Mankind safely forward1938 REVISITED?One mistake, and the world as we know it is gone. One slightest error, and the civilization that we so proudly and arrogantly cling to will dissolve into fine dust encircling our desolated planet. But, that fact does not seem to bother anyone. Wrapped in hyper-logic exasperations of the most desolated sort, mankind is rapidly drifting towards its own disintegration; proclaimed by rational world leaders as “a sustainable future” with “zero emission”. It is all a lie! There is no “sustainable future” and “zero emission” is a fantasy product presented, while death and destruction are filling our lungs. And I am not referring to the ongoing pandemic. Not at all. That, after all, is a minor incident in the Grand drama. In 1993 I went with the Norwegian-owned buoy-tanker Anna Knutsen from Antwerp in the Netherlands to the Statfjord C buoy on the Norwegian side. We collected 200.000tons of crude and brought it back to Teesside in England. There are twenty and more tankers shuttling up to Norway every month collecting crude. Each of these giants evaporate enough carbon-gas to destroy life in a small town. Multiply that with 2000, because that is the daily gift of poisonous vapor which Norway, in all it’s green, self-proclaimed hype, gives back to mankind. Just a thought. Here is another one. In 2003 I visited Fushun in North-East China. What’s so interesting about Fushun, you might ask? Fushun is the place of the Ping Ding Massacre. The one that Japan committed towards the local, Chinese population there. But, again, that is a minor incident in the Grand drama. For centuries Fushun’s West Pit has been the largest open-pit coal mine in Asia. It contributed greatly to China’s new prosperity, before it was shut down in 2019. We will accept any solution – and I underline “any” – to advance the economy. We will even burn down the Rain Forrest in Brazil. The common longue of renewable oxygen in the world. While lame European Union and the United States watch by and do nothing. We are on the edge of an unfathomable deep abyss. From where there is no hope of survival. Just as it was in 1938 in the German Reich. They believed in the cause and failed. We believe in our cause, and we are failing. Again. These days as we are living are the days of 1938 revisited. Our leaders are not qualified to bring mankind safely forward. Covid-19 has proved that. We are going down on a first-class ticket with no possibility of return. PAGE UNDER CONSTRUCTIONCONTINUES BELOW EMPTY SPACE

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Helmut Kohl was the Chancellor who voted for the Euro, created dialogue and common ground with Russa and united Germany together with Mikhail Gorbachev. Kohl was a German statesman who served as Chancellor of Germany from 1982 to 1998 and as the chairman of the Christian Democratic Union from 1973 to 1998. From 1969 to 1976, Kohl was minister president of the state Rhineland-Palatinate. Kohl chaired the Group of Seven in 1985 and again in 1992.

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中文版

太空中的中國

我們衷心祝賀中國在航天航空領域取得的巨大成就。中華古文明驕傲人的全部潛力，如今已為世人所欽佩。我們預測中華人民共和國將首次登陸火星。

Petrofilm.com 的主編 Harald Dahle-Sladek 在美國太空飛行器 Gemini 10 內拍攝電視紀錄片《Space 1989 歐洲的未來》。

我們必須與中華人民共和國建立對話和共同點。中國絕不能孤立。那會導致戰爭

他們在國家內部建立了一個國家。他們自己宣稱自己凌駕於法律之上，同時繼續騷擾和破壞許多人的生命。在他們遵守法律的門面的背後，他們將自己的人民賣給了外國勢力。這些人喜歡被抬頭仰望，帶著令人難以置信的虛榮心雜亂無章地走來走去。這些人通過邀請外國軍隊和熱核武器將許多人的生命置於極大的危險之中，這些人被帶到了挪威的土地上。歷史將評判這些叛徒。

中國的法律權利

法治是中國的基石。祖國擁有在其自己的領土後院香港實施法律和秩序的合法權利。無需徵得任何其他國家的許可。在西方，這既不是很好理解也不是很受歡迎。西方在民主和“權利”方面天真爛漫的言論常常被表現為政治壓迫，並被用作宣傳。香港是祖國；只有一個。

CHINA’S LEGAL RIGHT

Law and order are the corner stone of China. The Motherland has legal right to impose law and order in it’s own territorial backyard, Hong Kong. Without having to ask any other country of permission. In the West, this is neither not very well understood nor liked. Western naivete spun in terms of democracy and “rights” are often presented as political oppression and used as propaganda. Hong Kong is the Motherland; and there is only one.

親愛的讀者們。

總編輯的真誠意見是，最好是在同情，尊重和尊嚴的基礎上與俄羅斯和中國建立對話與共同點，而不是加劇緊張局勢並冒著核對峙的危險。由於這個簡單的原因，除了英語以外，petrofilm.com還被部分翻譯成俄文和中文。在這種情況下，俄羅斯意味著俄羅斯人居住在歐洲大平原上烏拉爾山脈以西的歐洲一側。謝謝您的理解，祝您有美好的一天。

騷擾和破壞許多人的生活

挪威的秘密警察在本州內作為一個州運作

戰爭還沒有結束。 1945年結束的戰爭一直持續到今天。挪威秘密警察的目標對像是秘密警察，奧斯陸司法部和其他部門的作家，記者和反對違法行為並無視人權的人。挪威警察和卑鄙的人在為美國大使館的SIMAS計劃監視自己的居民時違反了第90條的規定。

完全無視人權

違反了§90，間諜段落，挪威法律，《歐盟基本權利憲章》和《聯合國人權》

這位無法無天的秘密警察滲透了天主教堂，使教會對自己教會的成員發動攻擊。秘密警察在商店，工作場所的人中散佈虛假謠言，以無視和排斥國家敵人。竊聽手機並使用獲得的信息進一步使生活變得更具破壞性。從航空公司獲取飛行數據以進行跟踪和進一步騷擾。關注國外人士。在西班牙和其他國家開展活動，以鎮壓反對派。在奧斯陸的街道上激怒人們，向他們走去，在商店的門口封鎖入口，到達人們的工作場所以招惹麻煩，從而將人們開除。他們使用廉價策略，散佈同性戀和其他偏見的謠言，以進一步抹黑人們。他們拜訪目標的鄰居，並告訴他們這個人是壞人。他們盡一切可能破壞任何有反對自己意見的人的生活。特別是那些將與俄羅斯對話而不是戰爭的人。您將目光投向當今挪威的東方，您的生活就好壞了。秘密警察可以與無數與他們合作的人接觸。他們通過人民工作，因此其行為的印記不明顯。真理，人權和正義的叛徒。

挪威的秘密警察：“事實就是我們所說的”

戰爭結束後的挪威納粹警察已經消失，但邪惡的實質核心卻沒有消失。這就是今天的挪威，與沃爾特·烏爾布里希特（Walter Ulbricht）領導下的東德民主共和國復員，斯大林（Satlin）統治下的生活以及克羅地亞（Ante Pavelic）統治下的克羅地亞處於同一水平。挪威有一個光輝的民主國家-獨裁政權的獨裁統治，侵蝕著人民的真正繁榮和真正人權，並在一個國家內部作為一個國家運作。 Petrofilm.com擁有大量有關“秘密國家”運作的證據。這不是玩笑或幻想，它是真實的。今天的挪威魁斯林（Quslings）賣光了挪威的人口，摧毀了反對派。

當我們與人類有關時，會特別想到三個詞：同理心，尊重和尊嚴。您將在此處閱讀和觀看的是這三個詞的反義詞，並結合了一個常見的口號“法西斯主義”。法西斯主義的種子存在於我們內部，在一般公眾中，它在一個有魅力的法西斯領袖領導下，在適當的時候出現在這裡。

在我自己與人打交道和進行一般對話的工作中，我發現我們中的許多人無法以溫暖，同情和人性的眼光看待另一個人。我認為這種缺陷是造成不和諧，衝突和戰爭的幾個主要原因之一。我稱這種現象為人與人之間的冷漠。

另請參閱中文文件夾中的中文文本

主編相信與中國建立良好的雙邊關係和持久和平符合人類的利益。各國和人民必須放眼長遠，共同努力。

Translation: The Editor-in-chief believes that establishing good bilateral relations and lasting peace with China is in the interests of Mankind. Countries and people must take a long-term view and work together.

與中華人民共和國建立對話與共同點

親愛的讀者們。

潛艇與英國的

F-35核威懾力量 

先鋒級是為皇家海軍服務的英國核動力彈道潛艇。每艘潛艇最多配備16枚UGM-133 Trident II導彈。該類是1994年引入的三叉戟核計劃的一部分。該班級包括四艘潛艇：先鋒，維克托里烏斯，警惕和復仇。它們是由Vickers Shipbuilding and Engineering在1986年至1999年在Barrow-Furness建造的，現在由BAE Systems擁有。這些潛艇位於蘇格蘭格拉斯哥以西的HM海軍基地克萊德。

英國的核威懾態勢英國逐漸鞏固了其核力量，因此僅保留了海上戰略威懾成分。英國的獨立核威懾力量通常被稱為“三叉戟”，它由三個主要要素組成：“先鋒”級潛艇是運載“三叉戟”彈道導彈的平台。四艘“先鋒”級潛艇（SSBN）保持連續的海上威懾（CASD），這意味著一艘船始終配備三叉戟導彈進行巡邏。該級從1992年開始服役，並將繼續服役至2030年代。如果英國要維持CASD，一旦潛艇達到使用壽命，則需要使用新型的SSBN來取代Vanguard。這種導彈的射程超過4000海裡，是英國核彈頭的運載工具。根據1998年戰略防禦評論（SDR）和2010年戰略防禦與安全評論（SDSR）的限制，現在每艘Vanguard潛艇只能部署8枚作戰導彈和不超過40枚核彈頭。英國的核彈頭庫存。

建立和維護英國核儲存的基礎設施位於伯克郡的兩個原子武器設施（AWE）站點

2引言有報導稱，影子國防部長埃米莉·桑伯里（Emily Thornberry）審查了勞方國防計劃，考慮以機載系統取代英國目前的潛艇核威懾方案。1該計劃將看到取消先鋒繼任者潛艇計劃，從而終止英國的潛艇計劃。當前的持續海上威懾（CASD）姿態。作為替代方案，將開發一種基於自由落體核彈的能力，這是英國在1950年代和1960年代最後一次使用的一種威懾手段，這項政策建議最初是在2015年大選之前為智庫CentreForum起草的。分析師兼前皇家空軍情報部門儲備人員托比·芬威克（Toby Fenwick）。23芬威克先生是自由民主黨的成員，是該黨的“三叉戟政策工作組”成員。4根據該計劃，英國的洛克希德·馬丁公司F-35輕型II多用途戰鬥機的未來機隊正在採購國防部將進行“雙重使用”，以交付B61-12制導核炸彈。有人提出這架飛機不能提供全天候的能力，但是一旦發生危機，它可能會迅速動員。有關英國的CASDposture可以被機載核力量取代的建議對裁軍，能力，歐洲有嚴重影響。威懾力和成本增加，需要仔細檢查

3對基於F-35的核威懾提案裁軍的批評摘要

批評者認為，利用“雙重用途”飛機進行任何形式的核共享都違反了《核不擴散條約》（NPT）的第一條。根據托比·芬威克（Toby Fenwick）的提議，意大利是《不擴散核武器條約》規定的無核國家，仍將是北約核共享安排的一部分。可以看到，B61-12型熱核精密自由落體重力炸彈安裝在F-15E攻擊鷹的塔架

建議將B61-12炸彈的準確性，低產量和對地面穿透能力相結合，使其成為北約核武庫中最有用的核彈。如果英國要開發托比·芬威克（Toby Fenwick）設想的新功能，那將意味著開始一項測試計劃。這不僅會很昂貴，而且很可能違反《核禁試條約》。有人爭辯說，只有將北約飛機交付的戰術核武器完全從歐洲撤走，並僅憑歐洲對戰略核力量的威懾力量，才能為華盛頓和莫斯科創造必要的政治環境，以減少俄羅斯自己的戰術核武器。

能力

基於F-35的核力量將無法達到對敵對國家造成不可接受的損害所必需的全部目標，因此不會取得可信的威懾力。空軍基地和航空母艦容易受到核打擊和常規的先發製人打擊以及恐怖主義。與當前的“三叉戟” II彈道導彈相比，飛機在空中時更容易受到地空導彈的攻擊。在危機期間，基於飛機的系統將需要進行可見部署，這在任何外交危機中都有可能破壞穩定和升級的影響，因為其他國家將能夠在英國動員其核力量時發現。

根據俄羅斯的核武庫現代化計劃，僅基於B61-12自由落體炸彈的英國獨立核威懾力量對有效防禦威懾未來威脅的能力將極為有限。將飛機交付的戰術核武器整合到英國和意大利這兩個國家，將進一步使北約的核威懾態勢合法化，這種態勢不適合冷戰後21世紀的安全環境。以英國為基礎的美國和英國的戰略彈道導彈系統是第二個決策中心，有助於確保東歐盟國保有北約的防禦能力。降低北約核威懾的信譽可能會受到東歐反對派的反對，並可能給歐洲安全環境帶來更大的不確定性。

托比·芬威克（Toby Fenwick）的論文低估了在英國維持本土造船能力的價值。芬威克對於基於F-35的核力量的能力的錯誤估計直接導致他大大低估了有效的基於F-35的核威懾力量的成本。對於英國是否能夠操作維持可信的核威懾所需的所需飛機數量，存在著嚴重的疑問，如果確實這種類型的平台完全適合這種角色的話。由美國領導的F-35計劃充滿了技術和財務問題，涉及許多其他夥伴國家。依靠這個平台提供英國的核威懾力量將是巨大的風險，特別是與英國主權潛艇產業的穩定相比。基於三叉戟的系統的退役可能會花費數十億美元

文本也用單獨的文件夾翻譯成中文

恥辱！

像美國這樣技術最先進的國家怎麼可能是數字最差，死亡最多的國家呢？之所以發生這種情況，是因為該國的領導層已經腐爛到核心，更多地關注貪婪而不是生命。下圖來自紐約

我們不需要的是電視屏幕上的另一張面孔，bla或其他解釋。站在美國文化中謀殺其公民。將貪婪擺在生前。不安？是的，你應該是！假使人類誤入歧途的假領導者，只不過表現出正派，欺詐和犯罪的光彩。是的，人不單靠麵包生活。但是，如果我們的領導人不以理智和道德的態度對自己的內心和思想都有所了解，那麼我們的救贖將從何而來呢？

你們中有人聽說過建立對話和共同立場嗎？

我們必須與中國建立和平與穩定，而不是仇恨和建立隔離牆。中國是人類重要和尊重的一部分，如果人類要生存，就必須包括中國。對於你們所有人-包括WION-TV-您是否想與中國開戰？顯然，因為您可惡的言論一次又一次證明了您積極進取，而您的主要興趣是批評。

“向量”威脅

俄羅斯火箭專家在分析美國彈道導彈能力和具有遠距離彈道能力的防空導彈時發現，問題在於美國火箭無法攔截中層中的任何彈道導彈，即高度在35000m至80000m之間。因此，俄羅斯一直致力於開發高超音速巡航飛行手段，這些距離正是在這些不同的高度。美國彈道導彈防禦系統使用的原理是將火箭送入太空，並在撞擊點附近計算彈道導彈的彈道。

美國的攔截彈正在以固體燃料作為亞軌道火箭運行。一旦啟動，便無法停止並且無法調節牽引力。更重要的是，攔截彈將不符合彈道導彈的目標彈道計算，迴避機動以及有關導彈攔截彈的計算。北約的國防存在巨大漏洞！如今，北約正處於關鍵的切入點，如果該聯盟不成為沒有爪子的紙老虎，那麼所有國家都必須應對媒介威脅！伙計們，要保持專注和警覺！消除恐怖主義的一切禍害，對所有人來說都是美好的一天。

捍衛我們的自由

總統拜登（Joe Biden）必須立即重啟與俄羅斯的核對話，以確保歐洲的持續和平，就像裡根（Regan）總統和戈貝切夫（Gorbechev）秘書長在他之前所做的那樣。

今天，包括這位作家在內的許多人都認為，美國應該而不是一直批評某些國家並以長期制裁對其進行懲罰，而是應該首先考慮自己的國內問題！ 1961年，德國猶太人社會心理學家埃里希·弗洛姆（Erich Fromm）在墨西哥和美國居住並當過心理學家，哲學家和作家，後來在瑞士洛迦諾生活和工作，發表了他的論文“人類可以預防嗎？

他在對外交政策的事實和虛構進行的分析中對冷戰進行了分析。弗洛姆指出，“美國，美國和蘇聯都使用相同的預測，將對方視為敵人，並主張結束這種危險的對抗。左圖顯示的是1971年，埃里希·弗羅姆（Erich Fromm）在他位於瑞士洛迦諾的公寓里手稿。波紋管圖片顯示了1961年11月4日至9日在東德西柏林的弗里德里希大街的美國和俄羅斯坦克對桶的情況。潛在的極端危險情況。

這在許多方面都類似於今天的海灣地區局勢，以及北約與俄羅斯在烏克蘭之間不斷升級的對抗。

挪威的逻辑障碍

美国对北越政权的近乎狂热的批评夺去了282,000名美国人的生命，合计1,353,000。从您自己之外的其他角度对待其他国家可能会带来可怕的后果。 2000年，挪威怀着雄心壮志进入伊朗，三年后被驱逐出境。 2010年，挪威向刘晓波颁发了诺贝尔和平奖，此后不久，他就被赶出了中国。在这两种情况下，挪威都使用支票簿外交手段向后爬行。白俄罗斯目前有一位统治者，他知道他想要什么。挪威总理索尔伯格访问了立陶宛维尔纽斯，并会见了反对卢卡申科总统的领导人斯韦特兰娜·蒂哈诺夫斯卡娅。挪威也不喜欢普京总统。地球上陆地面积最大的国家的领导人。但这似乎并不重要。挪威支持香港所谓的民主反对派团体，这些团体将这座城市变成了战区，为自己的“权利”而战。压制香港是祖国的事实。

觸摸圖片播放視頻

Macron一需要一支歐盟聯合軍事力量來使歐洲擺脫美國的威脅，尤其是在特朗普宣布退出冷戰時代的核條約之後。 “我們必須保護自己，不論是中國，俄羅斯甚至是美國，”他告訴歐洲一家廣播公司，他首次暗示歐洲可能需要從美國進行自衛。法國總統已經制定了主要的國防開支，以使法國與北約的支出目標保持一致，正在帶頭建立一支獨立於北約的九國歐洲快速反應部隊。

挪威諾貝爾委員會濫用職權

，並在政治背景下使用該獎項來推動挪威議會Stortinget的議程。他們於2003年與伊朗和七年後與中華人民共和國合作。這兩個例子都證明挪威議會，挪威諾貝爾委員會和奧斯陸外交部在建立可持續對話和國際關係共識方面的能力嚴重缺乏經驗。在這種情況下，挪威為聯合國的共同利益為聯合國安理會作出貢獻的事情對我們來說仍然是一個謎。

中國的法律權利

親愛的朋友和讀者們。治安是中國的基石。祖國擁有在其自己的領土後院香港實施法律和秩序的合法權利。無需徵得任何其他國家的許可。在西方，這既不是很好理解也不是很受歡迎。西方天真的從“民主”和“權利”的角度講是政治上的壓迫，是宣傳。香港是祖國；只有一個。美國在製裁世界“每個其他”國家之前，應照顧好自己的人權和黑人公民問題。祝你有美好的一天，乾杯

PC2000地震調查

當被判有罪的欺詐者Norex Group的Kjell G Finstad乘坐BGP的Xu Wenrong登上豪華護衛艦Grace並逃走了數百萬。閱讀文章。

尊敬的讀者和朋友們！

我們已經意識到當今支持美國政治的暴力文化，儘管通常不承認或報導這類事件，但經常壓制和否認這種事件。 1861年至1865年美國第一次內戰的結果決定了誰應該加入獲勝者俱樂部，並引領這個新國家邁向未來。第二次美國內戰是在我們自己的時代通過隱身進行的，它決定誰不應該包括在獲勝者俱樂部中。

正是在這兩種矛盾的情況下，美國發生的許多暴力政治死亡事件使我們更加清楚地表達了自己的看法，以我們以前從未意識到的方式脫穎而出，並向我們發出了警告。保持警惕。幫助打擊國內外恐怖主義。向當局報告可疑事件。祝你有美好的一天，加油！

北約核

核空軍基地，歐洲，美國核倉庫，美國海軍早期預警，即時響應相控陣雷達

歐洲和美國以及北約之間的深刻分裂不能成為歐洲土地上戰術核武器的守護者。必須由歐洲控制，而不是由美國控制。Macron一需要一支歐盟聯合軍事力量來使歐洲擺脫美國的威脅，尤其是在特朗普宣布退出冷戰時代的核條約之後。 “我們必須保護自己，不論是中國，俄羅斯甚至是美國，”他告訴歐洲一家廣播公司，他首次暗示歐洲可能需要從美國進行自衛。法國總統已經制定了主要的國防開支，以使法國與北約的支出目標保持一致，正在帶頭建立一支獨立於北約的九國歐洲快速反應部隊。

中國的法律權利

總統唐納爾·J·特朗普造成了非常危險的內部和跨大西洋崩潰！

迪士尼樂園是這個國家最高的智力貢獻。

這方面只有批評。跨大西洋的關係是極限！特朗普皇帝與歐洲政治領導人和北約夥伴進行對話-長官貴賓犬除了詹斯·斯托爾滕貝格，聽話的北約秘書長唐納德·J·特朗普。老實說，我們不感激！
我們也不重視美國拒絕《 INF條約》並使歐洲脆弱的事實。皇帝的最後誓言是一時興起裁減美軍在德國！一遍又一遍地證明唐納德·J·特朗普總統是我們不信任的人。但是，他應該向真正的總統約翰·肯尼迪（John F. Kennedy）學習，他給了歐洲人，尤其是德國人民在困難時期的希望和方向。但是他沒有！

挪威諾貝爾委員會濫用職權

。在世界外交舞台上取得的驚人成就。

伊朗與挪威之間的局勢是一場災難，隨著挪威國家石油公司（Statoil）受賄案的迅速展開，僅用了十二個月，挪威就被徹底踢出了伊朗。 2010年之後不久，挪威又引爆了另一枚外交炸彈，這次是與中國一起爆炸的，這是天真地向中國反對派人物溫家寶頒發了諾貝爾和平獎。挪威花了十年的時間在中華人民共和國建立了新的外交據點。波斯和中國是人類最古老的兩種文化，在不到十年的時間裡都拒絕了挪威的使用。在世界外交舞台上取得的驚人成就。

你們中有人聽說過建立對話和共同立場嗎？

Translation: Have any one of you heard of creating dialogue and common ground? We must create peace and stability with China, not hate and build walls. China is an important and respectful part of Humanity, and if Humanity want to survive, China must be included. To all of you - including WION-TV - do you want war with China? Clearly, because your hateful rhetoric proves again and again that you are aggressive and that your main interest is to criticize.

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習近平，我們的中國夢

還重申

TikTok還重申，它從未與中國當局共享數據，也從未按照當局的命令審查內容。該公司進一步表示，將近整整一年它一直試圖與美國進行真誠的談判。Bytedance寫道：“相反，我們遇到的是一個沒有考慮事實的政府，沒有通過標準的法律程序就規定了協議的條款，而是試圖干預私人公司之間的談判，” Bytedance寫道。

COVID-19並非中國病毒，必須停止陰謀論

與中國建立對話與共同點。我們不建議進行熱核戰爭。

與中國和平相處

中華人民共和國對美國和歐盟的持續騷擾作出了反應。世界人民應該放眼長遠，與中國建立對話和共同立場，而不是短視，以便人民解決共同問題，鼓勵良好合作。 COVID-19是共同的全球挑戰，需要最佳的合作。中國的污名化和政治化是幼稚的，不是很聰明，並且有潛在的危險。我們只有一個星球，讓我們共同努力。中國是和平與穩定的重要貢獻者。

隱秘的平民戰爭美國。

在唐納德·J·特朗普總統的領導下，

美國社會的兩極分化變得更加明顯。

我們已經意識到當今支持美國政治的暴力文化，儘管通常不承認或報導這類事件，但經常壓制和否認這種事件。 1861年至1865年美國第一次內戰的結果決定了誰應該加入獲勝者俱樂部，並將這個新國家引領到未來。

第二次美國內戰是在我們自己的時代通過隱身進行的，它正在決定誰不應該包括在獲勝者俱樂部中。正是在這兩個矛盾的情況下，美國發生的許多暴力政治死亡事件使我們更加清楚地表達了自己的看法，以我們從未意識到的方式脫穎而出，並向我們發出了警告。保持警惕。幫助打擊國內外恐怖主義。向當局報告可疑事件。祝

我們必須與中華人民共和國建立對話和共同點。

中國絕不能孤立。那會導致戰爭

香港

中國的法律權利

歐美關係

中國不能克制，過去三十年來美國一直在睡覺。歐美之間的關係發生了衝突，夥伴關係也因此破裂。 Covid-19暴露出西方領導人的災難性缺乏和準備。華盛頓可以在20年前與德黑蘭握手，但要讓這個“千載難逢的機會”從窗口中消失。閱讀我的深入文章。

總統唐納爾·J·特朗普造成了非常危險的內部和跨大西洋崩潰！

迪士尼樂園是這個國家最高的智力貢獻。

這方面只有批評。跨大西洋的關係是極限！特朗普皇帝與歐洲政治領導人和北約夥伴進行對話-長官貴賓犬除了詹斯·斯托爾滕貝格，聽話的北約秘書長唐納德·J·特朗普。老實說，我們不感激！

我們也不重視美國拒絕《 INF條約》並使歐洲脆弱的事實。皇帝的最後誓言是一時興起裁減美軍在德國！一遍又一遍地證明唐納德·J·特朗普總統是我們不信任的人。但是，他應該向真正的總統約翰·肯尼迪（John F. Kennedy）學習，他給了歐洲人，尤其是德國人民在困難時期的希望和方向。但是他沒有！

我們愛這個國家

當她起來時

遙遠的挪威像金子一樣閃閃發光

她今年43歲，是奧斯陸一家計算機商店的商店經理。一天，四個男人和一個女人進入商店。他們在她為客戶服務的辦公桌前排隊。五人小組中的一位女士走近她，說：“我的硬盤驅動器有問題，”她拿著一個小的便攜式驅動器，“您能幫我修理一下嗎？”她問櫃檯後面的女人。她回答說：“我們在這裡不做這種操作，”但是我當然可以嘗試為您私下修復它，如果您可以接受的話，明天您可以在這裡收集它。”中年婦女同意為這項服務支付40美元。”

第二天，女人回到商店。商店經理說：“在這裡，我為您固定了驅動器。”女人回答：“我不要！”商店經理說：“但是，為什麼……我們達成協議！”女人就說：“我不要，因為你是私下做的！”

兩天后，告訴女店長與計算機商店的老闆，律師和她的朋友會面。她來了。她的朋友律師介紹了一個不知名的人。他說：“他是在這里工作的人。我有關於您的投訴。”律師指著他面前桌子上的四封信。這些信是從奧斯陸警察學院（Politiskolen）寄來的。困惑的商店經理回答：“能給我看看嗎？”她伸胳膊收到一封信。律師回答：“對不起，不，您不能看看。”

商店經理被踢出了商店經理職位。沒有工作，沒有錢，沒有食物。在隨後的三十年中，同一名婦女在街上遭到騷擾，從字面上走下來，竊聽電話，工作被拒絕，工作被破壞，汽車經銷商作為項目的一部分給她的汽車突然從她身邊奪走。在有人打電話給經銷商並給她口臭之後她曾經去過的天主教堂裡的神父和修女被介紹了關於她的虛假故事。一位神父在教堂內襲擊了她。她每週在商店，咖啡館，餐館，公共圖書館和公共場所受到騷擾。

為什麼今天在挪威會發生這種情況？因為這位誠實的女人曾是挪威最大的報紙《 Aftenposten》和右翼報紙《 Morgenbladet》的記者，並且多年來一直是一名自由職業者，並寫了關於俄羅斯可能滲透到歐洲和平運動中以抗議釋放的報導美國製造的中子炸彈銷往歐洲。她還寫過關於俄羅斯在挪威的行動的文章，並通過她的工作與在奧斯陸的俄羅斯人擦臂。挪威當局和秘密警察不關心違反《聯合國第23條》，工作權和大規模侵犯基本人權的情況。

這名婦女現在得知另一個國家，另一個挪威“正在崛起”。壓抑和邊緣生活之一。她還活著，但是有多長時間，還不確定。一支警察部隊在凌晨4點將挪威猶太人從床上拖下，擠進他們等待的出租車，然後將其運送到波蘭的納粹滅絕營，這絕對不會讓一個人喪生！他們完全沒有問題，可以讓一個人安德·貝林·布雷維克（Ander Behring Breivik）徹底站起來，無論他在奧斯陸還是在外島（烏托亞）都沒有開槍射擊來阻止他，工黨兒童和青少年度假營。當天有數千名上班的警察中，沒有人有權干預。 “是的，我們熱愛這個崛起的國家……”

挪威人是一個好人。善良的人。一個可以信任的人。這就是為什麼來挪威的人們喜歡在這裡的原因。但是，在集體心理中的某個地方，我不確定這是什麼時候發生的，挪威人必須做出生存選擇。扮演溫柔的失敗者的角色，他們需要更強大的狗的安心支持，或者堅持真正的愛國主義，這種愛國主義足以站得住自己的兩隻腳。足夠可靠，可以被他人信任，足夠強大，不能利用美利堅合眾國的慷慨。

我們都想賣東西。天氣是54架F-35戰鬥機，服務，石油和天然氣，有時甚至是我們。一些人已經表明，挪威已經有充分的理由成為美國的第51個州。當挪威人唱歌時說：“是的，我們愛這個國家，因為它崛起。”這是有必要問的，他當時指的是哪個國家？這個國家是自由世界的燈塔，美國還是歐洲最外圍的一塊狹長的土地，它正努力成為對自己和人民誠實的不誠實的人？

漲潮時，我們有六個小時的時間來拍攝地震線。這是4471號線。在這裡，我們位於Hendijan的泥灘上，兩邊都是皮帶驅動的車輛，這些車輛分別來自中國石油天然氣集團公司（CNPC）和地球物理勘探局（BGP）。在右側的後面，將兩公斤炸藥向下推至十米，然後引爆。然後，地震檢波器開始接收地震信號。

挪威的寂寞之魂

她說，她是六十年代的虛弱女性，在挪威生活了四十年。她來自英國，與挪威人結婚。

他去世後，她繼續住在奧斯陸時尚區之一比格多（Bygdøy）的房子裡。 “我在這裡住了四十多年。我從來沒有受到鄰居的邀請，甚至沒有喝咖啡或談話。我丈夫去世後，我感到非常孤獨。”紮根於英國文化的人們容易相處並互相邀請喝茶，這對她而言尤其困難。

可悲的是，在挪威，尤其是在奧斯陸，很少有人或從未有人邀請過鄰居。確認。 “他們只是孤立自己，因為沒有人在乎，然後他們獨自一人死亡。這是挪威財富，金錢，自然和大肆宣傳的幸福魅力幕牆的背面。奧斯陸主要藥店之一的負責人證實：“自殺率很高，合法化的人越來越多，而且整個社會都在邊緣化。”幾千年來，挪威人互相邀請來喝杯咖啡，而我本人也被邀請來了，但那是遙遠的北方，但現在已經不復存在了。挪威人變得懶惰，自食其力，並且在許多方面對待生活和同胞的方式變得人性化。挪威作為社會幸福展示的神話是一個故事。

挪威的逻辑障碍

总编辑

美国对北越政权的近乎狂热的批评夺去了282,000名美国人的生命，合计1,353,000。从您自己之外的其他角度对待其他国家可能会带来可怕的后果。

2000年，挪威怀着雄心壮志进入伊朗，三年后被驱逐出境。 2010年，挪威向刘晓波颁发了诺贝尔和平奖，此后不久，他就被赶出了中国。在这两种情况下，挪威都使用支票簿外交手段向后爬行。

白俄罗斯目前有一位统治者，他知道他想要什么。挪威总理索尔伯格访问了立陶宛维尔纽斯，并会见了反对卢卡申科总统的领导人斯韦特兰娜·蒂哈诺夫斯卡娅。挪威也不喜欢普京总统。地球上陆地面积最大的国家的领导人。但这似乎并不重要。挪威支持香港所谓的民主反对派团体，这些团体将这座城市变成了战区，为自己的“权利”而战。压制香港是祖国的事实。

觸摸圖片播放視頻

危險的行為

地方法院法令

親愛的讀者和朋友們！

唐納德·J·特朗普總統已將國民警衛隊和其他可疑人物進入美國城市和州，以維護秩序與和平。該法案不會阻止陸軍國民警衛隊或國家授權的國民警衛隊在其本州或相鄰州內以執法身份行事-關鍵是要受到該州州長的邀請！

通過拒絕尊重擔任州長的人民的意願，總統有意繞開了《波斯國民憲法》的真正含義。要合理。對平民人口使用戰爭型武力是否合理且相稱？不它不是。正如我們所看到的那樣，這將導致無政府狀態，甚至導致更加危險和日益加劇的兩極分化，由此產生的結果是不確定的。我的總統應該在批評美國人之前首先考慮自己的性格。

環顧Barents歐洲北極地區

總編輯

該地區被稱為Barents歐洲北極地區。這個最北端的區域通過挪威，瑞典，芬蘭和俄羅斯與北部邊界向巴倫支海方向延伸。該地區是歐洲大陸的最北端，突然掉入大海，消失了。歐洲大陸突然冰冷的巴倫支海盡頭，這清楚地證實了曾經在這裡發生的地質過程。

挪威最終進入了歐洲巴倫支海

巴倫支歐洲北極地區包括挪威，瑞典，芬蘭和俄羅斯。

眾所周知，歐洲突然之間毫無預警地完成了！親身體驗這個第一手資料會對旅行者產生重大的心理影響，他們敢於走近這個“幽靈般”的區域。特別是在11月，12月和1月之間的冬季。為什麼冬季旅行？我從12月23日至1月6日乘坐Richard S渡輪來回旅行。因此，我申明我有一個“實用的”冬季經歷。北極圈位於南部的兩個奈斯恩站和奧恩山脈之間。再往北。

雄偉的沿海輪渡“理查德·威斯（MS Richard With）”全速駛過大海！

10月19日，俄羅斯北部一個多雨的城市會見了來自Barents World及其他地區的旅行者。歷史悠久的城市阿爾漢格爾斯克再次向世界展示了一些東西-兩國人民的關係及其合作，這對於生活在北方的人們而言是值得注意的。隨著俄羅斯將巴倫支/歐洲北極理事會（BEAC）的主席移交給瑞典，發生了一個重要事件。

等等。從北一站到下一站。下雪了，船慢慢駛過有時是淺海峽。這些沿海渡輪上的船長本身就是也操縱這些船的船長的兒子。船體下方的大沙洲移動，狹窄的通道機動，保持高度警惕。

有光。但這是另一種光。經過北角，歐洲邊緣和北極之間沒有任何東西。風在吹，光線必須遵循自然循環。突然，一個小小的人被與自己比自己大得多的東西的巨大接觸“俘獲”。可以觀看，而不是爭論。沿著挪威海岸的冬季旅行有助於提高心理意識和深度，這是在灰色和弱色光中體驗生活的獨特機會。和冷！ -12至-27之間，風不開。帶一件很厚的冬衣！

沿海地區的人們紛紛前來-邀請您喝咖啡。他們對我做了！（這僅在冬季，輪渡半滿或半滿，具體取決於您的需求。）食物非常美味，當您越過北極圈時，您將在寬敞的飯廳裡的食客面前在冰水中洗禮

。

數。真冷！旅程結束後，您和我一樣會感到“重生”-並且您將永遠不會忘記剛剛經歷過的爬行動物的大腦。因為此旅程不是大腦認知部分的體驗，也不是迪斯尼樂園的錯覺

核威懾

威懾的定義各不相同，但已故著名學者肯尼思·沃爾茲（Kenneth Waltz）提出了一個普遍的定義，即核武器比常規武器更能可靠地阻止國家參戰。可信度和能力對威懾至關重要，因為它們會影響嚴厲程度和懲戒程度。

特定威懾態勢的可信度是基於對潛在攻擊者的威懾力和威脅的可實現性進行評估的主觀判斷。 MoD用以下術語定義威懾：

令人信服的潛在侵略者認為，脅迫或武裝衝突的後果將超過潛在的收益。這就要求維持具有明確的政治意願採取行動的可信的軍事能力和戰略。政府2013年的《三叉戟替代方案評論》將英國的核力量描述為：

“作為政治手段而不是戰爭手段，這是不得已而為之的手段，它是在危機期間能夠在短時間內向適當規模和非常高的一系列目標發出核打擊的最低核威懾能力。置信度。”

信譽標準

可信和有效的核威懾以五個標準為基礎：可讀性，可及性，解決能力，生存能力/無敵性和破壞力。

擴大威懾力

一個國家的核武庫首先保護那個國家免受外部侵略。因此，核武器與國家主權概念緊密相關。但是，人們普遍同意，核威懾也可以擴大到無核盟國。原則上，所需要的只是核武器國家的一項聲明，即它將對以核手段對其盟友的襲擊進行報復。然而，這種承諾是否會被認為是可信的則完全是另一回事。

沒關係美國傳播什麼，只有來自這一方面的批評，而跨大西洋的關係正處於斷裂點。唐納德·J·特朗普皇帝正在與歐洲政治領導人和北約夥伴進行對話，除了詹森·斯托爾滕貝格，唐納德·J·特朗普的服從的北約秘書長貴賓犬。坦率地說，我們對此不感激。

記者卡爾·伯恩斯坦（Carl Bernstein）週一在美國有線電視新聞網（CNN）的一項調查中稱，唐納德·特朗普總統與德國總理安格拉·默克爾的電話交談“如此不尋常”，以至於德國官員被要求保密。

消息人士告訴CNN，特朗普以“非常激進”的方式鄙視默克爾，稱她為“愚蠢”，並指責她“在俄羅斯人的口袋裡”。

一位消息人士告訴美國有線電視新聞網：“他在電話中最堅強，在他看來是弱者，而在最弱者中他是最弱者。”

消息人士告訴CNN，儘管為回應特朗普與默克爾的對話採取了特別措施，但德國總理還是採納了美國總統的言論“就像鴨背上的水一樣”。

我們也不讚賞美國退出《 INF協議》並使歐洲脆弱。皇帝的最新口號是一時興起削減美軍在德國！一次又一次地證明唐納德·J·特朗普總統是我們不能信任的人。但是，他本應該從真正的總統約翰·肯尼迪那裡學到的，他給歐洲人，特別是德國人民帶來了困難時期的希望和方向。但是他沒有。

歐洲人將自己決定，歐洲決不能成為美國的附庸國！最終，歐洲的戰術核武器必須由新的歐洲陸軍控制。保持警惕。睜大你的眼睛和耳朵。與國內外恐怖主義作鬥爭祝你有美好的一天。乾杯!

挪威人口得不到任何保護，什麼都沒有！

挪威的新Quislings是個人，對國際刑事法院戰爭罪行法庭負有刑事責任，並應受懲罰在新戰爭爆發前的幾年中，挪威向左，右和中央派發了和平獎，同時又將本國人口騙向了威脅生命的核角，從那裡沒有生存的希望。挪威的超級官僚使人民準備死，沒有生存的希望。

巴拉克·奧巴馬（Barack Obama）總統應獲得什麼獎項，而不是由挪威國會選拔的華盛頓諾貝爾委員會（Norwegian Nobel Committee）以外的諾貝爾和平委員會。這與阿爾弗雷德·諾貝爾（Alfred Nobel）的獎項構想相去甚遠。圖片：奧巴馬在奧斯陸舉行的諾貝爾頒獎典禮上從諾貝爾委員會主席蓋爾·倫斯塔達上課。

核共享是北約核威懾政策中的一個概念，其中涉及沒有自己的核武器的成員國，例如挪威，計劃由北約使用核武器，特別是為這些國家的武裝部隊提供了條件在使用這些武器時參與交付這些武器。

在1960年代後期，成立了北約核計劃小組，以解決歐洲希望對美國的核計劃施加影響的願望。這些核共享安排將緩解歐洲人，尤其是德國人對簽署《不擴散條約》的擔憂。

挪威的新奎斯林

在ICC戰爭犯罪法庭中是個人，刑事責任人並應受懲罰

第7條

將危害人類罪定義為“在了解攻擊的情況下，作為針對任何平民的廣泛或系統攻擊的一部分而犯下的行為”。

第8條

根據武裝衝突是國際衝突（通常意味著在國家之間進行戰鬥）還是非國際衝突（通常意味著在非國家行為者（例如反叛團體）之間或在國家與國家之間進行戰鬥）來定義戰爭罪行。此類非國家行為者）。第8條列出了總共74項戰爭罪。

CLICK PICTURE FOR THE ICC WEB PAGES

在新戰爭之前的幾年中，挪威向左，右和中央派發了和平獎，同時又將本國人口騙入了威脅生命的核角，沒有生存的希望。奧斯陸的大佬官僚讓它的人口準備死了！Vidkun Quisling在他的時代也這樣做，他在戰後被處決。

德國哲學家卡爾·賈斯珀斯（Karl Jaspers）：“如果曾經發生過一次，

那就有可能再次發生！” 主編：“如果挪威不是非常非常謹慎，它可能會再次發生。”

Vidkun Quisling：“我真的相信我所做的是正確的事情！”

挪威人口得不到任何保護，什麼都沒有！

挪威人口

將無法吸收大規模的俄羅斯反擊

下圖：在Zapad-2017演習中，Iskander M導彈在哈薩克斯坦命中目標。容量增加的導彈飛行了480公里，成功擊中了哈薩克斯坦馬卡特射擊場的目標。

下圖：伊斯坎德爾M平台上的兩枚導彈。迅速，精確和無情的報復。

我將一如既往地彬彬有禮，首先將這句話告訴對方。希望您能從歷史和地理角度上進行反思，如果您已經忘記了，請允許我仔細地提醒您，直到烏拉爾（Ural）屬於北歐平原的俄羅斯大陸。 70％的俄羅斯人口居住在烏拉爾以西。因此，俄羅斯“本身”是歐洲生活中一個完整，和平與積極的組成部分。

舉起兩個典型的天然氣管道Nord Stream 1和Nord Stream 2就足夠了。德國公司和俄羅斯之間的合作以及俄羅斯公司在德國的合作對兩國和歐洲都至關重要。沒關係美國怎麼說。歐洲人必須自己決定，歐洲決不能成為美國的附庸國。歐洲的戰術核武器必須由新的歐洲陸軍控制。保持警惕。睜大你的眼睛和耳朵。與國內外恐怖主義作鬥爭祝你有美好的一天。乾杯!

永遠的朋友？

一個人不能通過將狗屎扔在另一側並表現出好像一個人擁有該地方的方式來營造良好的氛圍

一個人不能通過將狗屎扔在另一側並表現出好像一個人擁有該地方的方式來營造良好的氛圍。圖片來自2003年5月在國家石油公司NIOC總部舉行的挪威與伊朗伊斯蘭共和國上次部長級會議。左側是伊朗，石油部長是左手Namdahr Zangeneh編號樹閣下。挪威的右邊是能源和石油部長，埃納·斯坦森斯閣下閣下從右數第六。照片（C）2003 Harald Dahle-Sladek

Y-12橡樹嶺國家安全中心

Y-12國家安全中心是美國能源部國家核安全管理局的設施，位於田納西州橡樹嶺，靠近橡樹嶺國家實驗室。Y-12國家安全中心由Babcock＆Wilcox Y-12運營（B＆W Y-12），並由WSI-Oak Ridge保護

你好朋友！ Pantex工廠位於得克薩斯州阿馬里洛（Amarillo）東北，是美國進行核武器最終組裝，拆卸和維護的主要設施。

Pantex是國家核安全局（National Nuclear Security Administration）核安全企業（Nuclear Security Enterprise）的六個生產設施之一。我們感謝美國為維護歐洲的安全與和平提供的慷慨支持。保持警惕！我們必須團結一致，以一切邪惡手段打擊恐怖主義，並向當局報告可疑活動。祝你有美好的一天！

航空之星飛機廠俄羅斯烏里揚諾夫斯克航空工業園區

主編從迪米特羅夫格勒到伏爾加河附近的薩馬拉，並住在列寧的出生地烏里揚諾夫斯克。 “我們參觀了在冷戰期間生產戰略轟炸機的AVIASTAR飛機工廠，” Harald Dale-Sladek說。

1970年代初期從頭開始設計生產下一代戰略轟炸機，但不清楚哪一個，Ulyanovsk航空生產中心，在1991年11月成為由自己的員工控制的股份制企業後，更名為Aviastar，據說是最大的世界上的航空業生產以及俄羅斯的最新生產。

俄羅斯艦隊將在未來7年內更新70％

弗拉基米爾·普京（Vladimir Putin）參加了在克里米亞船塢鋪設的兩艘新登陸艦的活動。幾年前，在克里米亞加入俄羅斯之前，這些造船廠正在衰落。但是現在俄羅斯艦隊的更新正在緊鑼密鼓地進行中。普京從克里米亞接觸了聖彼得堡和塞弗德文斯克的造船廠，那裡也正在建造新船。北約和烏克蘭在黑海開始聯合實踐的明確信號是：最好將它們帶離克里米亞海岸和俄羅斯水域。俄羅斯的新艦已經擁有新的高超音速武器

美國是否解除了製裁

在2016年和2018年之間真的發生了嗎？'

尊敬的讀者和朋友們。雖然，有人可以辯稱，所謂的美國製裁在2016年至2018年間確實發生了。但是，有理由相信，當外國資產控制辦公室OFAC對同一時期與伊朗和伊朗資產有業務往來的外國個人進行尖銳而令人不快的調查時，會得出這樣的結論：制裁併不意味著任何事情。”如果您的意圖是在知情的情況下規避美國與伊朗的政治，我們認為這是一個非常糟糕的主意，並且將產生後果。

北流2

允許在丹麥使用錨定舖管機

由俄羅斯天然氣工業股份公司（Gazprom）領導的在俄羅斯波羅的海建造Nord Stream 2天然氣管道的公司Nord Stream 2 AG已獲得丹麥當局的許可，可使用帶錨的管道鋪設船代替動態定位船。Nord Stream 2項目由兩條平行的管道組成，總長度為1230公里，用於將俄羅斯的天然氣通過波羅的海運輸到德國。

B61-12

如果他們將到達俄羅斯領土，那就是懷疑

北約核

核空軍基地，歐洲，美國核倉庫，美國海軍早

期預警，即時響應相控陣雷達

核空軍基地-歐洲-美國核武器庫，美國海軍-預警預警，即時響應，相控陣雷達

歐洲和美國以及北約之間的深刻分裂不能成為歐洲土地上戰術核武器的守護者。必須由歐洲控制，而不是由美國控制。

歐洲美國

今天我們比冷戰時期更接近核戰爭！特朗普國內和跨大西洋瘋狂的崩潰！

我將一如既往地彬彬有禮，首先將這句話告訴對方。對於更歷史性和地理性的思考，謝謝。如果您已經忘記了，請讓我小心地提醒您，直到烏拉爾（Ural）屬於北歐平原的一部分之前，俄羅斯都是一片大陸。 70％的俄羅斯人口居住在烏拉爾以西。因此，俄羅斯“本身”是歐洲生活中一個完整，和平與積極的組成部分。

美國以其單方面政策，消極和仇恨的言論，正在推動德國，波蘭和挪威與俄羅斯聯邦發生衝突。另一方面，我們的目標是創造對話和共同基礎，並緩解緊張局勢。

足以支撐兩條天然氣管道Nord Stream 1和Nord Stream 2，這是當今德國公司與俄羅斯以及俄羅斯和德國的俄羅斯公司之間合作的主要例證。這對兩國和歐洲都至關重要。別管美國說什麼，因為只有來自這一方面的批評，而跨大西洋的關係正處於斷裂點。唐納德·J·特朗普總統正在與歐洲政治領導人和北約夥伴對話，坦率地說，我們對此不感激。他應該向約翰·肯尼迪總統學習，他給了歐洲人特別是德國人民以希望和方向。

在華盛頓的軍事計劃者眼中，歐洲不過是單方面和以自我為中心的唐納德·J·特朗普政府的危險性，單方面製裁政治的緩衝區。畢竟，美國從未在自己的領土上經歷過重大國際衝突，現在押注自己的未來，即下一場戰爭將繼續進行，並將再次失敗於歐洲的生存灰燼！歐洲人必須自己決定，歐洲不能成為美國的附庸國。最終，歐洲的戰術核武器必須由新的歐洲陸軍控制。

保持警惕。睜大你的眼睛和耳朵。打擊恐怖主義，無論在國內還是國外，都具有邪惡的力量。祝你有美好的一天。乾杯!

挪威對中國龍的荒謬虛偽和俄羅斯熊。
主編

點擊圖片觀看中國異議人士劉曉波入獄獲諾貝爾和平獎

1977年11月，我被挪威最大的報紙《 Aftenposten》送往意大利羅馬，報導政治，電影和電視。當意大利廣播電台（RAI）從黑白轉為彩色電視的那個月，當電視主持人Rosanna Vaudetti將我介紹給馬奇尼廣場（Piazza Mazzini）的電視新聞室時，她顯得更加迷人和風度翩翩，米蘭的現場故事與AMPEX融為一體羅馬的錄音故事。那時我在Qurinal宮（意大利共和國總統的官邸）進行了會談，當時他是現任總統Giovanni Leone的兒子Jancarlo Leone。

點擊圖片觀看蘇聯外交大臣安德烈·格羅米科與意大利總統喬凡尼·利昂

意大利共和國總統喬瓦尼·利昂先生閣下，左三，妻子和三個兒子。揚卡洛·萊昂（Jancarlo Leone）從右數排名第二。

President of the Italian Republic His Excellency Giovanni Leone, number three from left, with wife and three sons. Jancarlo Leone is number two from right.

六個月後，遭到十槍擊中，意大利第38任總理Aldo Moro遇難。被激進的極左組織紅旅正式殺害。北約與中央情報局和美國合作的比利時格拉迪奧後備部隊是真正的肇事者。

1940年4月9日，德國軍隊佔領了奧斯陸。

German troops take Oslo 1940

卡爾·賈斯珀斯（Karl Jaspers）：“如果它曾經發生過一次，那麼它可能會再次發生！”

1978年，在冷戰中期，我對歐洲的基督教佩斯運動進行了深入研究，主要是在丹麥，荷蘭和德國。這些熱情的信徒團體抗議美國的“中子炸彈”（Neutron Bomb），該炸彈可殺死人類和動物，但其基礎設施完好無損。但是歐洲的年輕一代則相反。在阿姆斯特丹，柏林和哥本哈根之間爆發了大規模的示威遊行，這清楚表明，這種炸彈在歐洲領土上不受歡迎。但是，最大的問題是，這些反中子彈和平團體是否得到了莫斯科的財政支持。

Click picture to watch: London, protests for Peace against War

點擊圖片觀看：倫敦，抗議和平戰爭

歐洲針對美國中子彈的示威

Demonstrations in Europe against the American Neutron Bomb

我會見了人們，打了些電話，做筆記。其中一個電話是俄羅斯奧斯陸大使館。我們仍然在1978年，我為右翼報紙“ Morgenbladet”撰稿。我應邀在奧斯陸的挪威秘密警察臨時秘書處辦公室聊天。在那兒，我遇到了一個向俄羅斯大使館打來的特別電話，以及我所說的話。

這些句子是脫離上下文的，並作為串謀的證據發給我。當然，這顯然是胡說八道。這是一項巨大的調查，為了獲得結果，我不得不努力。此外，我的印像是PTS希望以孤立的陳述和曲解的故事為基礎。

二十九年後的2007年，來自PST的人們進入我在奧斯陸的工作地點，要求我把我趕出去。這違反了《人權》第23條，該條規定人人有權工作。但是警察因不尊重挪威簽署的國際條約而聞名。自2007年冬季以來，我一直被拒絕在挪威從事所有工作，在包括教堂在內的公共場所遭受了數千次騷擾。

我們寫信並希望對正確的問題有答案，我們使用的是人類的權利以及聯合國人權和《歐洲聯盟憲章》的權利。但是挪威卻不這樣認為。 2010年，挪威諾貝爾委員會授予劉曉波中國人“諾貝爾和平獎”，以表彰其“為在中國實現基本人權的長期而非暴力的鬥爭”。

挪威戲劇作家易卜生（Henrik Ibsen）：-挪威應該首先考慮自己，而不是批評其他國家。

Henrik Ibsen: Norge burde se mer på seg selv først, istedet for å kritisere andre land.

正如挪威劇作家賴恩·易卜生（Henrik Ibsen）曾經說過的那樣：“挪威應該而不是批評其他任何人，而要首先研究自己！”挪威政府的荒唐偽善，拒絕我的工作並將挪威猶太人送往波蘭的毒氣室的挪威國家警察，以及挪威諾貝爾委員會的愚蠢，使挪威成為了本世紀偽善的“世紀最佳國家”。

挪威於2000年加入伊朗伊斯蘭共和國，成為該國經歷過的最嚴重的外交和工業災難的序幕。 2010年，在挪威議會任命的挪威諾貝爾委員會向被囚禁的中國人權活動家劉曉波頒獎之後，與中國的噩夢般的關係才使它黯然失色。

從1998年1月到2003年5月，我在伊朗伊斯蘭共和國工作。前兩年，我用六艘地震船記錄了世界上最大的2D地震項目，將伊朗的沿海地區從北部的Hendijan映射到阿曼海。接下來的幾年，我在德黑蘭進行了高層對話。 2002年4月，我在德黑蘭外交部與阿里·阿哈尼（Ali Ahani）大使和侯賽因·阿德利（Hussein Adeli）博士副對外經濟事務部長，中央銀行行長，駐渥太華大使館和東京進行了會談。

德黑蘭外交部大使阿里·阿哈尼·哈拉爾德·達勒·斯萊德克

Ambassador Ali Ahani Harald Dahle-Sladek in the Foreign Ministry Tehran

挪威終於在2000年進入伊朗伊斯蘭共和國。然後，德黑蘭的外交部等待了二十年或更長時間，想知道為什麼挪威沒有採用其專門的深水技術來幫助伊朗建設南帕爾斯項目以及其他近海和陸上項目。

至少可以說，當我於2002年4月到達德黑蘭外交部時，心情很陰沉。阿里·阿哈尼（Ali Ahani）大使很生氣。挪威外交部多年來一直在街頭兩旁發揮作用，以培養與伊朗反對派團體的接觸，例如聖戰者默克（Mejahidin Kalk MEK）。挪威人的態度是親切的，但態度僵硬，沒有反映出伊朗文化及其人民的偉大。德黑蘭非常受傷。

伊朗反對派組織Mujahedin Kalk

Mujahedin Kalk: Iranian oposition Organization

達勒·斯拉德克（Dahle-Sladek）：-關於挪威和伊朗關係的阿哈尼（Ahani）大使，我注意到您有些惱怒，為什麼？

阿里·阿哈尼（Ali-Ahani）：-實際上，伊朗伊斯蘭共和國和挪威有很多機會。除了經濟和工業合作，我們還有石油和天然氣。我想強調我們完成在波斯灣南部和里海的油氣項目的重要性。挪威和伊朗是兩個重要的產油國，可以在世界石油市場上進行合作與協調並穩定油價，這既符合石油生產國的利益，也符合石油消費者的利益。

挪威外交大臣揚·佩特森先生

Foreign Minister Mr. Jan Pettersen

達勒·斯拉德克（Dahle-Sladek）：-您提到挪威外交大臣揚·佩特森（Jan Pettersen）訪問德黑蘭是一個分水嶺。你能解釋一下嗎？

阿里·阿哈尼（Ali-Ahani）：事實上，在過去幾年中，我們的關係缺乏足夠的勢頭來進一步擴大我們的關係。實際上，與歐洲其他國家相比，我們與挪威的關係處於落後狀態。外交部長對德黑蘭的訪問顯示了貴國對擴大與伊朗關係的堅定決心。當然，伊朗伊斯蘭共和國政府具有這種政治意願和熱情！

Dahle-Sladek：-謝謝Ahani博士。

這次秘密的挪威警察PST在哪裡？儘管我單槍匹馬地穿透了美國所謂的世界第一恐怖主義國家，但我什麼也沒聽到。從2000年至2004年，我與伊朗駐奧斯陸大使一直保持著親密和友好的關係，而Noghrehkar Shirazi閣下閣下，並於2007年在奧斯陸軍事協會會見了伊朗外交部長Manouchehr Mottaki。

伊朗外交部長Manouchehr Mottaki和主編Harald Dahle在2007年挪威奧斯陸軍事學會上

今天，挪威公民的警察監視已經超過了DDR中對STASI的監視。與狂熱並存的是同一名警察對挪威猶太人的培育。挪威納粹高級警官在警察中任職很久，直到1960年代。引用德國哲學家卡爾·賈斯珀斯的話說：“如果發生過一次，就可以再次發生！

你好朋友！在戰後實施當前的“陷進”戰略時，對挪威的領導層來說，與我們我們非常尊重的美國朋友一起玩似乎更為重要，而不是想出一個更聰明，更充分的準備在當今精確的導彈技術仍是科學幻想的時代建造的，比當今的大型洞穴更靈活，更便宜，更不易受傷害的替代品。

挪威軍隊再也不能讓其軍事人員在演習中使用實彈，因為挪威棘手的國防預算實在是微不足道！這向東方俄羅斯發出了多麼美妙的信號。挪威有一種防禦，但主要是在紙面上以及在高權力走廊的政要之間的非約束性對話中。

在發生嚴重國際危機的情況下，裝有遠程巡航導彈9M728的Iskander-K導彈，射程未知，但估計範圍為2000公里，將從伊拉克邊境轉移至Alakurtti軍事基地48公里。由於距離足夠近，足以威脅美國海軍陸戰隊在挪威特隆德拉格縣的八個預置洞穴。

伊斯坎德爾有幾種不同的常規彈頭，包括集束彈藥彈頭，燃料-空氣炸藥增強爆炸彈頭，高爆炸性碎片彈頭，用於掩體掩體的對地穿甲彈和用於反雷達任務的電磁脈衝裝置。

該導彈還可以攜帶核彈頭。 2017年9月，KB Mashinostroyeniya（KBM）總設計師Valery M.Kashin說，伊斯坎德爾至少有七種導彈，其中包括一枚巡航導彈。下圖：炸彈中熱核鏈反應的發展。

A WARNING SIGN FOR OUR TIME

Monuments Carved in Granite on Barren Fields

By Harald Dahle-Sladek

When one talks about Life, it is pertinent to ask, what life does one mean? The entire life, or just selected parts of it? The parts that we like and prefer and leave the rest not to be mentioned? The person who says she “loves me”, but ignore everything that I have achieved after I came out of the hospital?

The people who will walk a mile with me, but say “no thank you” to carry my burden and walk another mile? The ones who never invited me for a cup of tea, but proclaim seriously that I am a “friend”? The ones who admire their own achievements highly, but never had time to visit me once? What life are they adhering to? The one in parts, or the one in totality?

A warning sign for our time.

I want to be seen in totality; I do not want that my life be selectively butchered and twisted into something it is not. My articles are monuments in stone in a barren landscape devoid of humanism. They are there to warn and to encourage, but not to be neglected.

In today’s vain world, where it has become so increasingly popular to talk IN a mobile phone, instead of empathizing WITH and showing human DIGNITY; where one is accustomed to appreciating media hype, political lies, lack of responsibilities leading to mass starvations and mass death. In such a world and coldness between people, the abnormal has become the trend, and sadly this is what we adhere to.

In such an inter-human setting, the message is clear: why bother to respect the other person right in front of ourselves. It is so much easier to babble because the spoken word carries no longer any commitment. It is free and it does not cost anything to say this or the other. Life is easy when one is free not to engage in another person’s life-and-death experiences, when it is so much more convenient to look at a movie.

People who ignore monuments carved out in granite on barren fields are confirming themselves to the believes of death and destruction. We who write and warn have the humanistic right to say this. It is our task in life. Not to be kind to death and destruction, but to admire and encourage Life. We expect the same from others as we expect from ourselves. And if “the other” fail, we must go forward alone, and warn. That is our destiny.

TEHRAN

Seyed Mohammad Hossein Adeli PhD

Deputy Foreign Minister for Economic Affairs

Governor of the Central Bank - Ambassador to Tokyo and Ottawa

Secretary General of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum

Dr. Adeli explains Iran's view regarding Afghanistand and the U.S. The success of the United States in Afghanistan also comes as the active support from Iran. A golden opportunity for Washington to better its relations with Tehran went out of the window.

CLICK PICTURE PLAY VIDEO

Dr. Adeli: "Great disappointment!"

This interview was conducted in Dr. Hussein Adeli's office in the Foreign Ministry in Tehran. It was the first of two meetings that Harald Dahle had with Dr. Adeli. The first was in April 2002, and the second meeting was held in May 2003.

During the interview made in April of 2002 it became quite clear to the Editor-in-Chief, that the rejection of the United Sates to appreciate what Iran had done for the country in Afghanistan, neither did not sit well with the upper echelon of the Islamic Republic of Iran, nor was it well received by the Deputy Foreign Minister for Economic Affairs. This would have been a Golden Opportunity for the United States to better the relations with Iran, but in wain. Washington was not ready to hand Tehran a firm handshake.

Dahle: -Tehran has sent an invitation to Washington for a meeting and better the relations between the two sides. I understand that the United States has rejected this initiative. How do you view the current relations with the U.S. after this disappointment?

Adeli: -Well, actually our relations with the West in general has improved a lot during the last, may be four, five years.

Dahle: -Yes.

Adeli: -Specially with the policies that have been followed by President Khatami, Dialogue among Civilization, the Rule of Law, the Principles of Civil Society, the elimination of tensions between Iran or other countries, the elimination of misunderstanding. All of these policies have been seriously followed by Iran in its Foreign Policy and has contributed to the relations with all countries except the United States. And with the West in general we have been able to exchange delegations on the level of Foreign Minister and head of Governments.

Dahle: -Aren't the operations of the United States in Afghanistan very much based on the early assistance from Iran?

Adeli: -But with the United States, it is unfortunately to see, that even developments in Afghanistan, which owes a lot to understanding and effective assistance from Iran, has not, I believe, been able to penetrate into the hearts or the minds of decision makers in the United States.

Dahle: -Without the help from Iran in Afghanistan, you say that the United States would not have been where they are now?

Adeli: -I think that there is no doubt, even in the American eyes, that what we now see in the situation in Afghanistan owes a lot to Iranian assistance, Iranian understanding. The military success of the United States owes a lot to understanding and appreciation from Iran, and also the political process in Afghanistan owes the same thing.

Adeli: -And may be that was a very unique opportunity for the United Sates to reciprocate these kinds of understanding, and to seize and stop those kinds of policies that are pursued by them, in the past couple of decades. But apparently there is still not a very strong sign from that side.

Dahle: -Iran has friendly relations with many countries in the world, so why not also with the United States?

Adeli: -Off course, the general policy of Iran is to have friendly relations with every country in the world, including the United States, provided that this kind of relationship would be based on an equal footing, on a mutual beneficial sort of relationship. So, this is why I think that, as the policies of the United States, which are normally a unilateral policy, we hope that one time they would join the other countries of the West and developing countries, and would join that kind of understanding of Iran. That the developments in the region would open their eyes, and that they would adopt a new policy towards our country!

Dahle: -Thank you Dr. Adeli.

GASPROM

EUROPE'S DEPENDENCE ON RUSSIAN GAS

FINLAND

FINLAND AND SWEDEN TO JOIN NATO. RUSSIA COUNTRES WITH PUTTING NUCLEAR MISSILES IN KALININGRAD. IS NATO REALY DEFENDING OUR FREEDOM OR JUST THINKING THAT IT IS?

Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor is a fifth-generation, single-seat, twin-engine, all-weather stealth tactical fighter aircraft developed for the United States Air Force.

REINFORCING DETERRENCE ON NATO'S EASTERN FLANK

Hello friends! The US think-tank RAND with close ties to the military, just completed a very important study with regards to NATO allies defence of the Baltic states Estonia and Latvia. And the result is pretty darn gloomy reading. For my own part I will also ad Norway.

NATO today is not able to defend it's most vulnerable states! Please read the report yourself and make up your own opinion. We must fight ISIS and terrorism in all it's uglyness. Keep your eyes and ears wide open and repport anything suspicious. Cheers!

A RAND CORPORATION STUDY

Russias's Planned Expansion Dwarfs NATO's

NATO CANNOT SUCCESSFULLY DEFEND THE TERRITORY OF ITS MOST EXPOSED MEMBERS

In a series of wargames conducted between summer 2014 and spring 2015, the RAND Corporation examined the shape and probable outcome of a near term Russian invasion of the Baltic states. The games’ findings are unambiguous.

As currently postured, NATO cannot successfully defend the territory of its most exposed members. Across multiple games using a wide range of expert participants in and out of uniform playing both sides, the longest it has taken Russian forces to reach the outskirts of the Estonian and/or Latvian capitals of Tallinn and Riga, respectively, is 60 hours.

THE SUWALKI GAP NATO'S NIGHTMARE

DEFENDING THE BALTIC REPUBLICS A STRATEGIC CHALLENGE FOR NATO

The outcome was, bluntly, a disaster for NATO. Across multiple plays of the game, Russian forces eliminated or bypassed all resistance and were at the gates of or actually entering Riga, Tallinn, or both, between 36 and 60 hours.

NATO'S WAR GAMES ANACONDA 2016: PROTECTION OF THE BALTIC STATES

Vladimir Putin has now attacked neighboring countries three times, with his second invasion of Ukraine still unfolding. His pursuit of greater Russian influence along Moscow’s periphery has ended what was nearly a generation of post–Cold War peace and stability in Europe and revived legitimate fears of Moscow’s intentions among its neighbors.

After eastern Ukraine, the next most likely targets for an attempted Russian coercion are the Baltic Republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Like Ukraine, all three spent many years as component republics of the Soviet Union, gaining independence only on its dissolution.

The three are also contiguous to Russian territory. Also like Ukraine, Estonia and Latvia are home to sizable ethnic Russian populations that have been at best unevenly integrated into the two countries’ postindependence political and social mainstreams and that give Russia a self-justification for meddling in Estonian and Latvian affairs.

This storyline is disturbingly familiar. Unlike Ukraine, the Baltic states are members of NATO, which means that Russian aggression against them would trigger Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty —the collective defense provision according to which an at- tack against any signatory is considered to be an attack against all. This creates an obligation on the part of the United States and its alliance partners to be prepared to come to the assistance of the Baltic states, should Russia seek to actively and violently destabilize or out-and-out attack them.

In a September 2014 speech in the Estonian capital of Tallinn, President Barack Obama articulated and strongly affirmed that commitment: [W]e will defend our NATO Allies, and that means every Ally. . . . And we will defend the territorial integrity of every single Ally. . . . Because the defense of Tallinn and Riga and Vilnius is just as important as the defense of Berlin and Paris and London. .

Article 5 is crystal clear: An attack on one is an attack on all. . . . We’ll be here for Estonia. We will be here for Latvia. We will be here for Lithuania. You lost your inde- pendence once before. With NATO, you will never lose it again.2 Unfortunately, nei- ther the United States nor its NATO allies are currently prepared to back up the Presi- dent’s forceful words.

MILITARY GEOGRAPHY FAVORS RUSSIA

During the Cold War, NATO positioned eight Allied corps along the border between West Germany and its Warsaw Pact neighbors to the east. More than 20 allied divisions were stationed to defend that frontier, with many more plan- ned to flow in as reinforcements before and during any conflict (see Figure 1). The borders that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania share with Russia and Belarus are roughly the same length as the one that separated West Germany from the Warsaw Pact.

They are, however, defended only by the indigenous forces of the three Baltic states, which muster the rough equivalent of a light infantry brigade each. Since Russia’s invasion of Crimea, other NATO countries, including the United States, have rotated forces through the Baltics, but these have typically been in battalion strength or smaller—hardly enough to defend the republics against a plausible Russian attack.

The distances in the theater also favor Russia. From the border to Tallinn along the main highways is about 200 km; depend- ing on the route, the highway (versus crow-flight) distance to Riga is between about 210 and 275 km. From the Polish border to Riga, on the other hand, is about 325 km as the crow flies; to Tallinn, almost 600 km. And to get anywhere from Poland, NATO forces would have to transit the “Kaliningrad corridor,” a 110- to 150-km-wide stretch of territory between the Russian enclave and Belarus that could be subject to long-range artillery and flank attacks from both sides and would require a commitment of (scarce) NATO forces to secure.

The terrain in the theater is a mix, with large open areas interspersed with forested regions; lakes; and, in some places, sizeable wetlands. Off-road mobility in parts of all three Baltic countries could be difficult, especially for wheeled vehicles. There is, however, a fairly rob- ust network of roads and highways throughout, and there are few large rivers to serve as natural defensive lines and barriers to move- ment.

Our analysis sought to account for the effects on movement and combat of this variability in terrain. To be sure, Russia’s army is much smaller than its Soviet predecessor. Today, it can muster for operations in its Western Military District (MD)—the region adjacent to the Baltic states—about 22 battalions, roughly the same number of divi- sions forward deployed in the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries in 1990. These forces appear more than ade- quate, however, to overwhelm whatever defense the Baltic armies might be able to present.

German Army

CURRENT NATO POSTURE CANNOT SUPPORT ALLIANCE COMMITMENTS

Despite President Obama’s bold words in Tallinn, a series of RAND wargames clearly indicates that NATO’s current posture is inadequate to defend the Baltic states from a plausible Russian conven- tional attack. The games employed Russian forces from the Western MD and the Kaliningrad oblast—a chunk of sovereign Russian territory that sits on the northeastern border of Pol- and, along the Baltic Sea coast—totaling approx- imately 27 maneuver battalions in a short-warning attack to occupy either Estonia and Latvia or both and present NATO with a rapid fait accompli.

The strategic goal of the invasion was to demonstrate NATO’s inability to protect its most vulnerable members and divide the alliance, reducing the threat it presents from Moscow’s point of view. The scenario assumed about a week of warning, which en- abled NATO to flow some reinforcements into the Baltics— mainly light infantry units that could be speed- ily air transported, along with airpower. Tables 1–4 list the forces with which both sides were credited at D-Day—when the hostilities began.

The two sides adopted strategies that were generally similar across the games played. The Red players typically made a main effort toward the Latvian capital of Riga, with a secondary attack that quickly secured the predominantly ethnic Russian areas of northeast Estonia, and then proceeded toward Tallinn.

The NATO players, recognizing that they had woefully inadequate forces to mount anything resembling a forward defense, sought instead to use indigenous forces to delay Red’s advance along major axes while positioning the bulk of their forces in and around Tallinn and Riga in an attempt to sustain a minimal lodgment in and around the two capitals.

Four factors appeared to contribute most substantially to this result. First and obviously, the overall correlation of forces was dramatically in Russia’s favor. Although the two sides’ raw numbers of maneuver battalions—22 for Russia and 12 for NATO —are not badly disprop- ortionate, seven of NATO’s are those of Estonia and Latvia, which are extremely light, lack tactical mobility, and are poorly equipped for fighting against an armored opponent. Indeed, the only armor in the NATO force is the light armor in a single Stryker battalion, which is credited with having deployed from Germany during the crisis buildup prior to the conflict. NATO has no main battle tanks in the field.

Meanwhile, all Russia’s forces are motorized, mechanized, or tank units. Even their eight airborne battalions are equipped with light armored vehicles, unlike their U.S. counterparts. Second, Russia also enjoys an overwhelming advantage in tactical and operational fires. The Russian order of battle includes ten artillery battalions.

Type Location Qty Maneuver battalions Tank Mechanized infantry Motorized infantry Airborne Naval infantry Total Western MD Western MD Western MD Western MD Kalin- ingrad oblast 4 5 5 8 3 25 Artillery battalions Tube artillery Heavy rocket launcher Medium rocket launcher Total Western MD Western MD Western MD 3 2 5 10 Surface-to-surface missile battalions Iskander short-range ballistic missile Tochka very short-range ballistic missile Tochka very short-range ballistic missile Total Western MD Western MD Kaliningrad oblast 2 2 1 5 Mi-24 Hind attack helicopter battalion 6.

Each Russian brigade or regiment in the Western MD or Kaliningrad was assumed to be able to produce one deployable battalion tactical group for the attack. This is consistent with the pattern observed in Russian Army operations in Ukraine. The majority of Russian ground forces in Kaliningrad were assumed to be held in reserve for defense of the enclave, and were not available for offensive operations; they are not listed in this table.

France, Poland, Rafale B/C 1, Norway, Stockholm F-16C 1 Canada, Poland CF-18C/D 0.5 Denmark Poland F-16C 1 Total 18.5 a Deployed from Spangdahlem, Germany. Deployed from Aviano Air Base, Italy. We allowed some NATO combat aircraft to be based in Sweden, based on discussions with RAND colleagues who have had informal discussions with Swedish defense officials about scenarios similar to this one. Analytically, this allowed us to explore the possible value of such arrangements.

The relative abundance of bases available in Central and Western Europe, especially relative to the size of the deployed force, makes our results relatively insensitive to this assumption, although Swedish basing proved valuable insofar as it allowed NATO combat aircraft access to the battlespace that largely avoided the concentration of modern air defenses located in Kaliningrad. Deployed from Lakenheath Air Base, United Kingdom. One deployed from Lakenheath Air Base, United Kingdom.

RUSSIAN FAIT ACCOMPLI CONFRONTS NATO WITH UNPALATABLE CHOICES

Russian forces knocking on the gates of Riga and Tallinn in two or three days would present NATO leaders with a set of highly unattractive options. The leaders and people of the Baltic states, who would need to decide whether to defend their capitals, would confront the first quandary. Quality light forces, like the U.S. airborne infantry that the NATO players typically deployed into Riga and Tallinn, can put up stout resistance when dug into urban terrain. But the cost of mounting such a defense to the city and its residents is typically very high, as the residents of Grozny learned at the hands of the Russian Army in 1999–2000.

Furthermore, these forces likely could not be resupplied or relieved before being over- whelmed. Whether Estonia’s or Latvia’s leaders would choose to turn their biggest cities into battlefields—indeed, whether they should—is, of course, uncertain. The second and larger conundrum would be one for the U.S. President and the leaders of the other 27 NATO countries.

Under the best of circumstances, this would require a fairly prolonged buildup that could stress the cohesion of the alliance and allow Russia opportunities to seek a political reso- lution that left it in possession of its conquests. Even a successful counteroffensive would almost certainly be bloody and costly and would have political consequences that are unforeseeable in advance but could prove dramatic. Any counteroffensive would also be fraught with severe escalatory risks. If the Crimea experience can be taken as a precedent, Moscow could move rapidly to formally annex the occupied territories to Russia.

NATO clearly would not recognize the legitimacy of such a gambit, but from Russia’s per- spective it would at least nominally bring them under Moscow’s nuclear umbrella. By turning a NATO counterattack aimed at liberating the Baltic republics into an “invasion” of “Russia,” Moscow could generate unpredictable but clearly dangerous escalatory dynamics.

On a tactical level, a counteroffensive campaign into the Baltics would likely entail the desire, and perhaps even the necessity, of striking targets, such as long-range surface-to-air defenses and surface-to-surface fires systems, in territory that even NATO would agree constitutes “Russia.” Under Russian doctrine, it is unclear what kinds or magnitudes of conventional attacks into Russian territory might trigger a response in kind (or worse), but there would certainly be concern in Washington and other NATO capitals about possible escalatory implications.

Finally, it is also unclear how Russia would react to a successful NATO counteroffensive that threatened to decimate the bulk of its armed forces along its western frontier; at what point would tactical defeat in the theater begin to appear like a strategic threat to Russia herself?

The second option would be for NATO to turn the escalatory tables, taking a page from its Cold War doctrine of “massive retaliation,” and threaten Moscow with a nuclear response if it did not withdraw from the territory it had occupied. This option was a core element of the Alliance’s strategy against the Warsaw Pact for the duration of the latter’s existence and could certainly be called on once again in these circumstances.

The deterrent impact of such a threat draws power from the implicit risk of igniting an escalatory spiral that swiftly reaches the level of nuclear exchanges between the Russian and U.S. homelands. Unfortunately, once deterrence has failed—which would clearly be the case once Russia had crossed the Rubicon of attacking NATO member states—that same risk would tend to greatly undermine its credibility, since it may seem highly unlikely to Moscow that the United States would be willing to exchange New York for Riga.

Coupled with the general direction of U.S. defense policy, which has been to de-emphasize the value of nuclear weapons, and the likely unwillingness of NATO’s European members, especially the Baltic states themselves, to see their continent or countries turned into a nuclear battlefield, this lack of believability makes this alternative both unlikely and unpal- atable.

The third possibility would be to concede, at least for the near to medium term, Russian control of the territory they had occupied. Under this scenario, the best outcome would likely be a new cold war, with the 21st century’s version of the old “inner German border” drawn somewhere across Lithuania or Latvia. The worst be would be the collapse of NATO itself and the crumbling of the cornerstone of Western security for almost 70 years.

Cruice missiles attached to a B52 pylon

NATO NEEDS HEAVY FORCES TO DENY RUSSIA A QUICK VICTORY

In addition to assessing the viability of NATO’s current posture, our games explored enhancement options for creating a force that could deny Russia a swift victory in the first three days. Quality light forces, like the U.S. airborne infantry that the NATO players typically deployed into Riga and Tallinn, can put up stout resistance when dug into urban terrain. But the cost of mounting such a defense to the city and its residents is typically very high.

Avoiding the fait accompli is valuable because it begins to present Russia with the risk of a conventional defeat and thereby is at least the beginning of a more credible deterrent. On the one hand, Russia today looks to its northwest and sees little between its forces and the Baltic Sea but highway and the prospect of forcing NATO into the three-sided corner described above.

Our goal was to devise a posture that would present an alternative landscape: one of a serious war with NATO, with all the dangers and uncertainties such an undertaking would entail, including the likelihood of ultimate defeat at the hands of an alliance that is mater- ially far wealthier and more powerful than Russia. Nations can be tempted or can talk themselves into wars that they believe will be quick, cheap, victories that are “over by Christmas” but, historically, are far less likely to choose to embark on conflicts that they expect to be protracted, costly, and of uncertain outcome.

We set out to identify at least one plausible NATO posture that would change Moscow’s calculus in this scenario from the former to the latter. Our results strongly suggest that a posture that could credibly deny the fait accompli can be achieved without fielding anything like the eight corps that defended NATO’s Cold War border with the Warsaw Pact. A total force of six or seven brigades, including at least three heavy brigades, backed by NATO’s superior air and naval power and supported by adequate artillery, air defenses, and logistics capabilities, on the ground and ready to fight at the onset of hostilities appears able to avoid losing the war within the first few days.

Not all these forces would need to be forward stationed. Given even a week of warning, NATO should be able to deploy several brigades of light infantry to the Baltics. Soldiers from the U.S. 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team in Italy and the 82nd Airborne Division in North Carolina could be airlifted in within a few days, as could similar units from other NATO countries, including the United Kingdom and France. U.S. Army combat aviation assets rotationally based in Germany could self-deploy to provide some mobile antiarmor firepower, but by and large, these fast-arriving forces would be best suited to digging in to defend urban areas. In our games, the NATO players almost universally chose to employ them in that way in and immediately around Tallinn and Riga.

What cannot get there in time are the kinds of armored forces required to engage their Russian counterparts on equal terms, delay their advance, expose them to more frequent and more-effective attacks from air and land-based fires, and subject them to spoiling counterattacks. Coming from the United States, such units would take, at best, several weeks to arrive, and the U.S. Army currently has no heavy armor stationed in Europe. America’s European allies have minimal combat-ready heavy forces.

At the height of the Cold War, West Germany fielded three active corps of armored and mechanized units; today, its fleet of main battle tanks has shrunk from more than 2,200 to around 250. The United Kingdom is planning on removing all its permanently stationed forces from Germany by 2019; currently, only one British brigade headquarters, that of the 20th Armoured Infantry, remains in continental Europe, and the British government is committed to its withdrawal as a cost-saving measure. The quickest-responding NATO heavy armor force would likely be a U.S. combined arms battalion, the personnel for which would fly in and mate up with the prepositioned equipment of the European Activity Set stored in Grafenwoehr, Germany.

Getting this unit into the fight is a complicated process that will not be instantaneous. Breaking out the equipment—24 M-1 main battle tanks, 30 M-2 infantry fighting vehicles, assorted support vehicles—preparing it for movement, transporting it by rail across Poland, offloading it, and roadmarching it forward into the battle area are unlikely to take less than a week to 10 days.

Providing adequate heavy armor early enough to make a difference is the biggest challenge to NATO’s ability to prevent a rapid Russian overrun of Estonia and Latvia. It is critical to emphasize that this relatively modest force is not sufficient to mount a forward defense of the Baltic states or to sustain a defense indefinitely. It is intended to keep NATO from losing the war early, enabling but not itself achieving the Alliance’s ultimate objectives of restoring the territorial integrity and political independence of its members. But it should eliminate the possibility of a quick Russian coup de main against the Baltic states, enhancing deter- rence of overt, opportunistic aggression.

There are several options for posturing the necessary heavy forces, each carrying different combinations of economic costs and political and military risks. For example, NATO could permanently station fully manned and equipped brigades forward in the Baltic states; could preposition the equipment in the Baltics, Poland, or Germany and plan to fly in the soldiers in the early stages of a crisis; could rely on rotational presence; or could employ some combination of these approaches. The next phase of our analysis will explore a range of these options to begin assessing their relative strengths and weaknesses.

It is unclear whether denial of the prospect for a rapid victory would suffice to deter Russia from gambling on an attack on the “Baltic three,” were it inclined to contemplate one. What seems certain is that NATO’s current posture, which appears to offer Moscow the opportunity for a quick and relatively cheap win, does not. It is also important to point out that, critical though they are, maneuver brigades are insufficient in and of themselves. Armor and infantry battalions must be adequately supported with artillery, air defense, logistics, and engineering.

Over the past 15 years, the Army has reduced the amount of artillery organic to its divisions and has essentially stripped out all air defense artillery from its maneuver forces. Further, there are presently no fires brigades in Europe able to augment the modest number of guns at the brigade and battalion level. This is in marked contrast to Russian tables of organization and equipment, which continue to feature substantial organic fires and air defense artillery, as well as numerous independent tube and rocket artillery and surface-to-air missile units.

This disparity has had substantial impacts in our wargames. In one instance, in which NATO was playing with an enhanced force posture, the Blue team sought to use a U.S. armor brigade combat team (ABCT) to fight what was in essence a covering force action to delay the advance of a major Russian thrust through Latvia. A critical element of such a tactic is the use of fires to cover the maneuver elements as they seek to disengage and move back to their next defensive position.

In this case, however, the ABCT was so thoroughly outgunned by the attacking Red force, which was supported by multiple battalions of tube and rocket artillery in addition to that of the battalion tactical groups themselves, that the battalion on one flank of the brigade was overwhelmed and destroyed as it sought to break contact, and the rest were forced to re- treat to avoid the same fate. The lack of air defenses in U.S. maneuver forces showed up in another game, in which two arriving NATO heavy brigades were organized into a counter- attack aimed at the flank of a Russian thrust toward Riga.

Because the Russian Air Force is sufficiently powerful to resist NATO’s quest for air superi- ority for multiple days, the Red team was able to create “bubbles” in space and time to launch massed waves of air attacks against this NATO force. The absence of short-range air defenses in the U.S. units, and the minimal defenses in the other NATO units, meant that many of these attacks encountered resistance only from NATO combat air patrols, which were overwhelmed by sheer numbers.

The result was heavy losses to several Blue battalions and the disruption of the counter- attack. This highlights a critical finding from our analysis: A successful defense of the Baltics will call for a degree of air-ground synergy whose intimacy and sophistication recalls the U.S. Army–U.S. Air Force “AirLand Battle” doctrine of the 1980s.

The games have repeatedly identified the necessity for allied ground forces to maneuver within the envelope of friendly air cover and air support and for ground fires to play an integral role in the suppression campaign against Russia’s advanced surface-to-air defenses.

Against an adversary, such as Russia, that poses multidimensional threats, airpower must be employed from the outset of hostilities to enable land operations, and land power must be leveraged to enable airpower. Preventing a quick Russian victory in the Baltics would also require a NATO command structure able to plan and execute a complex, fast-moving, highly fluid air-land campaign.

This is not something that can safely be left to a pickup team to “do on the day”; it requires careful preparation. What cannot get there in time are the kinds of armored forces required to engage their Russian counterparts on equal terms, delay their advance, expose them to morefrequent and more-effective attacks from air- and land-based fires, and subject them to spoiling counterattacks.

NATO corps that defended the inner German border during the Cold War each possessedadmittedly to different degrees in some cases, the ability to plan for and fight the forces they would command in wartime. Tactical and operational schemes of maneuver were developed and rehearsed; logistics support was planned; the reception, staging, and onward integration of reinforcing forces were laid out and, if never practiced in full, tested to an extent that lent confidence that procedures would work reasonably well when called upon.

Traditionally, the level of planning called for in the initial phase of the defense has been the province of a U.S. corps. At the height of the Cold War, two Army corps under the operational command of 7th Army had planning responsibilities for Europe; today, none do.

The Army should consider standing up a corps headquarters in Europe to take responsibility for the operational and support planning needed to prepare for and execute this complex combined arms campaign, as well as a division headquarters to orchestrate the initial tac- tical fight, to be joined by others as forces flow into Europe.

Follow-on operations to rel- ieve and reinforce the initial defense and restore the prewar borders could well require at least one additional corps headquarters, which could be provided by a NATO partner or drawn from one of the Alliance’s nine preexisting corps.

THE PRICE OF DETERRING DISASTER

For more than 40 years, NATO’s member states made enormous investments to deter a potential Soviet attack on Western Europe. Today, the West confronts a Russia that has violently disrupted the post–Cold War European security order. Led by a man who has characterized the fall of the Soviet Union as the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century, Russia has at the very least put on hold the vision of a “Europe whole and free.” To the extent that Moscow believes that NATO poses a threat to its ability to exercise necessary influence along its periphery, the presence of the Baltic NATO members along its borders may well seem unacceptable.

Since the early 1990s, the United States and its NATO partners have shaped their forces based on the belief that Europe had become an exporter of security, and for more than two decades that assumption held true. Unfortunately, the usually unspoken accompanying assumption—that the West would see any disruption to that status quo coming far enough in advance to reposture itself to meet any challenge that might emerge—appears to have missed the mark. Instead, Russia’s aggressiveness and hostility have caught NATO still resetting itself in a direction that is making it less prepared to deal with Moscow’s behavior.

All members should reassess their force structures and postures with an eye toward deter- mining whether there are affordable near-term actions that can be taken that could in- crease the Alliance’s capability to respond to a threat to the Baltics and thereby strengthen deterrence of such a threat. These measures need not be limited to strictly military ones.

For example, one challenge NATO would face in the event of a Baltic crisis would be moving heavy equipment and supplies from storehouses and ports in Western Europe east to Pol- and and beyond. A successful defense of the Baltics will call for a degree of air-ground synergy whose intimacy and sophistication recalls the U.S. Army–U.S. Air Force “AirLand Battle” doctrine of the 1980s.

Substantial investments may be necessary to facilitate these flows, investments that becau- se they also benefit the civilian economy— may prove more politically palatable than direct expenditures on troops and weapons. But troops and weapons are also needed, and it verg- es on disingenuous for a group of nations as wealthy as NATO to plead poverty as an excuse for not making the marginal investments necessary to field a force adequate at the very least to prevent the disaster of a Russian coup de main.

Buying three brand-new ABCTs and adding them to the U.S. Army would not be inexpen- sive—the up-front costs for all the equipment for the brigades and associated artillery, air defense, and other enabling units runs on the order of $13 billion. However, much of that gear—especially the expensive Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles—already exists.

Some is available due to recent cuts in Army force structure; there is also equipment in long-term storage, and some could be transferred from Reserve Component units, if needed. So, although there may be some costs to procure, upgrade, or make serviceable existing equipment—as well as to transition units from one type to another—it is likely much less than $13 billion.

The annual operating and support costs for three ABCTs plus enabling units—the price tag to own and operate the units—are roughly $2.7 billion.23 That is not a small number, but seen in the context of an Alliance with an aggregate gross domestic product of more than $35 trillion and combined yearly defense spending of more than $1 trillion, it is hard to say that it is a fortiori unaffordable,24 especially in comparison to the potential costs of failing to defend NATO’s most exposed and vulnerable allies—of potentially inviting a devastating war, rather than deterring it.

It can be hoped that Russia’s double aggression against Ukraine is the result of a unique confluence of circumstances and that it does not portend a more generally threatening approach to the West. However, President Putin clearly appears to distrust NATO and harbor resentments toward it. His rhetoric suggests that he sees the Alliance’s presence on Russia’s borders as something approaching a clear and present danger to his nation’s security.

Aggressive acts, angry—even paranoid— rhetoric, and a moderate but real military buildup combine to signal a situation where it may be less than prudent to allow hope to substitute for strategy. Taking measured steps to bolster NATO’s defensive posture in the Baltic states is not committing the United States and Europe to a new Cold War and does not signal irreversible hostility toward Russia. It is instead due diligence that sends a message to Moscow of serious commitment and one of reassurance to all NATO members and to all U.S. allies and partners worldwide.

The first step to restoring a more-robust deterrent is probably to stop chipping away at the one that exists. If NATO wishes to position itself to honor its collective security commitment to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, its members should first hit the pause button on further steps that reduce its ability to do so.

Methodology and Data: The research documented in this report was conducted in a series of wargames conducted between the summer of 2014 and early spring 2015. Players included RAND analysts and both uniformed and civilian members of various Department of Defense organizations, including the U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, Joint Staff, U.S. Army in Europe, and U.S. Air Forces, Europe, as well as NATO Naval Command, Europe.

RAND developed this map-based tabletop exercise because existing models were ill-suited to represent the many unknowns and uncertainties surrounding a conventional military campaign in the Baltics, where low force-to-space ratios and relatively open terrain meant that maneuver between dispersed forces—rather than pushing and shoving between opposing units arrayed along a linear front—would likely be the dominant mode of combat.

THE UNITED STATES

DangeroU.S. Polarization!

"We believe that the United States might not be able to control it's internal emotions as a Nation (6.1.21) and therefore risk taking the wrong decitions in foreign politics. This dangerous polarization can have a catastrophic concequence for the people of the world. It happened in Vietnam and with Afghanistan and it can happen again with the Peoples republic of China!"

In the name of Human Dignity.

The Russian withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 was an orderly and dignified affair. In sharp contrast to the withdrawal of the United States and NATO forces withdrawal of the same country 31.8.2021 which is a shameful and degrading experience which left thousands of people stranded waiting for their certain execution by the Taliban. Afghanistan became the mountain on which Western logic was pulverized.

Warning lamps Flashing!

And now. Warnings lamps are flashing, as nuclear powered nations seek to preserve an imagined threshold over an even more imaginary enemy. The people who brought us complete shame in Afghanistan are the very same people who now have control over the keys to the depots in Europe that store B61-12 thermo nuclear bombs. The collapse of Western logic in Afghanistan is the fuse which can bury Human Dignity.

Dear friends and readers,

The U.S. Federal Government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic exposes incompetence and decay. The conse-quences will play out over years to come. The COVID-19 crisis augurs three water-sheds: the end of Europe’s inte-gration project, the end of a united, functional America, and the end of the implicit social compact between the Chinese state and its citizens. As a result, all three powers will em-erge from the pandemic internally weakened, undermining their ability to provide global leadership.

CLICK ON FLAG PLAY ANTHEM

The Corona Virus is Accelerating America’s Decline!

We have been living for some time in a G-minus-2 world of poor leadership by the U.S. and China.

Europe

Start with Europe. As with the 2010-12 eurozone crisis, the bloc’s fault line today runs through Italy. Drained over decades of dynamism and fiscally fragile, it is too big for Europe to save and too big to let fail. During the pandemic, Italians have felt abandoned by their European partners at a moment of existential crisis, creating fertile ground for populist politicians to exploit. The images of Bergamo’s COVID-19 victims being carried in body bags by military convoy to their anonymous, unaccompanied burials, will long remain etched in the Italian collective psyche.

Meanwhile, when addressing how to help pandemic-stricken member states, the European Union’s technocratic, ostrich-like elites lapse into the institutional alphabet soup — ECB, ESM, OMT, MFF and PEPP — that has become their default language. The continent’s leaders have faltered and dithered, from European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde’s apparent gaffe in March — when she said that the ECB was “not here to close spreads” between member states’ borrowing costs — to the bickering over debt mutualization and COVID-19 rescue funds and the reluctant, grudging incrementalism of the latest agreement.

Suppose, as seems likely, that the successful economies of the EU core recover from the crisis while those on the bloc’s periphery falter. No political integration project can survive a narrative featuring a permanent underclass of countries that do not share their neighbors’ prosperity in good times and are left to their own devices when calamity strikes.

The U.S.

The United States’ decline, meanwhile, is over-predicted and under-believed. Even before the COVID-19 crisis, key U.S. institutions signaled decay: the incontinent presidency of Donald Trump, a gerrymandered Congress, a politicized Supreme Court, fractured federalism and captured regulatory institutions (with the U.S. Federal Reserve being an outstanding exception).

Deep down, however, many of those Americans who see the decay reject the thesis of decline. They remain convinced that the country’s thick web of non-state institutions and underlying strengths including its universities, media, entrepreneurial spirit, and technological prowess, as well as the global supremacy of the dollar — provide the resilience America needs to maintain its pre-eminence.

But so far, the world’s richest country has been by far the worst at coping with the pandemic. Although the US has less than 5% of the world’s population, it currently accounts for about 24% of total confirmed COVID-19 deaths and 32% of all cases.

In rapid succession, therefore, America’s credibility and global leadership have been buffeted by imperial overreach (the Iraq war), a rigged economic system (the global financial crisis), political dysfunction (the Trump presidency), and now staggering incompetence in tackling COVID-19. The cumulative blow is devastating, even if it is not yet fatal.

Many of these pathologies in turn stem from the deep and poisonous polarization in US society. Indeed, Trump is now goading his supporters into insurrection. Come November, even the basic democratic criterion of holding free and fair elections could end up being flouted. Of course, it would be alarmist and premature to see America’s far-reaching failures in the face of the COVID-19 crisis as threatening U.S. democracy or nationhood. But clinging adamantly to American exceptionalism at such a time seems like dangerous denialism.

P.R.China

Finally, there is China. Since the time of Deng Xiaoping, the country has thrived on a simple, implicit agreement: citizens remain politically quiescent, accepting curbs on freedom and liberties, and the state — firmly under the control of the Communist Party of China — guarantees order and rising prosperity. But the COVID-19 crisis threatens that grand bargain in two ways.

First, the Chinese authorities’ terrible initial handling of the pandemic, and in particular their catastrophic suppression of the truth about the COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan, has called the regime’s legitimacy and competence into question. After all, the social contract looks less attractive if the state cannot guarantee citizens’ basic well-being, including life itself. China’s true COVID-19 death toll, which is almost certainly higher than the authorities are admitting, will eventually come to light. So, too, will the stark contrast with the exemplary response to the pandemic by the freer societies of Taiwan and Hong Kong.

Second, the pandemic could lead to an external squeeze on trade, investment, and finance. If the world deglobalizes as a result of COVID-19, other countries will almost certainly look to reduce their reliance on China, thus shrinking the country’s trading opportunities. Similarly, more Chinese companies will be blocked from investing abroad, and not just on security grounds — as India has recently signaled, for example. And China’s Belt and Road Initiative — its laudable effort to boost its soft power by building trade and communications infrastructure from Asia to Europe — is at risk of unraveling as its pandemic-ravaged poorer participants start defaulting on onerous loans.

The COVID-19 crisis will therefore probably hurt China’s long-term economic prospects. Widespread internal rumblings have begun, even if they are less evident externally. Domestic disorder is unlikely, because President Xi Jinping could ratchet up repression even more ruthlessly and effectively than he already has. But the current social contract will seem increasingly Faustian to the average Chinese citizen.

Command of resources is a prerequisite for power. But, as international-relations theory reminds us, projecting power beyond one’s borders requires a modicum of cohesion and solidarity within them. Weak, fractured societies, no matter how rich, cannot wield strategic influence or provide international leadership — nor can societies that cease to remain models worthy of emulation.

We have been living for some time in a G-minus-2 world of poor leadership by the U.S. and China. Both have been providing global public “bads” such as trade wars and erosion of international institutions, instead of public goods such as stability, open markets, and finance. By further weakening the internal cohesion of the world’s leading powers, the COVID-19 crisis threatens to leave the world even more rudderless, unstable, and conflict-prone. The sense of three endings in Europe, America, and China is pregnant with such grim geopolitical possibilities.

中國的法律權利

China's Legal Rights

Dear friends and readers. Public security is the cornerstone of China. The Motherland has the legal right to enforce law and order in the backyard of Hong Kong in its own territory. No permission from any other country is required. In the West, this is neither well understood nor popular. The naivety of the West is political oppression and propaganda from the perspective of "democracy" and "rights." Hong Kong is the motherland, and there is only one! The United States should take care of its own human rights and black citizen issues before sanctioning "every other" country in the world. Have a nice day, cheers!

FASCISM IN AMERICA

"That which has happened is a warning!"

Karl Jaspers

"To forget it is guilt. It must be continually remembered. It was possible for this to happen. And it remains possible for it to happen again at any minute. Only in knowledge can it be prevented."

Karl Theodor Jaspers German, Born 23 February 1883, passed away on 26 February 1969, was a German-Swiss psychiatrist and philo-sopher who had a strong influence on modern theology psychiatry, and philosophy. After being trained in and practicing psychiatry, Jaspers turned to philosophical inquiry and attempted to discover an innovative philosophical system. He was often viewed as a major exponent of existentialism in Germany, though he did not accept the label.

The Stealthy Civil War OF

the United States

Polarization of the American society has become more evident under president Donald J Trump.

Dear friends and readers!

We have become aware of the violent culture underpinning American politics of today, even though such incidents are usually not acknowledged or reported, but often repressed and denied. The outcome of the first American civil war fought from 1861 to 1865 decided who should be included in the winner’s club and steer the new nation into the future.

HISTORY REPEATS ITSELF

The second American civil war, which is fought in our own time by stealth, is deciding who shall not be included in the winner’s club. It is against these two contradictory scenarios that many of the violent political deaths that has occurred in the United States speak more clearly to us, stand out in a way we have not realized before and warn us.

Stay vigilant folks. Help fight terrorism, domestic and foreign. Report suspicious incidents to the authorities. Have a blessed day, cheers!

NEVILLE AT CAPITOL HILL

THE DESTRUCTIVE FORCE OF

THE AMERICAN PARTITOCRACY

He came, went, and lost. Gravely misunderstanding his oppo-nent’s narrative, naively showing off a piece of paper which had the support of the parties and his Government. People rejoiced little Adolf's signature. Surrounded by the masses, Prime Minister Chamberlain appeared confident indeed!

A deal was reached on 29 September, and at about 1:30 a.m. on 30 September 1938, Adolf Hitler, Neville Chamberlain, Benito Mussolini and Édouard Daladier signed the Munich Agreement. On 30 September, upon his return to Britain, Chamberlain delivered his controversial "peace for our time" speech to crowds in London.

With a typical laid-back self-reassuring British flair, the parties had for years argued back and forth weather little Adolf on the other side of the secure Channel was worth taking seriously. And in the meantime, little Adolf released a few tricks himself, he had hidden upon his sleeves; a provocative gesture here, a threat there. Never mind that, the parties said, we have enough Port to ride off that. The dictatorship of the self-reassuring, democratic partitocracy was in swing! The very safety valve which Democracy was dependent on, failed to open. And as a result, thousand of Londoners perished in flames, and all hell brought lose. Neville’s ghost!

He came, stayed, and lost. Gravely misunderstanding his oppo-nents narrative, naively showing off his ball-cap with the inflammatory message, “Make America Great Again”. The masses rejoiced! On the Capitol Hill, Tom and Nancy, Chuck, and Mitch meant it well; with paper in hand each side proclaimed a moment of victory, futile as it was. Nine days after the Capitol was nearly burned down to the ground, these same representatives of the United States self-proclaimed, dysfunctional Democracy are still debating what to do with little Adolf, who just might have another trick hidden upon his sleeves. We have no guarantee that he has not.

Capitol Hill, the very safety valve which the Democracy of the United States is dependent on has not opened. It imploded. Neville’s shadow again! The German-Swiss psychiatrist and philosopher Karl Jaspers once uttered, “If it has happened once, it can happen again. To forget it guilt.”

In these desperate days, when we failed Democracy, we know for certain that it did happen again! You can’t blame little Adolf. It was the system that failed, Tom and Nancy, Chuck, and Mitch. Every one of them held up a piece of signed paper in their hands. And with it, brought Capitol down. Little Adolf will disappear, and Capitol must be rebuilt from the inside out. Ore, we might all go down in flames!

01/07/2021 12:00 AM EST

Statement of Acting Attorney General

Jeffrey A. Rosen

“Yesterday, our Nation watched in disbelief as a mob breached the Capitol Building and required federal and local law enforcement to help restore order. The Department of Justice is committed to ensuring that those responsible for this attack on our Government and the rule of law face the full consequences of their actions under the law. Our criminal prosecutors have been working throughout the night with special agents and investigators from the U.S. Capitol Police, FBI, ATF, Metropolitan Police Department, and the public to gather the evidence, identify perpetrators, and charge federal crimes where warranted. Some participants in yesterday’s violence will be charged today, and we will continue to methodically assess evidence, charge crimes and make arrests in the coming days and weeks to ensure that those responsible are held accountable under the law.”

Our leaders are not qualified to bring Mankind safely forward

1938 REVISITED?

One mistake, and the world as we know it is gone. One slightest error, and the civilization that we so proudly and arrogantly cling to will dissolve into fine dust encircling our desolated planet.

But, that fact does not seem to bother anyone. Wrapped in hyper-logic exasperations of the most desolated sort, mankind is rapidly drifting towards its own disintegration; proclaimed by rational world leaders as “a sustainable future” with “zero emission”. It is all a lie!

There is no “sustainable future” and “zero emission” is a fantasy product presented, while death and destruction are filling our lungs.

And I am not referring to the ongoing pandemic. Not at all. That, after all, is a minor incident in the Grand drama. In 1993 I went with the Norwegian-owned buoy-tanker Anna Knutsen from Antwerp in the Netherlands to the Statfjord C buoy on the Norwegian side. We collected 200.000tons of crude and brought it back to Teesside in England. There are twenty and more tankers shuttling up to Norway every month collecting crude. Each of these giants evaporate enough carbon-gas to destroy life in a small town. Multiply that with 2000, because that is the daily gift of poisonous vapor which Norway, in all it’s green, self-proclaimed hype, gives back to mankind. Just a thought.

Here is another one. In 2003 I visited Fushun in North-East China. What’s so interesting about Fushun, you might ask? Fushun is the place of the Ping Ding Massacre. The one that Japan committed towards the local, Chinese population there. But, again, that is a minor incident in the Grand drama. For centuries Fushun’s West Pit has been the largest open-pit coal mine in Asia. It contributed greatly to China’s new prosperity, before it was shut down in 2019.

We will accept any solution – and I underline “any” – to advance the economy. We will even burn down the Rain Forrest in Brazil. The common longue of renewable oxygen in the world. While lame European Union and the United States watch by and do nothing.

We are on the edge of an unfathomable deep abyss. From where there is no hope of survival. Just as it was in 1938 in the German Reich. They believed in the cause and failed. We believe in our cause, and we are failing. Again. These days as we are living are the days of 1938 revisited.

Our leaders are not qualified to bring mankind safely forward. Covid-19 has proved that. We are going down on a first-class ticket with no possibility of return.

PAGE UNDER CONSTRUCTION

CONTINUES BELOW EMPTY SPACE

P. R. OF CHINA

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Xi Jinping, -our Chinese Dream

Xi and Communist Party ideologues coined the phrase "Chinese Dream" to describe his overarching plans for China as its leader. Since 2013, the phrase has emerged as the distinctive official ideology of the party leadership under the great leader Xi Jinping.

China’s Rights in the South China Sea, and it's Maritime Borders, must they be Respected?

Ancient China claims soverign rights to all of South China Sea. Must this be respected by the United States, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philipines and the world? Start a constructive, friendly and sustainable dialogue with the ancient and proud Chinese people.

Click and Play: Spratley Islands

Shooting 2D seismic in Transition Zone 1 Hendijan North of the Persian Gulf. PC2000 seismic project in Iranian waters was the world's largest 2D seismic project at the time. Three seismic vessels, two Norwegian vessels and one Iranian vessel took part.

Mehdi Mirmoezi President of the National Iranian Oil Company NIOC, Deputy Minister of Petroleum. The interview took place in the Headquarter of the National Iranian Oil Company in Tehran. Petrofilm: creating Dialogue and Common Ground.

Click and Play: The National Iranian Oil Company NIOC

Mohammad Hossein Adeli PhD was Deputy Foreign Minister of Economic Affairs in President Mohammad Khatami's Govern- ment. He was the Governor of the Central Bank in President Hashemi Rafsanjani's Government. Ambassador to Ottawa and Tokyo. He is founder of the Ravand Eco- nomic Forum and Secretary General of Gas Exporting Countries Forum. A Petrofilm Dialogue interview.

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TOTAL South Pars Logistic Base on the free trade Kish Island Iran. Petrofilm Interview

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China's Guard of Honor join Russia's V-Day parade

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庆祝中国人民解放军建军90周年阅兵

PLA 90TH BIRTHDAY Click and Play

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I.R. IRAN FIRST ROUND

August 7 2018 First round Reimposing certain sanctions with respect to Islamic Republic of Iran

READ SANCTIONS LIST

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BLOCKED PERSONS LIST

Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List

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COMPANIES LEAVING

Click and PlayForeign Department

The Deputy Foreign Minister for Economic Affairs and former Governor of the Central Bank, Ambassador to Tokyo and Ottawa, His Excellency Hossein Adeli PhD and Harald Dahle after a one hour long filmed interview in the Foreign Department.

Hossein Adeli Harald Dahle

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Hossein Adeli

Manouchehr Mottaki Harald Dahle

Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki in President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad's Gov-ernment talks with Harald Jan Dahle about the various currencies Iran uses when trading. At one time Motttaki was leading Iran's nuclear negotiations.

Ali Ahani about Iran Norway relations

Ali Ahani Harald Dahle

Hello friends,

Without serious dialogue and common ground, there can be little hope for progress. Where there are clear disregard for humanistic values and human lives, real peace is not possible.

It is not enough to "talk peace", one also has to live a humanistic life. Who are we? We have to show the other side who we are and what values we adhere to.

Unlimited economic growth is not ad-visable, our natural resources are under severe threat. The increasing global warming should be our number one con-cern, for future generations.

In order to solve these common chal-lenges, we need to seriously focus on easing tensions and find common ground. Let Albert Schweitzer's words, "Reverence for Life" be our guiding light!

Have a good day!

Harald J. Dahle Founder DialogueNow

Six years in the the Islamic Republic of Iran followed by 14 years research.

Creating Dialogue and Common Ground with the Islamic Republic of Iran as an al-ternative to sanctions and war.

Altogether I spent five years in Iran, and using the following fourteen years working on the subject.

Meeting Hossein Adeli Ph.D.

HE Hossein Adeli Ph.D. had been Governor of the Central Bank in President Rafsanjan-is Government. When I met him in 2002 and 2003, he was Deputy Foreign Minister for Economic Affairs in the Foreign Depart-ment Tehran when Dahle met him.

Adeli is founder of the Rawand Institute, and economic think-tank. He as reveived the highest order of the Rising Sun from the Emperor Akhito of Japan himself. Adeli has also been Ambassador to Tokyo as well as to Ottawa.

Meetings in the Foreign Ministry in Tehran

"Hello Dr. Adeli.."

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"Welcome Mr. Dahle..."

"Please have a seat.."

"Thank you"

"On a scale from one to ten,

who has been the best person to be interviewed by you?"

"You, Dr. Adeli, and without a doubt, you are the clear winner, scoring ten points!"

Mr. Dahle turns to the cameraman who gives his approval, as well!

"Ha, ha, ha, thank you so much Mr. Dahle!"

"Our economy in Iran has a rising curve, and"

"when I sat as Governor of the Central Bank,

in President Rafsanjani's Government."

"many of the economic reforms that we applied at the time became a sucsess later."

"There are many conflicts in the world, and we don't want to see that the one who is stronger takes the gun and shoot."

"The general policy of Iran is to have a friendly relation with every country in the world including the United States,"

"Provided that this kind of relationship would be based on an equal footing, on a mutual beneficial sort of relationship"

President of the People's Republic of China His Excellency Jang Semin and President of the Islamic Republic of Iran Mohammad Khatami togheter in April 2002 on the State visit of Jang Semin.

"BIN HAI 517" IN FUJAIRAH-SHARJAH

CNPC BGP "BIN HAI 504"

TZ-1 MUDFLATS WITH CHRIS FARLOW

TZ-1 SHALLOW WATER SHOOTING

RUSSIAN FEDERATION

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Vladimir Putin

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Click and Play: Interview with Willy Wimmer 2

Der Gute Helmut

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DEUTSCHLAND

INDUSTRY 4.0 GERMANY'S 4TH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

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Macron: Europe must defend itself

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"Europe can no longer rely on the United States for its security. It is up to us to guarantee European security," Mr. Macron told an audi-ence of some 250 diplomats, law-makers and international relations experts on August 27.

His comments follow US President Don-ald Trump repeatedly distanced himself from the NATO military alliance, which groups the United States with most of Europe and has underpinned European security since World War II.

Macron's comments are likely to find support in EU powerhouse Germany after Foreign Minister Heiko Maas made a similar call for boosted military coop-eration last week. Writing in the Han-delsblatt newspaper, Maas called for Europe to "take an equal share of the responsibility" and "form a counter-weight" to Washington as Europe-US relations cool.

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Europe has becomme a Vassal of the United States and is in many areas not Master in it's own House.

CLICK RUSSIAN EMPIRE LOGO

Greater Coat of Arms of the Russian Empire

Russia to Ural is an integrated part of the European plain.

PETROFILM AT THE AVIASTAR PLANE FACTORY IN ULYANOVSK RUSSIA

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Outside factory; inside assembly line.

Iranian deal without the US: Delegation makes visit to Moscow to forge new agreement

Sergey Viktorovich Lavrov

Seen here is a picture of Jean-Claude Juncker, Presiden of the European Com-mission, Vladimir Putin President of the Russian Federation, and Angela Merkel, Chancellor of Germany.

"We welcome gas to Europe from Nord Stream 1 and 2." Harald Dahle

Junker Putin Merkel

NORD STREAM 1 AND 2

With Nord Stream 1 and 2 Russia has be-come an an even larger supplier of beutiful Russian gas to Western Europe, to the dismay of the United States.

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TOTAL halts $2 billion gas project in Iran

French oil giant Total is preparing to pull out of Iran to avoid risking US sanctions. The company said on Wednesday that it was unable to proceed with a $2 billion project to develop the country's giant South Pars gas field.

Patrick Pouyanné

In a statement, Total said it "will have to unwind all related operations" before November 4, unless it's granted a speci-fic waiver by US authorities that would protect it against sanctions. In a deal first signed in late 2016, Total agreed to operate the South Pars project with a stake of 50.1%.

THE SOUTH PARS PROJECT PETROPARS LTD

President of Petropras Ltd. A. Turkan talks with Harald Dahle about South Pars phase 6, 7, and 8.

A Turkan Harald Dahle

Partners in the project are TOTAL and Chinese state oil company CNPC.

TOTAL SUPPLY BASE ON KISH

Harald Dahle right at the TOTAL supply base on Iranian Kish island Iran

The TOTAL supply base on Kish was the very first enterprice that I encountered. I had flown in the night before, pitch black, found a hotel and had started from scratch. I stayed on Kish for the next three weeks and took part in one seminar and two conferences.

Norway's rather slow startup

Minister of Energy and Oil in Norway Einar Steensnes talks to Harald Jan Dahle about Norway-Iran relations.

The last country in Europe to open up relati-ons with the Islamic Republic. Austria has had Diplomatic relations since 1872 and trade since the sixteenth Century.

Einar Steensnes Harald Dahle

Minister of Energy & Oil in Norway His Ex-cellency Einar Steensnes receive filmed int-erviews which Harald Jan Dahle made in the Islamic Republic of Iran. (C)2003 Petrofilm

Einar Steensnes Bijan N Zangeneh

Mohajerani, Khatami: Dialogue among civilizations.

The seminar was a writers seminar in regi of International Pen, the world asso- ciaion of writers. The first conference was on Iran's Free Trade Industrial Zones, and the second was in regi of Seyyed Ata'ollah Mohajerani.

The Iranian writer journalist and author served as Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance of Iran under President Mohammad Khatami until 2000 when he was re-signed from office for alleged permis-siveness. He also served as the speaker of the cabinet during that time. He later became the president of the Iranian International Centre for Dialogue among Civili zations, but resigned from the post.

Harald Dahle Captain Steward

Vision of Iran below: Harald Dahle's Grand Dialogue Project in the I. R. of Iran

Harald Jan Dahle is promoting his grand dia- logue project Vision of Iran, while MJF Con-tract Director Reza Shaeri looks on. Picture is from the Kish University on the free trade zone Kish island Iran forty minutes by plane from Dubai.

Reza Shaeri Harald Dahle

THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN

HE Mohammad Ali Abtahi Vice President in President Khatami's Government talks with Harald Jan Dahle about the relation betwe-en the Leader and the President and more.

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M. Ali Abtahi Harald Dahle

Vice President HE Mohammad Ali Abtahi in President Khatamis Government is intervie- wed during a filmed session in the Center for Multireligious Studies in Tehran.

THE PETROLEUM MINISTRY

HE Bijan Namdahr Zangeneh

Bijan Namdahr Zangeneh Photo H Dahle

MY TRAVEL ROUTES IN THE GULF

PC2000 SEISMIC PROJECT

HENDIJAN TRANSITION ZONE 1 ON THE MUDFLATS

"BANG!!!"

The geophone is sticking up on the left side and records the seismic vibrations.

STRAIT OF HORMUZ

Petrofilm Television Documentary Special

THE FUTURE OF EUROPE IN SPACE

FROM THE GEMINI 10 CAPSULE

Harald Dahle introduces his TV Space Docu mentary from NASA's Gemini 10 capsule.

Participating in the program, the Euro- pean Space related industries, the Eu- ropean Space Agency, the Centre nat- ional d'études spatiales, CNES the Ari- ane launcher program and NASA with it's space programs.

SCIENTIFIC ANIMATION

Animation of two intersecting Impact Craters

Asteroid evaporates two cities in a blink of an eye.

Los Alamos scientist Galen Gisler and I did this asteroid impact in the ocean simulation together while he was head of Faculty of Mathematical Studies & Geological Processes at the University of Oslo, Norway.

LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY ASTEROID SIMULATION

Click and Play THE NORWEGIAN VERITAS

Director of Intergrated Petroleum Risk Man-agement, IPRM DNV Mr. Kennish left, with Director Egil Olbjorn DNV right. Petrofilms Harald Jan Dahle inbetween.

ROCKWELL AUTOMATION

Buoy tanker Anna Knutsen on Statfjord C

SHOOTING SEISMIC IN TZ-1 Hendijan Iran

Chris protects ears during shootings, with another geophone in action below.

Chris and myself on the mudflats in TZ-1 Hendyjan North of the Persian Gulf. Chris is the on-site seismic Manager with base on board Bin Hai 504, picture below.

BIN HAI 517 IN SHARJAH UAE

Center

THE UNITED STATES

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Joe Biden 46th President of the United States

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B-52's from Barksdale AFB land in Qatar

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US ARMED FORCES ANTHEMS

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US MARINES CORPS ANTHEM

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CNPC's Bureau of Geophysical Prospec-ting BGP's Headquarter Hendijan north of the Persian Gulf.

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CNPC BGP representative in Hendijan

CNPC TRAILER CAMP HENDIJAN

In North of the Persian Gulf lies the BGP trailer camp. Click and Play

Below left is Harald Dahle at the CNPC BGP trailer camp at Hendijan Norh of the Persian Gulf Iran

CNPC TAKES OVER FOR TOTAL

China’s top oil and gas company CNPC is considering taking over Total’s stake in thew giant Iranian South Pars gas project if the French company leaves Iran to comply with any new U.S. sanc-tions, industry sources said.

Total signed the $1 billion deal to devel op the South Pars gas field in July. The contract gave CNPC the option to take over Total’s stake if it pulled out, accord- ing to sources involved in the talks.

The deal was the first major Western energy investment in the Islamic Repub- lic since international sanctions, includ- ing most of those imposed by the Unit ed States, were lifted as part of a land mark agreement in 2015 over Iran’s nuclear program.

RULE BRITANNIA

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Vice Admiral Horatio Nelson, 1st Viscount Nelson, 1st Duke of Bronté

FRIEDERICH II

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King of Prussia Friederich 2nd

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY HABSBURG EMPIRE

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The National Anthem of Schlesien

SCHLESIEN SILESIA

Silesia is a region of Central Europe located mostly in Poland, with small parts in the Czech Republic and Germany. Its area is about 40,000 km², and its population about eight million people.

OBERSCHLESIEN

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CHILE, PRUSSIA Gloria March Click & Play

CHINA*S MEGA PROJECT

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The Trinity Supercomputer

Trinity ATS-1 is a supercomputer at Los Alamos National labora-tory in New Mexico. It was built as the first Advanced Technology System for the National Nuclear Security Administration NNSA.

As of November 2017 Trinity is standing at the 7th rank among the most powerful supercomputers in the world, after an upgrade with Intel “Knights Landing” Xeon Phi process-ors, while it debuted in November 2015 at 6th.

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Stockpile stewardship LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY

Most work for stockpile stewardship is under taken at United States Department of Energy National lab-oratories.

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Mostly at Los Alamos National Labora-tory, Sandia National Laboratory, Law-rence Livermore National Laboratory, the Nevada Test Site and the Depart-ment of Energy production facilities.

Sierra Supercomputer

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All together these reserach facilities em-ploys around 27.500 personnel and cost billions of dollars each year to operate.

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THE UNITED STATES AND GLOBAL OIL

The big gap between what the United States now produces and what it con-sumes, nearly 10 million barrels a day, is simply too wide to be bridged.

The oil market is seamless and is largely driven by supply and demand. Middle Eastern supplies affect the price of Mid-dle Eastern oil, yes, but also the price of global oil.

And while the United States can and should conserve energy and develop alternate energy sources, the gap be-tween what the United States now pro-duces and what it consumes, nearly 10 million barrels a day, is simply too wide to be bridged.

THE NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY, N.I.O.C

President of NIOC, HE Mehdi Mirmoezi, Depty Minister of Oil, talks with Harald Jan Teodor Dahle about the situation in NIOC, the Persian Carpet 2000 seismic project and the co-operation with Nor-way's medium sized oil company Statoil.

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Harald Dahle Mehdi Mirmoezi

Harald Jan Dahle with the President of the National Iranian Oil Company and Deputy Minister of Oil, His Excellency Mehdi Mirmoezi, May 19 2002.

NIOC EXPLORATION DEPARTMENT

Director General of NIOC Exploration Department HE Mohammad Mohaddes talks to Harald Jan Dahle.

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Mohammad Mohaddes Harald Dahle

THE NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY GEOPHYSICAL DEPARTMENT

Director General of NIOC's Geophysical Department HE Mojtaba Khorasani talks with Harald Jan Dahle about NIOC and the Persian Carpet 2000 seismic project.

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Mojtaba Khorasani NIOC

THROUGH THE MARSHES

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BIN HAI 504 CLOSING DOWN FOR THE DAY, CHRIS FARLOW

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France 24 interview with HE Foreign Minister Manoucher Mottaki.

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Hussein Nassiri Harald Dahle

Hussein Nassiri, Advisor to President Director of Iran's Free Trade Economic Zones and Harald Jan Dahle.

Noghrehkar Shirazi Photo H Dahle

Iran's Ambassador to Oslo, Norway, His Excellency Noghrehkar Shirazi is here seen leaving the Headquarters of Nati-onal Iranian Oil Company NIOC in Tehr-an, June 2003. Bellow Harald Jan Dahle in meeting with NIOC Kala Naft NIOC's domestic supplier of oil and gas.

Harald Dahle Amanpour KALA NAFT

SHOOTING SEISMIC IN TZ-1

Geo Mariner roll-out of seismic line

Below, Bin Hai 517 seismic lines

Start of the Persian Carpet 2000 seismic project; towards Kish Island while the Iranian seismic vessel Pejwak (former Norwegan vessel Geco Eco) is seen in the horizon.

PERSIAN GULF IRAN "FULL THROTTLE"

to the Geo Mariner meeting point

CNPC BGP BIN HAI 504

CNPC BIN HAI 504 HAI SHI 1

BIN HAI 504 DATA ROOM

HENDIJAN: WE STRUCK OIL

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THE BIG HENDIJAN ANTICLINE

NIOC GEOPHYSICS DEPT.

BUSHEHR LAST STOP BEFORE DUBAI, DECEMBER 2000

Arriving Bushehr dead tired after one month being on board the ships Bin Hai 504, Bin Hai 517, Hai-Shi 1, Geo Mariner, Pejwak and Odin Explorer.

CNPC BGP HQ HENDYJAN

BIN HAI 517

GEO MARINER PERSIAN GULF

In 1984 Petrofilm created the epic FPSO Petrojarl 1 concept video, which made headlines. The video contributed to a ten year production contract with the Norwegian oil company Norsk Hydro on the Oseberg Field, the Norwegian side of the North Sea.